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NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Supreme Court Case No. 48132
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professional service corporation,
Defendants-Appellants,
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as

cvo 1-19-20686
Case N o. - - - - - - - - Category: A. A.
Fee: $221.00

Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff,
vs.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR
EJECTMENT AND OTHER RELIEF

LAW OFFICE OF VERNON K. SMITH,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company;
VERNON K. SMITH LAW, PC, an Idaho
professional service corporation,
Defendants.

COMES NOW the above-named plaintiff, Noah G. Hillen, the duly appointed
Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith, by and through his undersigned
counsel, and hereby alleges a Verified Complaint for Ejectment and other relief as follows:
I.
1.

PARTIES

Noah G. Hillen ("Plaintiff') is the Personal Representative of the Estate of

Victoria H. Smith (the "Estate") in that certain matter styled as In re Estate of Victoria H Smith,

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AND OTHER RELIEF - 1
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Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352, in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the state of
Idaho, in and for the county of Ada.
2.

On or about June 2, 201 7, the Honorable Judge Cheri C. Copsey entered an

Order on Motion Under Rule 70(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Vesting All Real and
Personal Property of the Estate in the Personal Representative ("Rule 70 Order") under which the
Court transferred to Plaintiff any and all personal property or real property which had been
transferred by the Estate to Vernon K. Smith, Jr. ("Vernon") since July 4, 2012. A true and correct
copy of the Rule 70 Order and subsequent judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
3.

Upon information and belief, Law Office of Vernon K. Smith, LLC, is an

Idaho limited liability company conducting business in the state of Idaho, county of Ada.
4.

Upon information and belief, Vernon K. Smith Law, PC is an Idaho

professional service corporation conducting business in the state of Idaho, county of Ada, and is
the successor to the Law Office of Vernon K. Smith, LLC.
5.

The Law Office of Vernon K. Smith, LLC and Vernon K. Smith Law, PC

are hereinafter collectively the "Defendants."
6.

This action is being pursued against Defendants, who are subject to these

proceedings given their status as possessors and/or occupiers of real property owned by Plaintiff.
II.

7.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Defendants are subject to the jurisdiction of this Court for the causes of

action set forth herein.
8.

This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's causes of action against

Defendants.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AND OTHER RELIEF - 2
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9.

The damages and/or property claimed herein and/or at issue here exceed the

minimum jurisdictional requirements of this Court.
10.

Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to Idaho Code Section 5-401, et. seq.

in that Ada County is the county in which the Premises (defined below) is located.
III.

11.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is the owner and the party with legal standing to care for and

otherwise maintain certain real property located in Ada County commonly known as 1900 W.
Main St., Boise, Idaho (the "Premises"), which property is less than five (5) acres.
12.

The value of the Premises is greater than $10,000.00.

13.

Defendants are in possession of that portion of the Premises identified

14.

Defendants have failed to timely pay the demanded monthly rent.

15.

On September 11, 2019, Plaintiff caused to be served upon Defendants, at

above.

the Premises, a Thirty (30) Day Notice of Termination of Lease (the "Termination Notice") which
terminated whatever right Defendants had, if any, to occupy or otherwise possess the Premises
effective October 31, 2019, and which demanded Defendants vacate the premises no later than
October 31, 2019. A true and correct copy of the Termination Notice is attached hereto as
Exhibit B.

16.

Defendants refuse to vacate or otherwise surrender possession of the

Premises by October 31, 2019, and continue to occupy and possess the same.
17.

Defendants' occupation of the Premises beyond October 31, 2019 was and

continues to be unlawful and without the permission of Plaintiff.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AND OTHER RELIEF - 3
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18.

Plaintiff, as the rightful owner of the Premises, is entitled to possession

thereof.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF:
COUNT ONE: EJECTMENT

19.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegations as though restated in

20.

Plaintiff owns the Premises.

21.

Defendants are in possession of the Premises.

22.

Defendants have refused to surrender possession of the Premises to Plaintiff

full.

following demand via the Termination Notice.
23.

Defendants' continued holding of the Premises entitles Plaintiff to

immediate possession of the Premises via ejectment of Defendants.
COUNT TWO: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT/QUIET TITLE

24.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegations as though restated in

25.

Idaho Code Section 6-401 provides for "[a]ctions to quiet title" and states,

full.

in pertinent part, that "[ a]n action may be brought by any person against another who claims an
estate or interest in real property ... adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse
claim."
26.

Idaho Code Section 10-1202 provides that "[a]ny person interested under a

deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract or any oral contract, or whose
rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or
franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AND OTHER RELIEF - 4
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instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or
other legal relations thereunder."
27.

Idaho Code Section 10-1201 provides for "[d]eclaratory judgments" and

goes on to state that "[ c]ourts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to
declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.
No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or
decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and
such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree." Idaho Code Section
10-1205 provides that "[t]he enumeration in Sections 10-1202, 10-1203 and 10-1204, does not
limit or restrict the exercise of the general powers conferred in Section 10-1201, in any proceedings
where declaratory relief is sought, in which a judgment or decree will terminate the controversy or
remove an uncertainty."
28.

Idaho Code Section 10-1208 provides that "[f]urther relief based on a

declaratory judgment or decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper."
29.

Defendants, who once held possession of the Premises with permission of

one of the Estate's heirs which Plaintiff believes was wrongful, now remains in possession of the
Premises with no legal right thereto, and is claiming an interest in real property owned by Plaintiff.
30.

Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment decreeing and declaring that

Defendants have no right to occupy or possess the Premises and for such other and further relief
as this Court deems appropriate.
COUNT THREE: TRESPASS

31.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegations as though restated in

full.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AND OTHER RELIEF - 5
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32.

Plaintiff is the lawful owner of the Premises.

33.

Plaintiff has made demand upon Defendants to cease and desist from their

trespassing on and unlawful occupation of the Premises.
34.

Defendants have failed and refused to cease and desist from their

trespassing on and unlawful occupation of the Premises.
35.

Defendants' continued and unauthorized trespass upon and use of the

Premises has caused and will cause damage to Plaintiff because it interferes with Plaintiffs use
and enjoyment of the Premises.
36.

Defendants' continued and unauthorized trespass upon and use of the

Premises has caused and will cause further damage to Plaintiff because Plaintiff is unable to lease
the Premises to a paying tenant.
37.

Plaintiff has been damaged by Defendants' trespass in an amount to be

proven at trial.
COUNT FOUR: UNJUST ENRICHMENT

38.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegations as though restated in

39.

Defendants have incurred a benefit by remaining in possession of the

full.

Premises with no lawful right thereto and without paying remuneration.
40.

Defendants have appreciated that benefit by possessing the Premises and

remaining in such possession despite demand to vacate from Plaintiff.
41.

Defendants' acceptance of the benefit of possession of the Premises is

inequitable because Defendants' have not paid for their past and continued use of the Premises.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AND OTHER RELIEF - 6
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42.

Plaintiff is entitled to the amount by which Defendants have been unjustly

enriched.
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS

43.

In order to prosecute this action it has become necessary for Plaintiff to

retain the services of the law firm of Givens Pursley LLP. A reasonable fee for said firm's services
in the event that Defendants fail to appear and contest this matter would be the sum of $1,000, and
such further amounts as the Court may deem reasonable should Defendants appear and contest this
matter.
44.

Pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-120, 6-324, and/or 6-31 lA, and any

other applicable statutes, rules, regulations, or law, Plaintiff is entitled to recover his costs and
attorneys' fees incurred in prosecuting this action.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as follows:
1.

For a Judgment in favor of Plaintiff on all counts of the foregoing

2.

For the specific relief sought in each Count of the foregoing Complaint;

3.

For and order of restitution of the Premises to Plaintiff, free of any and all

Complaint;

claims thereto by Defendants;
4.

For an Order of this Court directing that a Writ be issued, without further

notice, to the Sheriff of Ada County, to accomplish the restitution;
5.

For an award of Plaintiffs costs and attorneys' fees incurred herein, such

attorneys' fees to be the sum of $1,000 if Judgment is entered by default or a reasonable amount
if the matter is contested; and

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AND OTHER RELIEF - 7
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6.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

DATED this 13th day of November, 2019.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By Isl Randall A. Peterman
Randall A. Peterman- Of the Firm
Alexander P. McLaughlin - Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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VERIFICATION
ST ATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

NOAH G. HILLEN, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

I have read the foregoing VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AND
OTHER RELIEF, know the contents thereof and that the same are true to the best of my
knowledge, information, and belief.

Noah G. Hillen

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /

j

+1,day of November, 2019.

NO~~RY PUlr<!C_FOR ID~fIO,

Res1dmg at lJ:5__111sf. ~
My Commis-s-io=n.,,._E_x_p_ir'-l-~-s - ffi
-~- a-- 7-,-r}- D;l '{
•

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AND OTHER RELIEF - 9
Page 14

14791783.1

EXHIBIT A

Page 15

FllED

e
Fourtlh Judicna~ rnstiruct.• Ada Countv
CHRI S OPHER D. RICH., C~errk
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•

Tyler Atkinson 6/2/2017 at 2:49 PM

I

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
VICTORIA H. SMITH,

Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352
ORDER ON MOTION UNDER RULE
70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, VESTING ALL
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
OF THE ESTATE IN THE PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE

Deceased.

THIS MATTER came before the Court upon the Motion for Relief under Rule
70(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure ("Motion"), filed by Noah Hillen as Special
Administrator ("Special Administrator") on March 30, 2017. Vernon K. Smith, Jr. filed an
Objection ("Objection") to the Motion on April 6, 2017.

No other objection was filed.

A hearing regarding the Motion and Objection occurred on May 5, 2017, at which time the Court
considered the arguments of the parties, then granted the Motion.
The Court granted the Motion on May 5, 2017, under the authority granted it
under Rule 70(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Noah Hillen, as Personal Representative
is of the Estate ("PR" or "Personal Representative") is hereby granted the right and authority to

ORDER ON MOION UNDER RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
VESTING ALL REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE IN THE PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE- I
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execute or have notarized any and all documents necessary to carry out the purpose of this Order,
and to take any actions as necessary to carry out the purpose of this Order.
On May 25, 2017, Noah Hillen's appointment as a Special Administrator was
terminated, and Mr. Hillen was appointed as the Personal Representative of the Estate. As a
result, this Order conveys the properties to Mr. Hillen in his status as a Personal Representative
rather than a Special Administrator.
Accordingly, Judgment will be entered, pursuant to Rule 70(b) of the Idaho Rules
of Civil Procedure.
DATED this 2nd day of June, 2017.

The Honorable~. Copsey
District Judge
Signed: 6/2/2017 10:27 AM

ORDER ON MOION UNDER RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
VESTING ALL REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE IN THE PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE - 2
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Signed: 6/2/2017 02:49 PM

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _ _day of June, 2017, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing ORDER ON MOTION UNDER RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, VESTING ALL REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE
ESTATE IN THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE to be served by the method indicated
below, and addressed to the following:
RANDALL A. PETERMAN
ALEXANDERP.MCLAUGHLIN
Givens Pursley LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
P .0. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701
Attorneys for Noah G. Hillen, Special
Administrator

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 345-1129
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Deli very
[X] Email/ iCourt:
rap@givenspursley. corns

VERNON K. SMITH, JR.
Attorney at Law
1900 West Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Personal Representative of Estate of Vernon K.
Smith, Sr. and attorneys for David Gibson

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/ iCourt: vl 59@live.com

RORY JONES and ERICA JUDD
P.A.
th
225 North 9 Street, #820
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Attorneys for Vernon K Smith, Jr.

[ ] U.S. Mail
( ] Facsimile: (208) 331-1529
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email/ iCourt: rj nes@idalaw. om;
ejudd@idalaw.com

ALLEN B. ELLIS
ELLIS LAW, PLLC
12639 West Explorer Drive
Boise, Idaho 83 713
Attorneys for Joseph H Smith

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

JONES, GLEDHILL, FURMAN

Ronald L. Swafford
Swafford Law, PC
655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401
Attorneys for Sharon Bergmann

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 345-9564
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/ iCourt: aelli @a:elli law.com

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 524-4131
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email / iCourt:
r n @ warn rdlaw.com

ORDER ON MOION UNDER RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
VESTING ALL REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE IN THE PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE-3
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Courtesy copy provided to:
Victoria Anne Converse
10548 NW Skyline Blvd.
Portland OR 97231

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

ROBERT MAYNES
Maynes Taggart, PLLC
P.O. Box 3005
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83403
Attorneys for Walker Land & Livestock, LLC

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 524-6095
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

Darrell G. Early
Office of the Attorney General
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83 706
Attorneys for State ofIdaho Department of
Environmental Quality

[X]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile: (208) 373-0481
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

ORDER ON MOION UNDER RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
VESTING ALL REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE IN THE PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE-4
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EX HI BIT B
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THIRTY (30) DAY NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF LEASE AND/OR TENANCY
TO:

Law Office of Vernon K. Smith, LLC, Vernon K. Smith Law, PC and all occupants
of the Premises.

DESCRIPTION OF PREMISES: 1900 W. Main Street, Boise, Idaho (herein described as the
'Premises").
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the month-to-month lease, tenancy or other
occupancy agre ment ("Lease ) for the Premises between The Estate of Victoria H. Smith
(' Landlord") and the Law Office of Vernon K. Smith LLC, Vernon K. Smith Law PC or any
of each's predecessors, successors or assigns (collectively, "Tenant") shall terminate on October
31 , 2019, and Tenant must vacate the Premises no later than October 31, 2019.
Until such time as the Lease terminates Tenant must continue to perform all of
the terms and conditions of the Lease, including payment of rent and any other amounts due to
Landlord.
Please be advised that that nothing herein constitutes a waiver, release or estoppel
of any and all rights, remedies claims d D nses, actions or complaints the Landlord has or may
later have, all of which are hereby expressly reserves.
DA TED this 11th day of September, 2019.
THE ESTATE OF VICTORIA

H.

SMITH

£ n&@{
ByN!)G
Its: Personal Representative

THIRTY (30) DAY NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF LEASE AND/OR TENANCY -1
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DECLARATION OF SERVICE

To:
Law Office of Vernon K. Smith, LLC, et al.

For:
Givens Pursley LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
Boise, ID 83701-2720

Received by Tri-County Process Serving LLC on September 11, 2019 to be served on LAW OFFICE OF
VERNON K. SMITH, LLC AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS OF THE PREMISES.
I, Jordan Johnson, declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the foregoing
is true and correct.

On Wednesday, September 11, 2019, at 4:37 PM, I served the within named Law Office of Vernon K.
Smith, LLC by delivering a true copy of the Thirty (30) Day Notice of Termination of Lease and/or
Tenancy to Vernon K. Smith, Registered Agent, a person authorized to accept service on behalf of Law
Office of Vernon K. Smith, LLC. Said service was effected at 1900 W. Main St., Boise, ID 83702.
Approximate description of Vernon K. Smith
I hereby acknowledge that I am a Process Server in the county in which service was effected. I am over the
age of eighteen years and not a party to the action.

Our Reference Number: 177878
Client Reference:
Saturday, September 14, 2019

TRI-COUNTY PROCESS SERVING LLC
P.O. Box 1224
Boise, ID, 83701
(208) 344-4132
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To:

DECLARATION OF SERVICE

Law Office of Vernon K. Smith, LLC, et al.
For:
Givens Pursley LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
Boise, ID 83701-2720

Received by Tri-County Process Serving LLC on September 11, 2019 to be served on VERNON K. SMITH
LAW, PC AND ALL OTHER OCCUPANTS OF THE PREMISES.
I, Jordan Johnson, declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the foregoing
is true and correct.

On Wednesday, September 11, 2019, at 4:37 PM, I served the within named Vernon K. Smith Law, PC by
delivering a true copy of the Thirty (30) Day Notice of Termination of Lease and/or Tenancy to Vernon K.
Smith, Registered Agent, a person authorized to accept service on behalf of Vernon K. Smith Law, PC. Said
service was effected at 1900 W. Main St., Boise, ID 83702.
Approximate description of Vernon K. Smith

I hereby acknowledge that I am a Process Server in the county in which service was effected. I am over the
age of eighteen years and not a party to the action.
Our Reference Number: 177879
Client Reference:
Saturday, September 14, 2019

TRI-COUNTY PROCESS SERVING LLC
P.O. Box 1224
Boise, ID, 83701
(208) 344-4132
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2
3

4

Vernon K. Smith
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
ISB No. 1365
Tel. (208) 345-1125
Fax:(208) 345-1129
vkslaw@live.com

DEC 16 2019
PHIL McGRANE, Clerk
By HEATHER HOVET
DEPUTY

5
6

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

7

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

8
9

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Case No. CV0l-19-20686

10

Plaintiff,
ANSWER TO VERIFIED
COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT
AND OTHER RELIEF

11

V.

12

LAW OFFICES OF VERNON K. SMITH,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company; VERNON K. SMITH LAW, PC, an Idaho
Professional service corporation,

13
14

Defendants.
15
16

COMES NOW, the Defendants above named, Law Offices of Vernon K. Smith, LLC,

17

(having been previously converted into the current PC) and Vernon K. Smith Law, PC, (the

18

current PC) and for Answer to the Complaint on file herein, through their attorney, Vernon K.

19

Smith, does hereby respond and allege as follows:

20

FIRST DEFFENSE

21

The D~fendartts (hereafter collectively referred to as "Defendants") deny each and every

22

allegation set forth and contained in Plaintiffs (hereafter "Hillen") Verified Complaint for

23

Ejectment and Other Relief, not otherwise specifically admitted herein.··

24

SECOND DEFENSE

25

That Hillen does not have the standing to bring this action as a titled owner against the

26

Defendants, being an entity owned by Vernon K. Smith (hereafter "Smith"), who is the real

iiiiiiiiiiiiiii

=
~

en
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party in interest and source of Defendants' presence on the within described Premises; that
2

Hillen is not the true and lawful owner of the Premises identified in the Verified Complaint, as

3

the statute and case law does unequivocaliy place vested title and ownership with heirs and

4

devisees of a decedent, not with an Estate or a personal representative, as declared by LC. § 15-

5

3-101 and case law as identified hereinafter; th~t title to estate property passes to heirs (in an

6

Intestate estate) and to deyisees (in a Testate Estate) at the time of death of the decedent, as a

7

matter of law, subject only to the possible subsequent divestiture if necessary in the

8

administration of the estate by the exercise of the power granted to a personal representative by

9

LC. § 15-3-711, to satisfy creditors, of which there are none in this Estate. The "Official
Estates descend at death to successors identified by

10

Comment to LC. § 15-3-101,, 1, states

11

any probated will, or to heirs if no will is probated, subject to rights which may be implemented

12

through administration." The heirs obtain and retain title, subject only to divestment of their

13

title by the personal representative's exercise of the § 15-3-711 power, as limited by a required

14

determination that such divestment of the heir's ownership interest in estate property becomes

15

necessary for the administration of the estate for the benefit of creditors or other interested

16

parties. There were no estate creditors, and Hillen is attempting to act in excess of his

17

statutorily-conferred authority by claiming the effect of the magistrate's Rule 70(b) Order made

18

him the sole "owner" of the estate property, when such effect would divest the heirs of all

19

statutorily-conferred title in the estate property, inconsistent with "Copsey Order".

20

if it were to be perceived Magistrate Copsey had the intention to eliminate Vernon K. Smith's

21

(Smith) interest as an heir of the estate established under the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) and

22

subject to the authority of I.C. § 15-3-101, Magistrate Copsey would face a serious Judicial

23

Cannon of Ethics violation, as no authority exists to eliminate the interest of an intestate heir

24

derived under LC. § 15-3-101, and Lemp v. Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 401, 184 P. 222, 223 (1919)

25

has declared "The administrator or executor is not the owner of any part of the estate.

26

Magistrate Copsey would not commit to the intentional violation of the Idaho Code of Judicial
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That

2

Conduct and the Judicial Cannon of Ethics.
2

A judge acting in excess of statutorily-conferred authority has been addressed in State v.

3

Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 195 P.3d 731 (Ct. App. 2008) where that Court addressed the issue

4

as follows:
[C]ourts and lawyers sometimes say that a court lacked jurisdiction when they
really mean simply that the court committed error because the action that was
taken did not comply with governing law. For example, our appellate courts have
referred to a lack of "jurisdiction" when perhaps· more precisely meaning-that a
motion or complaint was not timely filed, that a condition precedent to the right to
file the action was not satisfied, or that governing statutes or court rules did
not authorize the particular decision made by the court. (citations omitted)
146 Idaho at.375, 195 P.3d at 734 (bold/underlined emphasis added).

5
6

7

8
9

Armstrong cited California's Supreme Court decision in People v. American Contractors
11

Indemnity Co., 33 Cal.4th 653, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 93 P.3d 1020 (2004) as further by-state

12

authority, confirming when a court acts contrary to the authority conferred by statute, it has

13

acted in excess of its jurisdiction. 146 Idaho at 376, 195 P.3d at 735. Idaho's Supreme Court,

14

in State v. Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326, 329 n.3, 246 P.3d 979, 982 n.3 (2011) acknowledged the

15

Idaho's Court of Appeal's decision in Armstrong, and confirmed the result in State v. Vaughn,

16

156 Idaho 13, 15, 319 P.3d 497, 499 (Ct. App. 2014) and State v. Steelsmith, 154 Idaho 577,

17

580 n.2, 288 P.3d 132, 135 n.2 (Ct. App. 2012).

18

Hillen's claim is inconsistent with the UPC which confers only a right of possession (to
only holds it in trust

19

a personal representative (PR)) and a "power" over estate property. A PR

20

for the parties entitled to it, subject to the purposes of administration"; and as established in

21

Lemp v. Lef!Zp, 32 Idaho 397, 401, 184 P. 222, 223 (1919), the law and authority remains clear

22

in Idaho a PR cannot own the property.

23

A PR may obtain possession only within the limitations of an objective necessity for the

24

benefit of estate creditors and other interested persons (LC. § 15-3-711). In the exercise of this

25

power under the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), Hillen is subject to liability for his actions taken

26

in excess of his statutory authority (LC. § 15-3-607), and personally liable in money damages
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3

1

for breach of his fiduciary duties (LC. § 15-3-712).

2

That Hillen has alleged no factual basis to support any need to exercise possession under

3

the UPC, there are no estate creditors and the estate tax has been paid; that a PR, by LC.§ 15-3-

4

711, has limited authority to take possession, but when doing so, is taken in trust however, for

5

the benefit of creditors and other interested in the estate.". There are no estate creditors, estate

6

taxes were paid, and Smith is a 2/3rds heir and interested party in the estate, and will obtain this

7

Premises upon closure of the Estate.
THIRD DEFENSE

8
9

1. That "Defendants" named herein are collectively referred to by Hillen as Law Office of

IO

Vernon K. Smith, LLC, and Vernon K. Smith Law, PC; however, the LLC was converted to the

11

professional corporation named Vernon K. Smith Law, PC, wholly owned by Smith, resulting in

12

one entity, not two;

13

2. That Smith individually holds the possession of the Premises, continuously for the past

14

almost fifty (50) years (commenced in 1971); the PC was formed in 2019, and operated by

15

Smith and through Smith's possession of the Premises and his 2/3rds ownership of the Premises

16

at present and since September 11, 2013, pursuant to I. C. §15-3-101, upon the death of his

17

Mother, the Decedent, Victoria H. Smith; that Smith, being an heir of Decedent, is vested with

18

2/3rds ownership of Decedent's assets immediately upon death.

19

3. A PR cannot hold title to the property of a decedent, as a matter of Idaho law (See Lemp

20

v. Lemp above); that Smith holds the title to 2/3rds of the entire 1900/1902 complex, of which

21

Hillen was allowed possession of the 1902 building (still vacant for over two years, remaining

22

in the same unfinished state of renovation as when taken by Hillen), the back apartments (of

23

which some are rented) and the upstairs of the main building (periodic rental), while Smith has

24

possession of the first floor of the main building, with Smith having less than 20% of the usable

25

space, while owning 66.66% (2/3rds) of the entire complex.

26
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4

·l

4. That Smith, as an heir, received a I/3 rd interest upon the death of the Decedent, and

2

thereafter received the I/3 rd interest of his sister, Victoria Ann Smith Converse, by assignment,

3

giving Smith the 2/3rds vested and titled ownership of all interests of Decedent.

4

5. That the Estate .is currently administered by Hillen, whose actions are limited to the

5

authority granted by the UPC, limiting Hillen' s power to obtain possession of property within

6

an estate only as needed to satisfy creditor claims against the estate, subject to his fiduciary

7

obligations and trust responsibilities; that in the absence of creditor claims, Hillen has failed to

8

demonstrate a legitimate basis to take possession of this remaining 20% of the useable space

9

within the Premises from Smith; that Hillen is attempting to do so without naming Smith as a

1o

necessary and indispensable party, contrary to the rules of civil procedure; that these

n

"Defendants" do not "possess" the Premises, but rather operate through Smith's possession,

12

who has the vested and titled ownership interest as described above.

13

6. That Smith is a necessary and indispensable party to this action brought by Hillen, as

14

required by Rule 19, IRCP; that Smith claims an interest relating to the subject of the action

15

pursuant to his ownership interest; that Defendants object to this failure that Hillen has failed to

16

name Smith as a defendant in this action, knowing his vested right in the Premises.

17

7. That Hillen has failed to state a cause of action against Defendants for which any relief

18

can be granted, subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12, IRCP, as the PC operates through

19

Smith, and neither Defendant had any arrangement or agreement with the Decedent or the

20

Estate, and are n~ither a trespasser nor in any state of unlawful detainment.

21

8. That the UPC mandates heirs receive an "in-kind distribution of assets" to every extent

22

possible; that Smith is entitled to retain this Premises as what will remain to be his share of

23

Estate assets; that no creditor interests exist to demonstrate necessity to take any further

24

property; that the PR has submitted the estate tax return and payment, in fact, even overstating

25

the estate interests, from which a claim will be processed against Hillen, personally, constituting

26
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5

1

a further factual basis to remove Hillen for his persistent mis-feasance, malicious accusations,

2

and on-going malfeasance.

3

9. That Hillen has a fiduciary duty to serve and protect the successor interests of the

4

Decedent by statute; that Hillen has a fiduciary duty owned to Smith, a 2/3rds heir to the assets

5

of the Estate; that Hillen is without any factual basis to justify any basis to take total possession

6

of this Premises, as Smith will receive the entire complex as among his distributive share of the

7

Estate assets.

8

FOURTH DEFENSE

9

1. That Hillen' s Complaint fails to set· forth any factual basis demonstrating any necessity

IO

to take possession of this femaining portion of the 1900 Main St. Premises, and failing

11

demonstration of any such necessity to exercise any power to take possession, Hillen's

I2

complaint lacks any factual allegations to support any legal basis to seek to eject Smith's

13

professional corporation from the Premises, whose theoretical presence exists and operates only

14

through Smith's possession of the remaining portion of the Premises; that Hillen's procedural

15

defects constitute an absolute bar t.o this action, as Hillen has failed to name Smith as a

16

necessary and indispensable party to this proceeding, required by the Idaho Rules of Civil

17

Procedure, and Hillen has failed to state a cause of action against any Defendants for ejectment,

18

as the entity occupancy is derived through Smith, the 2/3rds owner thereof, and no relief can be

19

granted against Defendants; that the assertion that Hillen claims to be the sole and exclusive

20

owner of the Decedent's property, by reliance upon an Order on its face is in contradiction of

21

the statutory provisions and case law renders the Rule 70(b) Order inferior and defective, when

22

entered by the magistrate on June 2, 2017, being a clear disregard of the statute, case law, and

23

authority that prohibits a PR from owning any estate property, rendering such Order ineffective

24

and inferior to the statutory authority and case law of Idaho.

25
26
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6

FIFTH DEFENSE
2
3

As and for an answer to those allegations set forth in Category 1, entitled "PARTIES",
Defendants respond to those allegations as follows:

4

1. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 1 thereof, Defendants state the

5

former LLC identified therein was converted in 2019 into the current PC; that Defendants

6

acknowledge Hillen is the current Personal Representative (PR) of the Estate of Victoria H.

7

Smith (Estate), Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352, Fourth Judicial District Court, Ada County,

8

Idaho.

9

2. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 2 thereof, Defendants state said

10

."Order" of the magistrate, entered June 2, 2017, under Rule 70(b), IRCP, has no enforceability

11

to any extent it contradicts the statutory provisions and case law identified within these

12

responsive pleadings; that the enforcement of said "Order" cannot defeat or exceed the vested

13

interests estat,lished by, statute and case law; that said "Order" is subordinate to the provisions

14

of the statute by virtue of the Uniform Probate Code, I. C. §15-3-101 and the established case

15

law cited herein; that all property interests of the decedent immediately transferred to and

16

became vested in the heirs upon the death of the decedent, which occurs immediately upon

17

death of the decedent, once identified to be property interests of the decedent; that nothing

18

within the administration of the Estate can cause any divesture or defeat the vested interests

19

established by statute and case law, and as an absolute bar to this action as alleged, a PR cannot

20

own estate property. See e.g., Lemp v. Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 401, 184 P. 222, 223 (1919) ("The

21

administrator or executor is not the owner of any part of the estate; that He, in his official

22

character, only holds it in trust for the parties entitled to it, subject to the purposes of

23

administration.").

24

That to any extent the allegations set forth in Paragraph 2, to the effect the Order" of the

25

magistrate is the superior or superseding authority, seeking to alter the ownership of the assets

26

of the decedent, such allegations are denied; that the creation of the statutory rights and
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7

supporting case law that vests the interests of the heirs is superior to any inferior "Order" of a
2

magistrate; that as alleged above, Hillen has failed to identify the true party in interest, being

3

Smith, the 2/3rds vested owner of the Premises, as Smith has not been included as a named

4

defendant in Hillen' s Verified Complaint, being a necessary and indispensable party; that Hillen

5

has furthermore failed to properly describe the Premises, as he already has been allowed

6

possession to approximately 75-80% of the dimensional floor space of the 1900 Main St

· 7

Complex, having left vacant die entire 1902 strµcture, taking no action to complete the

8

restoration that had been commenced by Smith, thereby failing to generate income, the sole

9

claim he used to take possession before; that the 1900 Main St Complex consists of numerous

10

structures, the three facilities previously possessed by Hillen include the upstairs apartments (#3

11

and 4) on the second floor of 1900 Main St facility, the back apartments (5 thru 8), and 1902

12

Main St. facility, taken by Hillen in 201 7, of which the 1902 building has remained vacant the

13

entire time, generating no income, but preventing Smith's continued renovation of that facility,

14

despite the bogus claims for taking possession, serving only to prevent Smith's completion of

15

the renovation for Smith's future needs; that this prior possession has been the result of the

16

wasteful, malicious, irresponsible, and inept administration by Hillen, whose objective has been

17

to jeopardize Smith's interests, as there are no creditors.

18

That the "Order" entered by the assigned magistrate, Cheri C. Copsey, remains subject

19

to the pre-emptive effects of the Uniform Probate Code, I. C. §15-3-101, and controlling case

20

law an administrator or executor (PR) cannot own any part of the estate;

21

a decedent's assets become vested interests of the heirs of the Estate, of which Smith, is a 2/3rds

22

heir and vested owner upon the death of the decedent; that Smith's 2/3rds interest is statutorily

23

"vested" not founded or impaired any "Order" of a magistrate court; that ownership is

24

statutorily mandated by I. C. §15-3-101, interpreted and confirmed by Fairchild v. Fairchild,

25

106 Idaho 147 (1984), and Ellmaker v. Tabor, 160 Idaho 576, 377 P.3d 390, (2015), and

26

prohibiting any ownership by a PR as identified in Lemp v. Lemp cited above.

that ownership of
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8

In support of this denial, Defendants state all assets of a decedent ''vest" in the heirs
2

immediately upon the date of death, not to any Estate, or PR, or administration process, as I. C.

3

§15-3 .. 101 states:
"15-3-101. Devolution of estate at death -- Restrictions. The power of a person
to leave property by will, and the rights of creditors,. devisees, and heirs to his
property are subject to the restrictions and limitations contained in this code to
facilitate the prompt settlement of estates. Upon the death of a person, his
separate property devolves to the persons to whom it is devised by his last
will,

4

5
6

7

Fairchild v. Fairchild, 106 Idaho 147 (1984), has held:

8

12

We view the statement that "all became cotenants" as a conclusion of law,
reached by applying existing law to the findings of fact. See LC. § 15-2-103
(concerning the share of the decedent's heirs); and I.C. § 15-3-101 (decedent's
property devolves to his heirs at death). This conclusion is correct. We
uphold it. ..... the narrow focus of this appeal has been the application of settled
law to the facts. Furthermore, there was no showing that the trial court
misapplied the law. Scott v. Castle, 104 Idaho 719, 662 P.2d 1163 (Ct.App.1983).
We hold that this appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably and without
foundation.

13

Ellmaker v. Tabor, 160 Idaho 576, 377 P.3d 390, (2015) thereafter held:

14

Idaho Code section Code section 15-3-101 provides, ''Upon the death of a person,
his separate property devolves to the persons to whom it is devised by his last will
.... " The word "devolve" means: "1. To transfer (rights, duties, or powers) to
another. 2. To pass (rights, duties, or powers) by transmission or succession."
Black's Law Dictionary 463 (7th ed. 1999). "The term is said to be peculiarly
appropriate to the passing of an estate from a person dying to a person living."
Black's Law Dictionary 540 (4th ed. 1968). "The legal title to estate property
vests in the heirs or devisees upon the death of the decedent." Pierce v.
Francis, 194 P.3d 505, 510 (Colo.App. 2008).

9

11

15
16
17
18
19

By law, "heirs" are the statutory beneficiaries in an Intestate proceeding while

20

"devisees" are the statutory beneficiaries in a Testate proceeding; that by statutory declaration,

21

devolution of property interests vest upon death of the decedent, not upon any estate, or any PR,

22

as ownership is prohibited by Lemp v. Lemp, supra. That Defendants claim that Smith has the

23

ownership and possessory interest in the Premises as an heir of that property, vested at the time

24

of death of the decedent, not subject to any PR's asserted claim of ownership within the estate,

25

which fact and legal result has been ignored or misunderstood by this PR. That Defendants deny

26

any allegation Hillen holds ownership of this Premises; that Hillen cannot, by statute or Idaho
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9

case law, become the owner, but only empowered to take possession to satisfy creditors against
2

the estate, and no basis has been alleged in these pleadings; that Hillen cannot engage in acts

3

outside the confines of his limited statutory authority regarding the exercise of his powers under

4

the UPC; that to any extent Hillen alleges he is the owner of the property interests of the

5

Decedent, such allegation is denied, and the validity and enforcement of this Order, beyond the

6

authority granted by the UPC, is herewith denied.

7

3. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 3 thereof, Defendants state that

8

Defendant LLC was converted to a professional corporation identified as Vernon K. Smith Law,

9

PC, operated by Smith.

IO

4. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 4 thereof, Defendants state that

11

Defendant, Vernon K. Smith Law, PC, was the result of the conversion stated above, and that

12

Smith is t}:l.e interested party owning and operating same.

13

5. For answer·· to the allegations contained in Paragraph 5 thereof, the collective

14

reference suggested by Hillen to both the LLC and PC, being collectively referred to as

15

"Defendants", has been recognized, but for purposes of clarification, the LLC is not a separate

16

entity as the LLC, pursuant to statute, was converted into a PC; that the PC is the professional

17

corporation owned and operated by Smith, and it is through Smith's vested ownership and

18

possession of the remaining portion of the Premises that the PC operates from, within the first

19

floor of the primary structure located at 1900 West Main St., representing only 20% of the floor

20

space of the entire Complex, as Hillen took the other space in 2017; that Smith has been in

21

possession of this entire Complex for almost fifty (50) years, with a right of continued

22

possession from his vested ownership following the demise of his Mother, Victoria H. Smith;

23

that Smith's operation of his PC is through his right of ownership and possession, not any

24

possessory interest derived from the PR.

25

6. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 6 thereof, Defendants state that

26

Defendants are not subject to these proceedings, as the PC entity is present on the property
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10

through the ownership and possession of Smith, who holds .the rights pursuant to statute. These
2

"Defendants" do not "possess" the Premises; Smith operates the business with his PC, and

3

Smith possesses the Premises pursuant to the vested ownership rights to that Premises Smith

4

owns, being the principal operator and agent in the professional corporation. Hillen, as a_matter

5

of law, cannot be an "owner" of estate property, as prohibited by case law, Lemp v. Lemp, cited

6

above. That Defendants den~ they are subject to these proceedings or any claim asserted by

7. Hillen.

s
9

10

SIXTH DEFENSE
As and for an answer _to those allegations set forth in Category II, entitled "JURISDICTION
AND. VENUE", Defendants respond to those allegations as follows:

11

1. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 7 thereof, Defendants state, as a

12

procedural and constitutional matter of law (as described below), concerning jurisdiction of the

13

court, such assertions· constitute questions of law, not allegations of fact; Defendants will not

14

respond with any legal opinion regarding jurisdiction of a court to preside over any subject matter;

15

Defendants leave the issue of jurisdiction to be decided upon the statutes and constitution; that

16

notwithstanding that reservation, Defendants would state, based upon the statutes that address the

17

"subject matter'' within the "Verified Complaint (Ejectment under Hillen's theory of Premises ·

18

ownership), >a possessory dispute is to be addressed within the magistrate division of the district

19

court, not the district court, as Hillen is claiming he has ownership of the property, not seeking a

20

quiet tile action to determine ownership of the property; Hillen is pursuing an ejectment action,

21

regarding possession, likened to an unlawful detainer action, though has chosen to declare

22

"damages" and then a bogus "claim", alleging damages exceed the "minimum jurisdictional

23

requirements of the court, as alleged in Paragraph 9 below, seeking jurisdiction of the district court;

24

that Defendants deny this action lies in the district court.

25

District and magistrate courts are courts of record in Idaho (See LC. §§ 1-101 and 1-102);

26

District Courts are constitutional courts, ·having original jurisdiction established by Art. V, §20 of
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11

the Idaho Constitution; Magistrate Courts are "inferior courts," created by the Idaho Legislature as
2

provided for in I.C. §1-2201, by citation to the authorization provided by Art. V, §2 of the Idaho

3

Constitution; the Idaho Legislature alone determines jurisdiction of magistrate courts (See Acker v.

4

Mader, 94 Idaho 94, 96,481 P.2d 605,607 (1971), stating: " .... Art. 5, §2 of the Idaho Constitution

5

intended the legislature to be the sole authority in determining the jurisdiction of the inferior

6

courts.").

7

A magistrate court cannot, by judicial declaration, be turned into Art V. § 20 District Court

8

(See Nate v. Denny, 2017 WL 3033308 at *8 (Ida.Sup.Ct. July 18, 2017), stating: ("[T]his Court

9

does not have the authority to rewrite the Idaho Constitution, ."). Neither labeling a magistrate

10

court to be a "division of the district courts," nor granting magistrate courts' jurisdiction equal to

11

that of the district courts, can turn magistrate courts into district courts (See, LC.AR. 5).

12

Because of the confusion created by I. C. §1-2208(1)(a), granting Magistrate Courts

13

general jurisdiction in actions where the amount of money, damages, or value of personal property

14

claimed does not exceed $5,000, and I. C. §1-2210(l)(a), granting Magistrate Courts general

15

jurisdiction in actions where the amount of money, damages, or value of personal property claimed

16

exceeds $5,000, these two statutes caused the Supreme Court to issue a "court rule", effective since

17

1981, expressly limiting the general jurisdiction of a magistrate court to cases "where the amount

18

of damages or value of property claimed, does not exceed $10,000." (See LC.AR. 5(c)(l)).

19

Reference to the adoption of that jurisdictional limitation of $10,000 is found in The Advocate,

20

Vol. 24, No. 1, January 1981 at pg. 2, and 1981 Idaho Court Rules Cumulative Pocket Supplement,

21

I.R.C.P. 82(c)(2)(A), where an effort was undertaken to explain this limitation.

22

This general jurisdictional limitation on a magistrate court, when combined with the

23

conferrals made in LC.§§ 1-2208(1)(b), (l)(c), (2), (3), (4), & (5); and 1-2210(1)(b), (l)(c), (l)(d),

24

& (1 )(e) operate to exclude jurisdiction over certain claims, including actions in which the amount

25

claimed, or the value of property placed at issue, exceeds $10,000, including: (1) quiet title actions;

26

(2) breach of contract actions; (2) general negligence claims; (3) personal injury actions; (4)
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12

wrongful death actions; (5) malpractice claims; (6) defamation claims; (7) mortgage foreclosure
2

actions; (8) a private adjudication of water rights; (9) trespass and easement claims; and (10) those

3

matters addressed by the Uniform Probate Code (Title 15), which do not involve either the probate

4

of a will or the administration of the estates of decedents, minors & incompetents, including

5

disputes arising out of charitable and spendthrift trusts, or matters concerning the exercise of

6

durable powers of attorney.

7

The "subject matter", alleged in Hillen' s complaint, despite this claim of damages, is in the

8

Nature of a possessory and unlawful detainer action, as suggested by the Exhibit "B" attached to

9

Hillen's complaint; Hillen claims ownership and right to possession of the Premises, and seeks to

10

eject Defendants, knowing Defendants' presence relies upon the ownership/possession by Smith,

11

the Decedent's heir; that Defendants have never claimed an ownership interest, as that belongs to

12

Smith, an heir; Defendants have no arrangement or agreement with Hillen, so upon what basis any

13

amount owed to Hillen by Defendants through the possession of Smith, is unsustainable, and there

14

are no jurisdictional basis for the district court, despite this false damage claim in excess of

15

$10,000.00.

16

Defendants have no privity, agreement, or obligation to Hillen; this controversy is over

17

Smith's right of vested ownership and possession of the Premises, though Hillen declines to name

18

Smith, the real, necessary, and indispensable party in interest, while Hillen knows Smith is a vested

19

owner who holds 2/3rds ownership interest in the entire Complex, and Hillen knows his fiduciary

20

duty to Smith, as a successor in interest under the statute.

21
22

Defendants deny the District Court has the jurisdiction to hear this alleged ejectment,
claim, as there is no basis for damages, and legal basis for any has been alleged.

23

1. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 8 thereof, Defendants re-allege the

24

response as set forth to the allegations contained in Paragraph 7 above; as the issue of

25

jurisdiction and statutory authority is to be determined by the court.

26
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13

2. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 9 thereof; Defendants deny ''the
2

damages and/or property claimed herein and/or at issue here exceed the minimum jurisdictional

3

requirements of this court"; that Defendants dispute Hillen has any damage claim; that Hillen

4

seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court, without any factual or legal basis to

5

establish the fundamental requirement of standing to assert such claims; that Hillen lacks the

6

statutory ownership of the real property and premises; that Defendants deny Hillen has any

7

ownership standing to invoke jurisdiction of either the district court or the magistrate court, as

8

Hillen has no factual basis as a PR to exercise a power to take possession of property without a

9

creditor claim, and has no ownership basis to assert any damages within any causes of actions,

IO

as alleged in the Verified Complaint for Ejectment and Other Relief. Defendants deny any

11

damages exist from which the alleged jurisdictional requirements are invoked therefore

12

Defendants deny the allegation contained therein.

13

3. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 10 thereof, concerning venue and

14

certain statutory authority, Defendants acknowledge statutory enactments raise questions oflaw,

15

not allegations of fact; that Defendants understand venue is a question of law, the determination

16

of which is based upon a disposition of fact; that unless the assertion of venue is denied, and

17

made the subject of a motion for proper venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3), Rule 12(h)(4), and

18

Rule 40.l(a) & (b), I.R.C.P., and LC. §5-404, an objection as to proper venue is waived; that

19

Defendants acknowledge the Premises described in the Verified Complaint (by address only) is

20

located in Ada County, Idaho, that upon that factual determination, Defendants would

21

acknowledge Ada County is the proper venue to address a controversy if a claim is stated for

22

which relief could be granted and the necessary and indispensable parties are included in that

23

action; that if the court has subject matter jurisdiction and in personum jurisdiction to embrace

24

such a claim, venue over such action would be based in Ada County, as the proper tribunal

25

under I. C. §5-401 et. seq.

26
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14

SEVENTH DBFENSE
2
3

As and for an answer to those allegations set forth in Category III, entitled "GENERAL
ALLEGATIONS", Defendants respond to those allegations as follows:

4

1. For answer to the allegations ~ontained in Paragraph 11 thereof, Defendants deny any

5

allegation asserted by Hillen that he, as the :PR, is the owner of the real property (Premises) he

6

commonly refers to as "1900 W. Main St., Boise, Idaho"; that ownership is statutorily vested in

7

heirs, not a PR of the Estate; that Defendants have their presence only through Smith, an heir

8

that holds a vested 2/3rds ownership interest in the Premises referred to in the Verified

9

Complaint; that Smith has the right associated Iwith any determination as to the possession of his

1o

vested interest in said Premises; that Defendants operate from the Premises through Smith, who

11

has had the continuous possession of the Premises for almost 50 years, as above d~scribed, that

12

the first floor of the building is an old commercial facility, which remains in need of significant

13

remodel and renovation that has been curtailed due, in part, to this estate controversy, having

14

no need to be subject to possession by the PR in the administration of the estate, as this facility,

15

if possession were to go to the PR, would also remain vacant as was the case with the 1902

16

building the PR was allowed to have possession; that while under his possession, it has been un-

17

occupied, prohibiting the remodel, before commenced by Smith, from being completed, and has

18

remained unfinished for the past two years, generating no value or purpose to the Estate, but

19

rather creating a loss of income to the estate, in the form of rent, and the PR' s sole intention has

20

been designed to disrupt and interfere with Smith's remodel plans that has served no benefit to

21

the heir(s).

I

22

2. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 12 thereof, Defendants state, upon

23

information from Smith, an appraisal declared the value of the entire Main St complex

24

(1900/1902) to have value in the real property, subject to the demolition deduction for the

25

removal of the buildings, which,remaining value exceeded $10,000.00; however, that the value

26

of the property is not the basis for jurisdiction, and this controversy does not concern the value
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15

of the real property, but Hillen's claim to possession of the property upon his theory of
2

ownership , not as a trustee which subjects him to his fiduciary responsibilities.

3

3. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 13 thereof, Defendants state the PC

4

operates out of the building through the possession of Smith, who has occupied and possessed

5

the entire Complex for almost fifty (50) years, and continuing thereafter following the death of

6

Victoria H. Smith, as the vested and titled owner.

7

4. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 14 thereof, Defendants were given

8

a "Thirty (30) Day Notice of Termination of Lease And/Or Tenancy" from Hillen; that

9

Defendants never had any "month-to-month lease, tenancy, or other occupancy agreement

10

("Lease") for the Premises with the Estate of Victoria H. Smith ... ; or with Hillen; that said

11

notification was another of Hillen' s factual distortions, as no lease or tenancy ever existed with

12

an Estate or Hillen with Defendants; that Smith is the one who occupies the Premises, and has

13

no obligation to pay rent for what he has an ownership interest in, and has been reduced to 20%

14

of the floor space while still owning 2/3rds of the entire complex; that the entire premises, and

15

these old buildings, have been historically maintained by Smith since placed in possession in

16

1971, operating his sole proprietor law practice and while representing the interests of his

17

Mother when instructed to; that Smith has preserved the structures, again in need of further

18

restoration, and at his expense has made the substantial and significant past repairs, remodel,

19

restoration, and improvements to all structures in an effort to address the deterioration and

20

preserve the habitability for continued use and operation of the facilities. That since the death of

21

Victoria H. Smith, Smith was immediately vested with title and ownership to 2/3rds of the

22

entire Premises complex, but the PR wanted certain portions of the complex (seeking the rental

23

income of certain facilities then rented to allow the continuing payment of their churned fees

24

(over a Million dollars to date), and took possession to 75-80% of the existing floor space,

25

disregarding Smith's concerns for the protection and preservation of the property and need to

26

continue the restoration, as portions were exterior installations that were sensitive to the
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elements, yet those concerns to protect and maintain this property were disregarded,
2

comprom1smg Smith's ability to protect and preserve the entire Premises, and unable to

3

continue with the restoration and renovation projects.

4

That the Estate does not own the property, nor does the PR, notwithstanding the

5

controversial "Order" identified as Exhibit "A" attached to the complaint; that the PR has had

6

no involvement with this remaining portion of the 1900 Main St. Premises (possessed by Smith)

7

since Hillen' s appointment, commenciQ.g with his appointment as Special Administrator in

8

2016.

9

That to allow Hillen to remove Smith, a vested owner, and his operating PC entity, from the

1o

Premises, knowing there are no outstanding creditors with claims against the estate, constitutes

11

another act ofmis-feasance, conceivably mal-feasance, and a continuing breach of his fiduciary

12

duty to the heirs, and will only serve to accomplish the same consequence that resulted when

13

the PR took possession of the 1902 Premises, left the remodel idle, unfinished and remained

14

vacant, subject to uncertain damage and losses, generating no income the· past two years,

15

accomplishing only to disrupt the renovation efforts engaged by Smith, disrupt Smith's

16

ownership interests, and his completion of the renovation of that facility and to coordinate the

17

further renovation of the main structure, thereby generating disposable income to pay property

18

taxes.

19

5. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 15 thereof, Defendants state that a

20

Notice was sent to Defendants by the PR, not to Smith; that no action was taken for which

21

Defendants had any obligation to Hillen, and still do not, as Defendants' presence was derived

22

through Smith, the•-vested owner holding 2/3rds of the ownership interest, not through Hillen;

23

that Smith's continued possession has never been discontinued and is a 2/3rds vested owner,

24

and will remain and maintain and preserve the Premises against any further damages or losses.

25

6. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 16 thereof, Defendants operate

26

within the Premises through the 2/3rds titled owner, Smith, who has neither vacated nor
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1

surrendered possession of the.remaining portion of the Premises or his ownership interest in the

2

entire Premises Complex; that Smith intends to remain there to protect and preserve his interest;

3

That Smith has financed all of the historic remodel projects, committing years to the process of

4

restoration, and has been in the on-going stage of extensive remodel when this probate

5

controversy with Smith's brother came into being and complicated the progress and completion

6

of the work.

7
8

7. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 17 thereof, Defendants deny same,
as Defendants operate from the Premises through the possession of the 2/3rds vested owner.

9

8. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 18 thereof, Defendants deny same;

1o

that Hillen is not the vested or rightful owner of the Premises, and Defendants have never had

11

any contract or agreement with Hillen.

12

EIGHTH DEFENSE

13

As and for an answer to those allegations set forth in in CLAIMS FOR RELIEF, entitled

14

"COUNT ONE: EJECTMENT", Defendants respond to those allegations as follows:

15

1. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 19 thereof, Defendant~ re-allege

16

those responses contained herein to the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 18 of

17

Hillen's Verified Co~plaint, as though said responses are set forth and re-alleged in full herein.

18
19

2. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 20 thereof, Defendants deny the
same, for the reasons stated previously above in these responsive pleadings.

20

3. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 21 thereof, Defendants

21

acknowledge they operate out of the Premises under the authorization of the entity owner,

22

Smith, as and for the reasons stated previously hereinabove in these· responsive pleadings.

23

4. For .answer to the allegations contained jn Paragraph 22 thereof, Defendants have no

24

privity, arrangement or agreement with Hillen, and Smith has declined to surrender possession

25

of the remaining portion of the premises he owns, as stated previously hereinabove in these

26

responsive pleadings.
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1
2

5. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 23 thereof, Defendanfs deny same,
for the reasons stated previously hereinabove in these responsive pleadings.

3

NINTH DEFENSE

4

As and for an answer. to those allegations set forth in CLAIMS FOR RELIEF, entitled

5

"COUNT TWO: DECLARATORY JUDGMENT/QUIET TITLE", Defendants respond to

6

those allegations as follows:

7

1. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 24 thereof, Defendants re-allege

8

those responses contained herein to the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 23 of

9

Hillen' s Verified Complaint, as though said responses are set forth and re-alleged in full herein.

10

2. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 25 thereof, a statutory reference to

11

I. C. §6-401, these Defendants state the contents of any statutory enactment raises questions of

12

law, not allegations of fact; that Defendants will not interpret statutory compilations enacted by

13

the Legislature, or conclude in what manner Hillen assert an action before the court, as in this

14

case seeking a right vested in a decedent prior to death, when vesture of decedent's property

15

interests thereafter vest in the heirs upon death, not into any "estate", or PR of any estate,

16

regardless of a magistrate's overarching language and erroneous understanding of the law; that

17

the court will determine what authority is derived from the alleged statute, I. C. §6-401; that

18

Defendants rely upon I. C. § 15-3-101, which statute and case law confirms Hillen does not

19

acquire ownership in the Decedent's assets,, prohibited from any ownership by Lemp v. Lemp,

20

cited above; that Hillen lacks the legal standing upon which to assert any "adverse claim" ·

21

against Defendants, when Hillen, limited to his authority as a PR, has no ownership interest in

22

the Decedent's property, notwithstanding said "Order"; that the PR is bound by his fiduciary

23

duty to embrace and protect the interests of the heirs; and must respect the interests and

24

objectives of the 2/3rds vested ownership in the premises, and a PR's "administration" cannot

25

conflict with or impair the vested interests of the vested owner(s) of the premises, or claim

26

ownership that is prohibited by law.
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3. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 26 thereof, another statutory
2

reference, I. C. § 10-1202, Defendants state any assertion made as to the contents of any

3

statutory enactment raises questions of law, not allegations of fact; that Defendants will not

4

interpret statutory compilations enacted by the Legislature regarding questions of construction

5

or validity arising under any "instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise", or to obtain

6

any declaration of "rights, status, or other legal relations", or to conclude in what manner a

7

plaintiff may bring an action, as in this case by a PR, on behalf of an estate, seeking the right of

8

a decedent prior to death, when the vesture of the decedent's property interests immediately vest

9

in the heirs upon death, not in any "estate" or any PR of any estate; that the court will determine

1o

what authority is to be derived from said statute, I. C. § 10-1202, relative to the facts of this

11

controversy; that Defendants rely upon I. C. § 15-3-1 01, and existing case law, confirming

12

Hillen has no ownership interest in the Premises, as a matter of law, and that Hillen has no legal

13

standing upon which to assert any "adverse claim" against Defendants, when the PR has no

14

ownership interest to the title to the Premises, notwithstanding said "Order"; that the PR is

15

bound by his fiduciary duty to embrace and protect the interests of the heirs; to respect the

16

interests and objectives of the 2/3rds vested ownership in the premises, and a PR's

17

"administration" cannot conflict with or impair the vested interests of the vested owner(s) of the

18

premises.

19

4. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 27 thereof, another statutory

20

reference, I. C. § 10_-1201, Defendants reiterate that any assertion made as to the contents of any

21

statutory enactment raises questions of law, not allegations of fact; that Defendants will not

22

interpret statutory compilations enacted by the Legislature relating to the interpretation of

23

statutory compilations addressing a determination or declaration of rights, status, and other legal

24

relations", or to conclude in what manner any statute may vest authority to bring an action on

25

behalf of an estate, with the same effect as that of a decedent prior to death, when the vesture of

26

the decedent's property interests immediately vest in the heirs upon death, not into any ".estate",
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or PR of any estate; that Defendants rely upon the court to determine what authority is to be
2

derived from the statutes, I. C. §§10-1201, 10-1202, 10-1203, 10-1204, and 10-1205, relative to

3

the facts of this controversy; that Hillen does not have standing to claim the right to take control

4

by possession in the absence of an ownership interest in the Premises, or necessity for the

5

satisfaction of a creditor, acting as a PR, as a matter of law, as Defendants rely upon the

6

statutory and case law, cited above; that there exists no standing for Hillen to assert an "adverse

7

claim'; against Defendants, as Hillen has no ownership interest in the title to this Premises, as

8

addressed in the Uniform Probate Code, as Hillen, as the PR, is bound by the statutes, case law,

9

and his fiduciary duty to the heirs, their interests and objectives as vested owners of the

10

Premises, and. Hillen's "administration" cannot conflict with or impair the vested interests of the

11

vested owner(s) of the Premises.

12

5. For answer· to the allegations contained in Paragraph 28 thereof, another statutory

13

reference, I. C. § 10-1208, Defendants again reiterate that any assertion made as to the contents

14

of any statutory enactment raises questions of law, not allegations of fact; that Defendants will

15

not interpret statutory compilations enacted by the Legislature regarding any relief, as addressed

16

in I. C. §10-1208, or to otherwise conclude in what manner any statute may vest authority

17

within Hillen to bring an action on behalf of an estate, with the same effect as that of a decedent

18

prior to death, when the vesture of the decedent's property ownership interests has immediately

19

vested in the heirs upon death, not into any "estate" or the PR of any estate; that Defendants rely

20

upon the court to determine what relief is to be derived from said statute, I. C. § 10-1208,

21

relative to the facts of this controversy; that Hillen does not have any standing to claim the right

22

to take control by possession in the absence of an ownership interest in the Premises, or

23

necessity for the satisfaction of a creditor, acting as a PR, as a matter of law, as Defendants rely

24

upon the statutory authority and case law cited herein; that there exists no standing in Hillen to

25

give rise to assert an "adverse claim" against Defendants, as Hillen has no ownership interest in

26

this Premises, and Hillen, as the PR, is bound by the statutes, case law, and his fiduciary duty to
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the heirs, their interests and objectives as vested owners of the Premises, and Hillen's
2

"administration" cannot conflict with or impair the vested interests of the vested owner( s) of the

3

Premises.

4

6. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 29 thereof, Defendants

5

acknowledge they operate from the Premises through the ownership and possession of Smith, an

6

heir holding 2/3rds vested ownership interest in the Premises; that Defendants do not claim any

7

ownership interest in the Premises, but derive their use of the Premises through Smith; that

8

Hillen' s beliefs are grounded in the Order of the magistrate, entered contrary to the statutory

9

authority and case law regarding ownership rights and the prohibition of a PR to own a

IO

Decedent's assets; ·that Hillen's beliefs appear contrary to his fiduciary duty owed to an heir,

11

and to any extent Hillen is asserting that Defendants claim an ownership interest in the Premises

12

is erroneous, as Defendants do not claim any ownership interest in the premises, but rather

13

exercising the right of use as provided by the 2/3rds Premises owner, to protect and preserve the

14

property throughout this on-going and contentious administration of the estate, froth with a

15

series of what has been the PR's misrepresentations, malicious falsehoods, malicious

16

accusations, mis-feasance, mal-feasance, bogus and baseless claims, and violations of the

17

fiduciary duty owed to an heir.

18

7. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 30 thereof, Defendants state Hillen

19

has no standing to seek any declaration Defendants have no right to occupy or possess the

20

premises, which claim, had it even existed, would be the subject of an unlawful

21

possession/detainer action under I. C. §6-303, not a quiet title action, and no basis to allege a

22

trespass, despite being alleged in the Verified Complaint.

23
24

25

TENTH DEFENSE
As and for an answer to those allegations set forth in CLAIMS FOR RELIEF, entitled
"COUNT THREE: TRESPASS", Defendants respond to those allegations as follows:

26
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1. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 31 thereof, Defendants re-allege
2

those responses contained herein to the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 30 of

3

Hillen' s Verified Complaint, as though said responses are set forth and re-alleged in full herein.
2. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 32 thereof, Defendants deny same,

4

5

for the reasons set forth above in Defendant's prior responses.

6

3. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 33 thereof, Defendants state that

7

Hillen's Notice speaks for itself, and deny any enforceable effect upon Defendants, as

8

Defendants occupy the Premises with the consent and approval of the vested owner holding

9

2/3rds of the ownership interest, all of which remained to be the reasons concerning the

1o

continued protection and preservation of the Premises by Smith; that Defendants are not and

11

have never been a trespasser on the Premises, and has not, nor do Defendants "unlawfully"

12

occupy the premises; that any allegation inconsistent with Defendants' response is herewith

13

denied.

14

4. For answer to the allegations contained in. Paragraph 34 thereof, Defendants deny any

15

trespassing or unlawful possession of the Premises; that Defendants occupy the Premises

16

through the ownership and possession of Smith, who continues to preserve and protect the

17

Premises as being a 2/3rds vested owner of.the Premises; that Defendants have never been a

18

trespasser on the Premises, and has never unlawfully occupied the Premises; that any allegation

19

inconsistent with Defendants' response is herewith denied.

20

·

5. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 35 thereof, Defendants deny same;

21

that to the contrary, past actions of the PR has been seen to be detrimental to the property

22

interests ofthe·2/3rds vested owner of these assets.

23

6. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 36 thereof, Defendants state the

24

continued presence and operation by Defendants, through Smith, will enhance the preservation

25

and maintenance of the Premises, and better serve the ownership interests of Smith, as

26

determined by the 2/3rds vested owner thereof; that it has been a discovered fact the PR has

ANSWER TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AND OTHER RELIEF
Page 46

23

been utilizing various rents and lease payments from other property interests for financing
2

unnecessary, improper, baseless, and wasteful administrative activities, wasting the estate cash

3

reserves on needless administration expenses, legal fees, baseless civil actions and malicious

4

accusations, seeking to curry the favor of the magistrate to the detriment of the 2/3rds owner's

5

best interests, that such wasteful actions has not served the interests of either heir, and there has

6

been no benefit or protection to the assets, but rather the wasteful consumption and destruction

7

of the assets; that Hillen has not endeavored to serve the best interests of the 2/3rds vested

8

owner of these assets, and in particular, as before addressed, the adjacent building, identified as

9

1902 Main Street, an asset in which Smith holds a 2/3rds ownership interest as well, Hillen took

Io possession of that building in 201 7, while it was then in a state of being renovated by Smith,
11

disrupting Smith's restoration process and the building has remained un-occupied, not

12

generating any revenue, which will be no different than what woul,.d occur with this remaining

13

portion of the Premises, as it has been in a state of renovation as well, disrupted when the

14

probate controversy arose, and has no rental value on the retail market because of the physical

15

condition and state of the uncompleted restoration and needed improvements yet required to be

16

addressed. That to leave this Premises vacant will cause needless exposure to unnecessary

17

vandalism (Smith continues to safeguard the 1902 facility, installing a steel privacy fence to

18

discourage transients and exposure to vandalism), and should there be a low-paying tenant

19

allowed to occupy the facility, there would be more wear and tear by a disinterested tenant,

20

while this preservation prevents the exposure to destructive effects that need to be avoided; that

21

Defendants deny any damages exist from Smith's ownership and possession, as Smith will take

22

the asset in the completion of the Estate, and Smith continues to preserve and protect his

23

property interests by his occupancy of the Premises; that Defendants have no obligation to

24

Hillen, and no obligation to pay Hillen any rent; that any allegation inconsistent with this

25

response is denied.

26

7. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 3?thereof, Defendants deny same.

ANSWER TO VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR EJECTMENT AND OTHER RELIEF
Page 47

24

ELEVENTH DEFENSE
2

As and for an answer to those allegations set forth in CLAIMS FOR RELIEF, entitled

3

"COUNT FOUR: UNJUST ENRICHMENT", Defendants respond to those allegations as

4

follows:

5

1. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 38 thereof, Defendants re-allege

6

those responses contained herein to the allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 37 of

7

Hillen' s Verified Complaint, as though said responses are set forth and re-alleged in full herein.

8

2. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 39 thereof, Defendants deny same;

9

that Defendants' occupancy, with Smith's consent and approval, serves to benefit the owner(s)

10

best interests, as Smith's continued possession and use serves to protect and preserve the

11

Premises.

12

3. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 40 thereof, Defendants deny same,

13

for the reasons as set forth above and as are further identifie'd in the affirmative defense set forth

14

below.

15

4. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 41 thereof, Defendants deny same,

16

for the reasons as set forth above and as are identified in the affirmative defense set forth below.

17

5. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 42 thereof, Defendants deny same.

18

TWELFTH DEFENSE

19

As and for an answer to those allegations set forth in the Category entitled "ATTORNEY

20

FEES AND COSTS", Defendants respond to those allegations as follows:

21

1. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 43 thereof, Defendants deny same;

22

that Hillen's Complaint is both unnecessary and wasteful, seeking to defeat the best interests

23

that serve to protect and preserve the Premises, which efforts serve to maintain and preserve the

24

value of the Premises, avoiding what will otherwise be a vacant facility, as there is enormous

25

expense remaining to be invested in replacing the entire heating system, the damaged ceilings,

26

the interior renovations and exterior restorations to the stucco fa~ade that have been placed on
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1

hold; that Defendants are entitled to recover all costs and expenses incurred in defending this

2

frivolous action, which action is being pursued maliciously and vindictively against both

3

:pefendants and the consequential damages to Smith, the 2/3rds owner of the Premises, in

4

malicious disruption to the 2/3rds vested owner thereof, whose sole objective has been to keep

5

and maintain the improvements in the manner and fashion that has been undertaken over the

6

many years and to eventually complete the restoration, as Smith will be the exclusive owner of

7

the Premises in the completion of the contentious probate proceeding.

8

2. For answer to the allegations contained in Paragraph 44 thereof, Defendants deny same.

9

THIRTEENTH DEFENSE

10

As a further affirmative defense, herein asserted as an Affirmative Defense, Defendants

11

allege and state as follows:

12

1. That Hillen has filed and served this Verified Complaint setting forth four malicious

13

causes of action upon Defendants, well knowing Defendants are an entity owned by Smith and

14

the use of the Premises has been by Smith in his law practice for almost fifty (50) years; that

15

Defendants have the consent and approval of the 2/3rds vested owner, having no agreement to

16

pay "rent" to Hillen.

17

2. That Smith has been in continuous possession of this Premises since 1971, having made

18

substantial and major improvements to restore the "well weathered" building when taking

19

possession in 1971, committed to restore the premises, make substantial improvements,

20

remodeled the interior, installed asphalt parking, made electrical alterations, replaced the entire

21

heating and duct system, modify the landscape and completely "re-faced" the fa9ade on each of

22

the three buildings with a stucco veneer in 1986, now after several decades is in dire need of

23

removal (partially commenced) and further restoration~ due to infiltration of moisture that

24

occurs with the structural movement; that extensive alterations and improvements are yet

25

needed to be done to upgrade the facility, and until that takes place, there is no commercial

26

interest in any rental and occupancy from a serious third party tenant, as identified in the letter
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to be submitted to Hillen's counsel, demonstrating a situation that would be no different than
2

what has transpfred with respect to the 1902 building facility, left vacant since Hillen insisted on

3

possession and did nothing to address that present state and need of repair that was commenced

4

by Smith, spending many thousands of dollars for what was accomplished in that restoration

5

process undertaken by Smith.

6

3. That should Hillen be allowed to be successful to remove Defendants from the

7

continued occupancy under the possession of Smith, Defendants will be severally damaged, and

8

Hillen will personally be subject to a resulting and significant claim for all such damages.

9

4. That all of the contemplated repairs, remodeling, alterations, and improvements that

lo

have been projected to take place have been placed on hold over the passing years due to this

11

probate controversy, and the delays caused by the misfeasance and malfeasance of the PR has

12

served to give cause for the need to petition for his removal as the PR, and these very malicious

13

actions are furthering that need for that course of action to occur.

14

15
16

Wherefore, Defendants, having answered Hillen's Verified Complaint, hereby prays for
entry of judgment as follows:
1. That Hillen's actions be dismissed with prejudice and Defendants recover all costs and

17

attorney fees; that Defendants reserves all claims that may come to exist for damages

18

and losses as a result of these baseless actions;

19

2. That Defendants shall.be allowed to continue with the on-going occupancy of the

20

Premises, as consented to, approved and requested by the 2/3rds vested owner, for which

21

Defendants are an entity owned by Smith;

22
23

24
25

3. That should this matter proceed to trial, a jury trial is requested to be scheduled to
address these factual disputes.
4. For such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper in the
premises.

26
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Dated this 16th day of December, 2019.
2

Attorney for Defendants

3
4

VERIFICATION

5
6

7
8
9

1O

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
)
County of Ada
Vernon K. Smith, being an officer and agent of the
first duly sworn, deposes and says:
P AINT FOR
I have read the foregoing ANSWER TO VERIFIED
AND OTHER RELIEF, aware of the contents thereof, and that t
the best of my knowledge, information, and belief.

JEC

11
12
13
14

15

Residing at: Boise, Idaho
My Commission Expires: 03/20/2023

16
17

18
19

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 1(5111 day of December, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the following
addresses:

20

21
22
23
24

)

Randall A. Peterman
Alexander P. McLaughlin
Givens Pursley, LLP
601 -West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com

U.S.Mail

25

26
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Electronically Filed
3/26/2020 4: 17 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Nichole Snell, Deputy Clerk

Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
013683-0002
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Case No. CV0l-19-20686

Plaintiff,

MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT
ON THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION
TO CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER
I.R.C.P. 54(B)

vs.
LAW OFFICE OF VERNON K. SMITH,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company;
VERNON K. SMITH LAW, PC, an Idaho
professional service corporation,
Defendants.
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COMES NOW the above-named plaintiff, Noah G. Hillen, the duly appointed
Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith, by and through his undersigned
counsel, and hereby moves this Court, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(c), for an Order approving his
Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to Certify Judgment Under I.R.C.P.
54(b) ("Motion"). This Motion is made on the grounds and reasons set forth in the memorandum
oflaw submitted contemporaneously submitted herein, the Declaration of Noah G. Hillen, and the
records before this Court. Oral argument is requested.
DATED this 26th day of March, 2020.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By Isl Randall A. Peterman
Randall A. Peterman - Of the Firm
Alexander P. McLaughlin - Of the Firm
Jack W. Relf- Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of March, 2020, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
AND MOTION TO CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B) to be served by the
method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Vernon K. Smith, Jr.
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Attorney for Defendant

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt: vkslaw@live.com

Isl Randall A. Peterman
Randall A. Peterman
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Case No. CV0l-19-20686

Plaintiff,
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COMES NOW the above-named plaintiff, Noah G. Hillen, the duly appointed
Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith, by and through his undersigned
counsel, and hereby submits the following Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial
Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to Certify Judgment Under I.R.C.P. 54(b).

I.

INTRODUCTION

The controversy presently before the Court boils down to a single issue: whether
Plaintiff, Noah G. Hillen ("Hillen"), as Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith
(the "Estate"), owns the Estate property Defendants Vernon K. Smith, LLC and Vernon K. Smith
Law, PC (collectively, "Defendants") 1 currently possess. Hillen does and his ownership is
evidenced by, among other things, that certainjudgment-affirmed by the Idaho Supreme Courtthat the Honorable Cheri C. Copsey ("Probate Court") entered in the probate of the late Victoria
H. Smith's Estate ("Estate Case").
Defendants-but mostly their attorney, Vernon K. Smith, Jr. ("Vernon"), who is a
party to the Estate Case and a 2/3 's heir2-attempts to collaterally attack the Probate Court's
judgment and findings that the duly appointed personal representative of the Estate holds all right,
title, and interest to Estate property. Defendants' assertions are legally unsound. As a matter of
law, Hillen holds the same power over the property at issue (the "Law Office"3) as that of an
absolute owner and Defendants remain in possession of the Law Office, despite Hillen's demand

1

Vernon K. Smith, LLC was converted into Vernon K. Smith Law, PC, resulting in a single entity. Answer
to Verified Complaint (filed December 16, 2019) ("Answer") at 4, "Third Defense."
2
Which, based on counsel's arguments, appears to be fairly problematic as Vernon regularly asserts in his
briefing defenses he personally has to this action-not defenses his clients have.

3

The Law Office is located at 1900 W. Main St., Boise, ID 83702.
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to vacate. These points are undisputed and Hillen is entitled to a judgment ejecting Defendants
from the Law Office and restoring possession thereof in Hillen. Hillen respectfully asks that this
Court grant his motion and enter a 54(b) certificate.
II.

BACKGROUND

Victoria H. Smith ("Victoria"), Vernon's mother, owned the Law Office prior to
her death in 2013. The parties agree on this point. Answer at 4, "THIRD DEFENSE"
(acknowledging that the Law Office was owned by Victoria prior to her death).
Victoria died on September 11, 2013. The posture of the Estate Case is complex
and subject to extensive litigation. 4 One of the less complex matters in the matter, however, is the
Probate Court's determination that Hillen, as the personal representative, is vested with all right,
title, and interest to Victoria's real and personal property. That determination is memorialized in
that certain Judgment on Motion Under Rule 70(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Vesting
All Real and Personal Property of the Estate in the Personal Representative (the "Rule 70
Judgment") entered by the Probate Court. A true and correct copy of the Rule 70 Judgment is
attached hereto as Exhibit A. 5 The Rule 70 Judgment states, in relevant part:
The Court does hereby vest in the Personal Representative as of May
5, 201 7, any and all real property of any kind or nature, including
but not limited to: any fixtures, appurtenances, additions, easements,
licenses, water rights, or similar rights of any kind or nature
appurtenant thereto; and any and all proceeds, product, offspring,
rents or profits of or from any real property (collectively 'Real
Property'), including but not limited to the [Law Office] ... Such
vesting is free and clear of any lien, claim, or interest of [Vemon]."
Rule 70 Judgment.
4

See e.g. In re Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457,432 P.3d 6 (2018).

5

Plaintiff asks this Court to take judicial notice of the Rule 70 Judgment, pursuant to I.RE. 201 (d). The
document is a public document on file in the Estate Case and recorded with the Ada County Recorder's Office.
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The pleadings establish that Defendants are in possession of the Law Office, and
have been, in one form or another, since 1971 and in Defendants' current form since 2019.
Complaint at 3, ,r 13; Answer at 4, "THIRD DEFENSE", ,r 2. Defendants claim they do not possess
the premises, but rather operate at the Law Office through V emon' s possession, but that is a
distinction without a difference. Answer at 5, ,r 5. First, Defendants' principal place of business is
the Law Office. Second, Defendants acknowledge they operate out of the Law Office (Answer at
17,

,r 6).

Third, Defendants registered the Law Office as their mailing address with the Idaho

Secretary of State. 6
It is similarly clear that Defendants intend to remain in possession of the Law

Office. Complaint at 3,

,r

16, Ex. B; Answer at 17,

,r 5 ("Defendants

state that [Exh. B to the

Complaint] was sent to Defendants by [Hillen]"); 17-18, ,r 6 ("Defendants operate within the [Law
Office] through the 2/3s titled owner, [Vernon], who has neither vacated nor surrendered
possession ... [and who] intends to remain there to protect and preserve his interest. ... ").
Therefore, the sole disputed issue before the Court is the effect the Rule 70 Judgment has on the
ownership of the Law Office. This is a purely legal question and the answer is clear: Hillen is the
sole lawful owner and/or has the same power and authority as would an absolute owner.
III.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Court considers whether a judgment on the pleadings is warranted under the
same standard as a ruling on summary judgment. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471,474, 163 P.3d
1183, 1186 (2007). When only matters within the pleadings themselves are presented, this Court

6

To the extent necessary, Hillen requests this Court take judicial notice of Defendants' filings with the Idaho
Secretary of State pursuant to I.R.E. 201. Such documents are public documents on file with the Secretary of State.
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cannot look to matters outside the pleadings. Syringa Networks, LLC v. Idaho Dep't ofAdmin., 159
Idaho 813, 367 P.3d 208, 219 (2016) (expressing a "preference for interpreting the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure in conformance with the interpretation placed upon the same language in the
federal rules" and applying that preference to Rule 12(c)).
When there are "no disputed issues of material fact, only a question of law remains,
and [the] Court exercises free review." Hoyle v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 367, 371, 48 P.3d
1256, 1260 (2002). "A judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, taking all the
allegations in the pleadings as true, [a] party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Lyon v.
Chase Bank USA, NA., 656 F.3d 877, 883 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Dunlap v. Credit Prat. Ass'n,
L.P., 419 F.3d 1011, 1012 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2005)).
IV.

ARGUMENT

This memorandum is divided into two sections. Section A discusses the substance
of Hillen's ejectment claim, which is Count One of the Complaint. Section B addresses Hillen's
request for a 54(b) certificate in the event the Court grant's this motion and enters a partial
judgment in Hillen's favor.
A.

Plaintiff is Entitled to a Judgment of Ejectment Removing Defendants from
the Law Office.

"An action for ejectment requires proof of (1) ownership, (2) possession by the
defendants, and (3) refusal of the defendants to surrender possession." PHH Mortg. Servs. Corp.
v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 637, 200 P.3d 1180, 1186 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). All

three elements are established by the pleadings.
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1.

Hillen is the Owner of the Law Office and/or Holds the Same Power
that an Owner Would Have Over the Same.

The Rule 70 Judgment is unambiguous. It vests all right, title, and interest in the
Law Office to Hillen. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Rule 70 Judgment following
Vernon's appeal. In re Estate ofSmith, 164 Idaho at 482,432 P.3d at 31. Vernon asserts the Rule 70
Judgment has no effect because it somehow conflicts with his "vested" ownership right in the Law
Office as a 2/3 heir of the Estate. Vernon claims his partial interest in the Law Office became
"vested" pursuant to Idaho Code Section 15-3-101 upon Victoria's death.
This argument lacks merit. First, Section 15-3-101 does not mention permanently
vesting interests nor pre-emption of future orders or judgments. Second, the Rule 70 Judgment
expressly states that Hillen's ownership of the Law Office "is free and clear of any lien, claim or
interest of the Claimants [which includes Vernon.]" The Rule 70 Judgment was, fittingly, entered
pursuant to Rule 70(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. That provision allows courts to "enter
a judgment divesting any party's title and vesting it in others." I.R.C.P. 70(b ). Therefore, any
interest Vernon once had in the Law Office was, if not before, divested by the Rule 70 Judgment
and vested in Hillen. This is to say nothing of the fact that Idaho Code Section 15-3-711 expressly
provides that Hillen "has the same power over the title to property of the estate that an absolute
owner would have," which includes the power to eject a party from the property.
2.

The Parties Agree that Defendants are in Possession of the Law Office.

There is no dispute this element is met. Hillen asserts-and Defendants admitthat Defendants are operating in the Law Office. Complaint at 3,

,r

13; Answer at 4, "THIRD

DEFENSE", ,r 2. And, while Defendants erroneously attempt to distinguish using the Law Office
from possession, that distinction is without merit. Actual possession of property is defined as
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"physical occupancy or control over property[.]" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1282 (9th ed. 2009).
Defendants occupy the Law Office both by their admissions and filings with the Idaho Secretary
of State. They are, therefore, in possession of the Law Office by virtue of physical occupancy.
3.

The Parties Agree that Defendants Refuse to Surrender Possession of
the Law Office.

There is likewise no dispute that the third and final element of ejectment is met.
Defendants intend to remain in possession of the Law Office despite demand to vacate by Hillen.
Complaint at 3, ,-r 16, Ex. B; Answer at 17, ,-r 5 ("Defendants state that [Exh. B to the Complaint]
was sent to Defendants by [Hillen]"); 17-18, ,-r 6 ("Defendants operate within the [Law Office]
through the 2/3s titled owner, [Vernon], who has neither vacated nor surrendered possession ...
[and who] intends to remain there to protect and preserve his interest. ... "). Accordingly, because
all three elements are met within the pleadings, Hillen is entitled to a judgment removing
Defendants from the Law Office and restoring possession of the Law Office in Hillen.
4.

Having Established Entitlement to Ejectment of Defendants, Hillen
Requests a Writ of Assistance.

A writ of assistance is the typical remedy in an ejectment action. Hillen is entitled
to one here. "A writ of assistance is a form of process issued by a court of equity to transfer the
possession of property, and more specifically lands, the title or right to which it has previously
adjudicated.... " Eagle Rock Corp. v. Idamont Hotel Co., 60 Idaho 639, 95 P.2d 838, 841 (1939).
Therefore, in addition to a judgment ejecting Defendants from the Law Office, Hillen respectfully
requests a writ of assistance.
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B.

Any Judgment on the Ejectment (Count One) Should be Certified as Final
Under Rule 54(b ).
Rule 54(b) provides that a partial judgment may be certified as final when "an

action presents more than one claim for relief' and the court finds "there is no just reason for
delay." Whether or not to certify a partial judgment as final is within the sound discretion of this
Court. PHH Mortg. Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631,636,200 P.3d 1180, 1185 (2009). In

Perreira, the district court certified as final a partial judgment restoring possession of real property
to the plaintiff. Id. at 634, 200 P.3d at 1183. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the district court's
decision to certify as final a partial judgment granting the plaintiff possession of real property at
issue. Id., 146 Idaho at 636, 200 P.3d at 1185.
The same result is warranted here. The Law Office represents a portion of the Estate
that Hillen is unable to sell, lease or otherwise account for due to Defendants' unlawful possession.

See Declaration ofNoah G. Hillen in Support of Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings and
Motion to Certify Judgment Under I.R.C.P. 54(b) ("Hillen Declaration"). 7 Hillen is charged with
expeditiously liquidating Estate property and distributing the proceeds to its heirs. As long as
Defendants occupy the Law Office, Hillen cannot discharge his statutory duties as personal
representative. In light of these facts, there is no just reason to delay decision on Hillen's motion.
If anything, time is of the essence.

7
The Hillen Declaration is submitted solely in support of the portion of this motion addressing the propriety
of a 54(b) certificate and not the portion discussing the need for judgment on the pleadings. Accordingly, the presence
of the Hillen Declaration does not result in a denial of the 12(c) motion for going outside of the pleadings. Nor does
the Court have to consider converting the motion to one for summary judgment.
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V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Hillen requests that this Court rule in his favor on Count
One, enter judgment on Count One in favor of Hillen and certify it as final under Rule 54(b), and
immediately issue a writ restoring possession of the Law Office to Hillen.
DATED this 26th day of March, 2020.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By Isl Randall A. Peterman
Randall A. Peterman - Of the Firm
Alexander P. McLaughlin - Of the Firm
Jack W. Relf- Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of March, 2020, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER
I.R.C.P. 54(B) to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Vernon K. Smith, Jr.
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Attorney for Defendants

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt: vkslaw@live.com
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Randall A. Peterman

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B) - 9
14972619.2

Page 65

Electronically Filed
3/26/2020 4: 17 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Nichole Snell, Deputy Clerk

Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
013683-0002
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Case No. CV0l-19-20686

Plaintiff,

DECLARATION OF NOAH G. HILLEN
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO
CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER
I.R.C.P. 54(B)

vs.
LAW OFFICE OF VERNON K. SMITH,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company;
VERNON K. SMITH LAW, PC, an Idaho
professional service corporation,
Defendant.

NOAH G. HILLEN, under penalty of perjury, hereby declares and states as
follows:
1.

I am above the age of 18 and a resident of the state of Idaho. I am the

Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith ("Estate") in that certain probate matter
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styled as In re Estate of Victoria H Smith, Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352, in the District Court of
the Fourth Judicial District of the state of Idaho, in and for the county of Ada ("Probate Case").
The Honorable Cheri C. Copsey ("Probate Court") presides over the Probate Case.
2.

I have personal knowledge of the facts in this Declaration and make this

Declaration on the basis of such knowledge.
3.

The Estate's res comprises, in part, the real property commonly known as

and located at 1900 W. Main St., Boise, ID 83702 (the "Premises").
4.

As long as Defendants remain in possession of the Premises, I cannot collect

rent for, sell, or otherwise account for the Premises which I need to do to exercise my duty to
administer the Estate on behalf of its heirs.
5.

Defendants' possession is unlawful as they do not have any sort ofleasehold

interest to any portion of the Premises. The undersigned sent a termination notice to Defendants
several months back terminating whatever tenancy Defendants may or may not have had.
6.

Defendants refuse to vacate the property. This creates a significant issue.

As the Personal Representative, I am charged with liquidating Estate property in an expeditious
manner and distributing the same to the Estate's heirs.
7.

However, Defendants' possession of the Premises effectively makes it

impossible to sell the Premises at top dollar, collect rent for use of the Premises, or otherwise
account for the Premises for obvious reasons.
8.

Accordingly, in the interest of fully administering the Estate and accounting

for its res, it is necessary to have the Defendants removed from the Premises as quickly as possible.
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Any delay associated with their removal prevents me from discharging my duties in a prompt
fashion.
I declare under penalty of pe1jury under the laws of the state of Idaho that the
foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge information, and belief.
Dated this 26th day of March, 2020.

Noah G. Hillen
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 26th day of March, 2020, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing DECLARATION OF NOAH G. HILLEN IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO
CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B) to be served by the method indicated below,
and addressed to the following:
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Vernon K. Smith, Jr.
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Attorney for Defendants

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt: vkslaw@live.com

Isl Randall A. Peterman
Randall A. Peterman
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Vernon K. Smith
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
ISB No. 1365
Tel. (208) 345-1125
Fax:(208) 345-1129
vkslaw@live.com

5

Attorney for Defendants Vernon K. Smith Jr.
6
7

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

8

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

9
10

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

11

Case No. CV0l-19-20686

Plaintiff,
12

DECLARATION IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS

V.

13
14
15

LAW OFFICES OF VERNON K. SMITH,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company;
VERNON K. SMITH LAW, PC, an Idaho
professional service corporation,

16

Defendants.
17
18
19

20
21

STATE OF IDAHO

)
): ss
COUNTY OF ADA )
COMES NOW VERNON K. SMITH, JR., and being first duly sworn upon oath and
under penalty of perjury, does herewith depose and state the following:

22

1. That your affiant is the attorney of record for the above-named Defendants, and is the

23

individual that is actually in possession of the premises being described in the Verified

24

Complaint for Ejectment, filed by the Plaintiff, referring to the premises identified as

25

1900 W. MainStreet, Boise, Idaho 83702.

26
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2. That affiant is over the age of eighteen (18), competent to testify, and does present the
2

facts identified herein based upon Affiant' s own knowledge and belief, as Affiant is an

3

heir of the Decedent, Victoria H. Smith, and does have personal knowledge of the facts

4

identified in this Declaration, and does make this declaration as based upon such

5

personal knowledge.

6

3. That Victoria H. Smith, the Decedent, who died on September 11, 2013, is Affiant' s

7

Mother, and through that relationship, and in the capacity of other matters as determined

8

by her, I came into the exclusive possession of the premises referred to as 1900 W. Main

9

Street, Boise, Ada County, Idaho 83702, commencing in 1971, and have maintained the

10

first floor of that primary two story building as my law office, renting out the remaining

11

second floor and the back apartments, delivering those rental proceeds to my Mother.

12

4. That in 2017, upon the appointment of Noah G. Hillen as the personal representative

13

(PR) of my Mother's Estate, Mr. Hillen (Hillen) came to the premises and informed

14

Affiant that he was taking possession and control of each of the tenant's occupancy

15

located on the second floor of the primary building and the back apartments,

16

appropriating the rents to himself, as the PR of the Estate, leaving your Affiant' s

17

occupancy alone, for among the reasons that I revealed to him that I was originally the

18

sole beneficiary under my Mother's holographic Will, and upon the invalidation of my

19

Mother's Holographic Will by the assigned magistrate in the probate proceedings, Cheri

20

C. Copsey, your Affiant went from being the sole devisee of the Decedent under her

21

almost three decade old Holographic Will, to that of an Intestate Estate, and as such,

22

became a 2/3 rd8 "vested" and "titled" owner of Decedent's assets, in accordance with the

23

Uniform Probate Code and the well-established case law, and though Affiant was

24

concerned about Hillen's purported "ownership" claim of the Decedent's assets that he

25

perceived he had, your Affiant declined to argue with him, and as he then examined the

26

facility Affiant was occupying, he recognized the facility had no economic viability in
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the rental market due to the needed renovations and restorations that underway, but ther
2

needed restoration was incomplete.

3

5. That Hillen took possession of the upstairs apartments, the back apartments, and the

4

1902 building facility, another facility that had been under renovation as well, asserting

5

his right to take possession as the personal representative, changing the entry locks, and

6

having taken possession of those facilities, and to date, the 1902 building remains

7

unusable on the retail market because of its incompleted state of renovation, has never

8

generating any income since he took possession in 2017, and the consequence of

9

Hillen's action only served to terminate Affiant's completion of that restoration project,

10

and ever since his possession, has been left idle, relying on Affiant's constant watch and

11

protection from vandalism and transient occupancy.

12

6. That this area around 1900 W. Main Street has maintained a high concentration of

13

homeless individuals and transients, and the area has come to more recently include low

14

income housing assistance, which has brought about even more transient attraction and

15

presence. The effect of Hillen's possession of the 1902 facility has remained in it

16

uncompleted state, and that has served to attract attention to these homeless individuals

17

to sleep in the courtyard, under and by the parapet walls and within the front porch area,

18

requiring your Affiant' s attention to protect the property with the installation of metal

19

fencing and other exterior expenditures to prevent any entry and unwanted occupancy.

20

7. That Affiant did present to this court his verified answer to the verified complaint,

21

setting forth within that verified answer factual aspects of this controversy, and

22

Affiant' s concerns regarding the legal issues now evolving, and Affiant does incorporate

23

those responses contained within that verified answer as though asserted within this

24

Declaration to the court.

25

8. As stated in the Verified answer, the above one above-named Defendant, the LLC was

26

converted to a professional corporation, now identified as a PC, which is operated by
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Affiant, and the possession comes through Affiant, and the possession of the premises
2

not through either of the named Defendants, but through your Affiant' s vested

3

ownership and possession of that portion of the 1900 W. Main Street premises, which

4

first floor of the primary structure at 1900 West Main St., building represents 20% of the

5

floor space of the entire Complex, as Hillen "commandeered" the other space in 2017;

6

and though Affiant has been in possession of this entire Complex for almost fifty (50)

7

years, with a right of continued possession from his vested ownership following the

8

demise of his Mother, Victoria H. Smith. Affiant has tried to cooperate with Hillen's

9

claim to ownership, but now must protect Affiant' s vested interests and prevent the

10

effects stemming from the misguided belief that Hillen can sell these remaining assets

11

when there are no creditor claims to satisfy and no other interests against the Estate.

12

9. That Hillen obtained an appraisal of the 1900 W, Main Street Complex, and the

13

appraisal declared the value of the entire Main Street complex (1900/1902) to have

14

value only in the real property, subject to the demolition-deduction for the removal of

15

the buildings, and Hillen before acknowledged the area occupied by Affiant was not in a

16

state of occupancy that would attract a tenant on the retail rental market, which is

17

unquestionably true as the first floor of the primary building is not suited for rental to a

18

third party. Hillen was made aware the entire 1900 office complex, including the 1902

19

building, was then in the progressive stages of interior and exterior renovation, now

20

being interrupted by this probate controversy, and was valued for only their land

21

valuation, as the improvements were regarded by the appraiser as of no value, obsolete,

22

and would be tom down in the retail market. Consequently, there was no intent to make

23

any reasonable Estate investment to be undertaken in any effort to restore any of the

24

structures, as the cost to do so would not add any value to the appraisal that was

25

produced, and the restoration costs would not be recovered by any rental income, and

26

DECLARATION IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS
4
Page 73

regardless, under the statutes, the property must be distributed in like kind, and that will
2

be distributed to Affiant as his share of any distribution of Decedent's assets.

3

10. The successor to receive this office complex would only logically be Affiant, as he has

4

had the continuous possession since 1971, made that his office complex, and intends to

5

preserve it, consistent with the mission style architecture, and Affiant has every intention

6

of doing that, as part of the legacy of his Father, as that was his office as well since

7

1946. Affiant will decide when and how to remodel any of the structural facilities, as

8

Hillen has refused to do so, and the structures are in need of substantial improvements,

9

as Hillen knows the state of the existing improvements have been deemed depreciated,

10

worn out, obsolete, and worthless for any valuation purpose.

11

11. That it has been confirmed that Hillen has been utilizing vanous rents and lease

12

payments from other property interests to fund unnecessary, improper, baseless, and

13

wasteful administrative activities, much of which has now exceeded one Million Dollars

14

for wasteful churning of attorney fees, of which this and other case serve to confirm,

15

wasting the estate cash reserves on needless administration expenses, legal fees, baseless

16

civil actions and malicious accusations, to the detriment of Affiant' s 2/3 rd8 ownership

17

interests, that such wasteful actions has not served the interests of either heir, and there

18

has been no benefit or protection to the assets, but rather the wasteful consumption and

19

disregard for the protection of the assets.

20

12. That as examples of disregard for the protection of assets, Hillen has refused to take the

21

needed investment to protect the Victorian House located at the "Home Place" along

22

Chinden Boulevard west of Boise, as it has been vandalized three times, and Affiant has

23

assisted in the investigation of each incident with law enforcement, and when Affiant

24

and law enforcement wanted camera installed, Hillen refused to do so, requiring Affiant

25

and law enforcement to engage that expense and activity. The same mentality has

26

existed with respect to the 1902 Main Street building, part of the Office Complex, as
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above mentioned, Hillen took possession of that building in 201 7, while in a state of
2

being renovated by Affiant, disrupting Affiant' s restoration process and since taking

3

possession, has remained un-occupied, save for Affiant' s continuous acts of protection

4

and preservation, and this disruption by Hillen has left the facility unable to generate any

5

revenue, leaving the building to Affiant to preserve and protect it from vandalism.

6

13. That for your Affiant to vacate the first floor of the 1900 W. Main Street facility would

7

be no different than what has occur with 1902 or the Victoria House, exposed to damage

8

and uncertain events of periodic vandalism, which Affiant alone has taken action to

9

protect and secure.

10

14. That Affiant's occupancy of the first floor has been in a state of phase renovation,

11

disrupted when the probate controversy arose, and has no rental value on the retail

12

market because of the physical condition and state of the uncompleted restoration and

13

needed improvements yet required to be addressed.

14

15. That to leave this first floor of the 1900 W. Main Street premises vacant will cause

15

needless exposure to unnecessary vandalism, which will require Affiant to continue to

16

safeguard it just as he continues to safeguard the 1902 facility, installing a steel privacy

17

fence to discourage transients and exposure to vandalism.

18

16. That since Affiant has been in continuous possession of this Premises since 1971, he has

19

made the only substantial and major improvements at his own expense to restore the

20

"well weathered" buildings, and completed substantial exterior stucco improvements in

21

1986, and again in the late 1990' s, remodeled the interior, installed asphalt parking,

22

made electrical alterations,re4modeled the two front rooms, replaced the entire heating

23

and duct system in 1974, now in need of further replacement, modified the landscape

24

and previously "re-faced" the fa<;ade on each of the three buildings with a stucco veneer

25

in 1986, now again in direr need of further stucco restoration, following decades of

26

penetrating moisture, with preliminary stucco removal commenced years ago, but now
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delayed by this estate controversy, awaiting Affiant's further restoration, having endured
2

two earthquakes, 1983 and 2020, causing more hairline cracks from the structural

3

movement; that extensive alterations and improvements are needed to restore the

4

structure to its former convenient use, requiring substantial upgrades, and until that takes

5

place, there is no commercial interest in any rental or occupancy from any serious third

6

party tenant.

7

17. There have never been any creditors in this estate, and there are no other interested

8

persons that have a claim against the estate that would require this behavior of Hillen or

9

pursue a sale, when that conflicts with his duty as a personal representative in a probate

10

estate, For Hillen to make the statement as he did in Par. 4 of his Declaration that "As

11

long as Defendants remain in possession of the Premises, I cannot collect rent for, sell,

12

or otherwise account for the Premises which I need to do to exercise my duty to

13

administer the Estate on behalf of its heirs", is both a mis-statement of his duty as a

14

personal representative in an estate, and a mis-statement of the law, as the premises

15

occupied by Affiant Hillen well knows cannot be rented out on the retail market as there

16

is no current heating system, requiring use of costly electric space heating units,

17

currently effective cooling system without modification, and the interior ceilings have

18

suffered water damaged from improper control of the water fixtures generated from the

19

upstairs apartments, and other detracting conditions of which Hillen was made aware.

20

18. A probate estate is not a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy estate; the assets are not to be liquidated

21

like is done in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the only apparent experience Hillen appears to

22

have been his occupation as a Chapter 7 Trustee; a probate estate is intended to be

23

distributed in like kind to the heir(s) under the statutes, especially when there exists no

24

necessity to liquidate assets to satisfy creditors or other need for liquidation of the

25

Decedent's assets. The law is clear an heir is the titled and vested owner of the

26

Decedent's assets, and there is no lease to terminate or rental occupancy to enforce, as

DECLARATION IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS
7
Page 76

no

Affiant's possession of the property is that of a titled and vested owner, mandated by
2

statute, by case law, and no magistrate or personal representative has any authority to

3

terminate or impede Affiant' s title ownership in the premises, absent a showing of

4

necessity, of which no exists, and none has been claimed or even asserted by Hillen in

5

these proceedings.

6

Dated this 30th day of April, 2020.

7

Attome

8

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

9

lO

11

I HEREBY CERTIFY on April 30, 2020, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing instrument upon the following person(s), pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Electronic
Filing and Service, by the method of e-mail, to:

12
13
14

Randall A. Peterman
Givens Pursley, LLP
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, ID 83701

[ ]Hand Delivered
[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsi ·
~-13
[X] i-Co

ail rap'@gi

fey.com

15
16

Dated April 30, 2020.

17
18
19

20
21

22
23
24
25

26
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Vernon K. Smith
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
ISB No. 1365
Tel. (208) 345-1125
Fax:(208) 345-1129
vkslaw@live.com
Attorney for Defendants Vernon K. Smith Jr.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV0l-19-20686

V.

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

LAW OFFICES OF VERNON K. SMITH,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company;
VERNON K. SMITH LAW, PC, an Idaho
professional service corporation,
Defendants.

I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This independent proceeding arises out of the probate controversy of the Estate of Victoria
H. Smith. The probate magistrate determined that Victoria H. Smith's 1991 Holographic Will was
invalid as a result of her finding of undue influence, and the transfers of Victoria's property assets
to VHS Properties, LLC, made over a year prior to Victoria's death by the use of a power of
attorney, was an act of "gifting", and the court declared the power lacked authority to gift, and the
transfer was invalidated. Those disputed findings were upheld on appeal to the Idaho Supreme
Court. Matter ofEstate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 466, 432 P .3d 6, 15 (2018).
For purposes of returning the title and possession of the property to the Decedent, the
probate court, being retired Judge Cheri C. Copsey, unfamiliar with probate matters, did not take
into account the statute that vests title and ownership of a decedent's assts immediately upon death
with heirs or devisees, and instead created and issued a Rule 70(b) Order, a copy of which is
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referenced in Plaintiffs memorandum submitted on this motion, placing title with the personal
representative of the estate, Noah G. Hillen.
As alleged in the responsive pleadings in this matter, and confirmed in the Declaration of
Vernon K. Smith (Vernon), he has been in continuous possession of the first floor of the 1900 W.
Main Street building since 1971, and now with the operation of the statute, maintains his law office
from that facility under Vernon's possession of the property as an heir of the Decedent pursuant
to LC.§ 15-3-101, and applicable case law, declaring Vernon to be a vested and titled owner of the
property, being a 2/3rds heir of Victoria's estate. There are substantial property assets in
Decedent's estate to allow for in-kind distribution as mandated by the statute.
Vernon's status to the property rights is now that of a titled and vested 2/3rds owner, never
an unauthorized occupier or unlawful detainment, or a tenant required to pay rent for his own
property interests, as the statute and case law confirm his titled ownership, and the provisions
within the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) limit the administration of a Personal Representative (PR)
to take possession, and may do so only in such matters needed to satisfy creditors or other

interested persons, of which there are none alleged in Hillen's Complaint. Hillen wants to sell the
property, which remains entirely unnecessary, and has no authority to take possession for the sole
purpose of merely liquidating property when no creditors exist.
Vernon has vigorously opposed Hillen's attempt to take possession and dispossess Vernon
from what is his ownership interest in the property, and such action by the Hillen, as a statutory
personal representative (PR) is acting without any supporting legal authority (necessity to sell
property to satisfy creditors) under either the applicable provisions of the Idaho Uniform Probate
Code (UPC), or by any strained construction of the misplaced probate court's Rule 70(b) Order.
In the absence of any necessity arising out of the administration of the estate for the benefit
of creditors or other interested persons, LC. § 15-3-711, the Uniform Probate Code states a
preference for the in-kind distribution of the estate to the heirs, as opposed to any liquidation of
estate property. LC. § 15-3-906. Actions taken by a PR in excess of his authority can and will
result in a breach of fiduciary duty remediable by an award of damages, LC. § 15-3-712, and can
properly be restrained by an order of the court, LC. § 15-3-607.
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II.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This independent action seeks, in part, the ej ectment of Vernon from the first floor of what
is commonly referred to as the "1900 W. Main Street" office building, of which Vernon occupies
the first floor for his law practice, as Hillen has taken the possession of the second floor and each
of the back apartments, with no justification for doing that other than to appropriate the rents that
Vernon had generated with the remodeled units he completed over the past decades. This is the
fourth action in which the Personal Representative, Noah G. Hillen, has sought the ejectment of a
person or entity from Decedent's property. The first action, Hillen v. Gibson, Fourth Dist., Ada
County Case No. CV 01-19-10368, requested the ejectment of a long-standing business joint
venture participant, David Gibson, from the Gowen property, 520 acres, placed there in 2004 by
Victoria H. Smith and her son Vernon K. Smith to generate compost for the entire 520 acres in an
agricultural operation.
In that action, Judge Hippler, on October 2, 2019, granted the request for entry of judgment
for an ejectment of Gibson, but declined to directly rule on the actual stated-basis for that request
for relief within Complaint, which a motion for judgment on the pleadings is limited to its
allegations. Hillen alleged he was the "sole owner" of the property, contrary to law. That false
premise was again been raised within the second action before Judge Hoagland, each of those
rulings are currently on appeal, and now this third action pending before this court with the same
allegation of ownership, without any alleged basis of a necessity for taking possession. There was
no supporting affidavit or declaration in either of the other two actions, but there is a declaration
from Hillen in this action, the effect of which confirms his sole intention is to liquidate the
property, with no established necessity for doing such, and cannot be supported in fact or embraced
in the law.
In Judge Hippler and Hoagland's cases, it appears those Judges merely held that Hillen
had authority to proceed with ejectment under LC.§ 15-3-711 by exercising "the same power over
the title to property of the estate that an absolute owner would have, in trust however, for the
benefit of the creditors and others interested in the estate." There lies the fundamental issue of

concern; there are no such creditor or interests that exist that necessitate any liquidation. The failure
to expressly reject Hillen's ownership and liquidation claims, while recognizing the personal
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representative's authority under I.C. § 15-3-711, creates an irreconcilable conflict in those

decisions, and each is on appeal under a certified Rule 54(b) Judgment.
The distinctions that arise out of the statutory limitations placed upon the exercise of a
"power" by a personal representative, in contrast to Hillen's claim he is the "sole owner" of the
Decedent's property, are extremely significant in determining the power and authority a personal
representative may actually exercise over a Decedent's property. If Hillen were to be determined
to be the "sole owner" of Decedent's property, to the exclusion of the statutory heirs, then arguably
Hillen is no longer subject to his trust obligation to the heirs, nor subject to the heirs' corresponding
statutory authority to restrain unauthorized actions (LC. § 15-3-607), or to seek damages for
Hillen's breach of fiduciary duty (LC.§ 15-3-712). If Hillen is deemed to be the "sole owner" of
the estate property, then the heirs' trust interest has been extinguished, and they would no longer
have the required standing to either seek restraint against the personal representative, or to seek
damages for breach of fiduciary duty, inasmuch as those statutory obligations have been eliminated
by court order. Thus, this court must exercise caution in considering the relief sought by the
Personal Representative, as the heirs must preserve their right and claims to assert the fiduciary
breaches that have occurred in these proceedings.
Hillen has, in this action, again directly placed at issue the same questions that he raised in
the previous actions before Judges Hippler and Hoagland, which are: (1) "[W]hether Plaintiff,
Noah G. Hillen ('Hillen'), as Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith (the
'Estate'), owns the Decedent's property that Vernon currently possesses[?]"
Hillen's request for relief arises from a June 2, 2017 Rule 70(b) Order issued by the
Magistrate, Cheri C. Copsey, assigned to the probate proceeding, ordering all of Decedent's
property, previously transferred to VHS Properties, LLC by the use of an exercise of a power of
attorney, be returned to the decedent's ownership. The language used within Magistrate's Rule
70(b) Order appeared to "divest" Vernon K. Smith of all title and interest in the exact same
property he is vested and titled as an owner under the statutes and case law, clearly in conflict with
his title and possession received by operation of law under LC.§ 15-3-101, as Vernon is a 2/3 rd8
heir to all of the property interests of the Decedent.
Hillen argues he has sole ownership of Decedent's property, and the corresponding right
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as sole owner to completely liquidate Decedent's property, a complete disaster, as real property is
unique under the law, and liquidation is entirely unnecessary. Hillen would then suggest his
ownership was confirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho
457, 466, 432 P.3d 6, 15 (2018). However, the only two issues raised on the appeal to the Idaho
Supreme Court were: (1) Did the probate court err in finding the holographic will invalid because
of undue influence? and (2) Did the probate court err in ruling that the power of attorney transfers
were entitled to be invalidated? No issue was raised or decided concerning the interpretation of
the Rule 70(b) Order, itself, as no one envisioned that Hillen would engage in such a misguided
attempt to circumvent the applicable Probate Code law and circumvent the limitations placed upon
him as a personal representative.
In its decision, the Idaho Supreme Court, in referring to the probate court's Rule 70(b)
Order, merely stated, "In June 2017, the court entered a judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 70(b), which vested title to all of Victoria's real and personal property in the personal
representative who had been appointed." Matter ofEstate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457,466,432 P.3d
6, 15 (2018). It is from this passing statement the parties' dispute in this matter finds controversy.
Hillen claims the effect of the Rule 70(b) Order was to vest him with sole ownership of Decedent's
property, not just a "power" over the Decedent's property, as conferred by the Idaho UPC in I.C.
§ 15-3-711 for the limited purposes of satisfying creditors and claims of interested persons, none
of which exist.
It is to be noted that Vernon is the one in possession of this premises, from where he

practices law, and he is not named as a Defendant in the action. The entities identified in pleadings
are there upon Vernon's possession, as the entities have no independent possessory interest.
As further argued below the only issues raised and actually decided by the Idaho Supreme
Court, was the invalidity of the power of attorney transfers and the validity of the Will. No issue
was raised before, or decided by, the Idaho Supreme Court construing the effect of the Rule 70(b)
Order, as it was thought to be merely the vehicle chosen by a magistrate to obtain the transfer of
the late Victoria H. Smith's property back to the ownership of the Decedent. Consequently, as
applied to the Defendant, Vernon's occupation of the 1900 W. Main Street property, he argues that
the Personal Representative Hillen has no authority, as conferred under the Idaho UPC or by the
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Rule 70(b) Order, that permits Hillen to eject him (the pleadings only allege non-possessory
entities) of his otherwise lawful occupation of that property, that he has lawfully occupied and,
maintained the premises throughout various stages since 1971, cannot be divested of possession.

A.

LIMITATIONS ON A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OWNERSHIP
Idaho law confirms Hillen cannot lawfully be an "owner" of a Decedent's property,

notwithstanding the Rule 70 Order, as a PR cannot hold ownership to a decedent's assets,
addressed in Lemp v. Lemp, 32 Idaho 397,401, 184 P. 222,223 (1919), being part of the law from
which I. C. § 15-3-101 was adopted in Idaho, placing title and ownership with the devisees or heirs.
The Lemp case, supra, unanimously declared "The administrator or executor is not the owner of

any part of the estate, and that proposition remains the state of the law today, as expressed within
the probate code and the more recent Idaho case law.
Had this magistrate intended to eliminate Vernon's interest as an heir of the estate, a right
unconditionally established under the UPC, such intention would be a violation ofl.C. § 15-3-101,
and a Judicial Cannon violation, as no authority exists to eliminate an heir's title and vested
ownership of the decedent's assets under LC.§ 15-3-101. No magistrate would knowingly commit
such a willful violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Judicial Cannon of Ethics, as it
constitutes a violation of the statute, the case law, and prohibition preventing a PR from owning
estate assets, and would otherwise serve to cause mounting damages against a PR.

B.

STATUTORY LIMITATIONS ON HILLEN'S PROBATE AUTHORITY
In contrast to ownership, Hillen may only seek a grant to possession, in trust, for the benefit

of creditors, if there were creditors, and in such a situation, his actions remain subject to review
under UPC provisions as cited above. I
The only intended function to be served by the Rule 70(b) Order/Judgment was voidance
of the transfer of Decedent's assets to VHS Properties, LLC and return those specific assets to
Decedent, who then being deceased, then can only statutorily vest in the heirs or devisees, never a

1

Hillen's claim in these cases has been based upon his erroneous claim to "ownership" of Decedent's

property, not mere "possession." In a larger sense, it is the very application of the UPC statutes, the case law, and the
remedies and restrictions they provide concerning the unauthorized actions of a personal representative which is at
the center of Hillen's misconduct, fueled by this court's erroneous Order.
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PR of any estate. The disaster occurring from this unintended consequence is Hillen's expresslystated objective to liquidate the Estate of Victoria H. Smith, as though his authority under the UPC
is being perceived by him to be no different than his experience as a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee,
which appears to be his only limited professional involvement.
Hillen's actions in the district court are predicated upon a claim he is the "sole owner" of
Decedent's property, not upon any statutory right to "possession" for any specified purpose
necessitated in the administration of the estate for the benefit of creditors. His unwarranted idea to
liquidate the assets is a breach of his duty under the UPC, as Hillen has declared the intention to
liquidate the estate, admittedly so in his Declaration, a direct contravention to the express standards
requiring the preservation of estate property under LC. § 15-3-906, and in-kind distribution to
heirs, and this gross contradiction of law must stop.
C. APPLICABLE STATUTORY/ CASE LAW TO PERSONAL REPRESNTATIVES

The UPC expressly states: "Estates descend at death to successors identified by any
probated Will, or to heirs if no Will, subject to limitations which may be implemented through
administration." Official Comment LC. § 15-3-101, ,r 1).
By Idaho law, the heir obtains and retains title, subject only to divestment and possession
in the necessary exercise of the § 15-3-711 power, limited by a required determination that such
divestment of the heir's ownership interest in Decedent's property is necessary for the
administration of the estate for the benefit of creditors or other interested parties. This Estate had
no claims, as Vernon resolved all debts and liabilities long before the death of the Decedent.
Vernon has a 2/3rds interest as a statutorily "vested" heir, statutorily mandated by L C.
§ 15-3-101, interpreted and confirmed by the well-established case law, Fairchild v. Fairchild, 106
Idaho 147 (1984), and Ellmaker v. Tabor, 160 Idaho 576, 377 P.3d 390, (2015).
LC. §15-3-101 specifically states:
"15-3-101. Devolution of estate at death -- Restrictions. The power of a person to leave
property by will, and the rights of creditors, devisees, and heirs to his property are subject
to the restrictions and limitations contained in this code to facilitate the prompt settlement
of estates. Upon the death of a person, his separate property devolves to the persons to
whom it is devised by his last will,
In the matter of Fairchild v. Fairchild, 106 Idaho 147 (1984), the court held:
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"We view the statement that "all became cotenants" as a conclusion of law, reached
by applying existing law to the findings of fact. See I. C. § 15-2-103 (concerning the share
of the decedent's heirs); and I.C. § 15-3-101 (decedent's property devolves to his heirs
at death). This conclusion is correct. We uphold it .
. . . the narrow focus of this appeal has been the application of settled law to the facts.
Furthermore, there was no showing that the trial court misapplied the law. Scott v. Castle,
104 Idaho 719, 662 P.2d 1163 (Ct. App. 1983). We hold that this appeal was brought
frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation."
In Ellmaker v. Tabor, 160 Idaho 576, 377 P.3d 390, (2015) it was further confirmed:
"Idaho Code section 15-3-101 provides, "Upon the death of a person, his separate property
devolves to the persons to whom it is devised by his last will ... " The word "devolve"
means: "1. To transfer (rights, duties, or powers) to another. 2. To pass (rights, duties, or
powers) by transmission or succession." Black's Law Dictionary 463 (7th ed. 1999). "The
term is said to be peculiarly appropriate to the passing of an estate from a person dying to a
person living." Black's Law Dictionary 540 (4th ed. 1968). "The legal title to estate
property vests in the heirs or devisees upon the death of the decedent." Pierce v.
Francis, 194 P.3d 505, 510 (Colo.App. 2008).
D.

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES FROM HILLEN'S BEHAVIOR
Because ofHillen's behavior, there are now four cases pending in district court that Hillen

has sought to gain possession of individual property holdings of Decedent's property, with no
necessity for doing so, the first being Hillen v. Gibson, Fourth Dist., Ada County Case No. CV
01-19-10368, currently on appeal; the second being Hillen v. V. K. Smith IIL Fourth Dist, Ada
County Case No. CV 01-19-10367, currently on appeal, the third being this case against Vernon
and his law office, the 2/3 rds heir, and the fourth against Riverside Farms, Inc., the entity that
continues to farm the Chinden Property to preserve the farm exemption and maintain the programs
that preserve the soil conditions and irrigation systems.
In each of these actions Hillen's pleadings fail to establish any statutory necessity, to
support a reason for possession, and no basis within the scope of relief under his motion for
"judgment on the pleadings" in this case. There has never been any alleged "fact" of an existing
creditor claim of necessity to take possession within Hillen's pleadings, as there are none,

formulating an irreconcilable conflict with the statute, and the entire controversy is the product
of Hillen believing he has been made the "title owner" of Decedent's properties, which is not
supported by the statute, case law, and prohibited from ownership by well-established case law.
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The distinctions that arise out of the statutory limitations placed upon the exercise of a
"power", exercised by a PR, in contrast to Hillen's claim as "sole owner" ofDecedent's property,
are manifestly significant in determining the authority a PR may exercise.
If Hillen were the "sole owner" of Decedent's property, to the exclusion of the estate's

heirs, he is no longer subject to his trust obligation to heirs, nor subject to the heirs' corresponding
statutory authority to restrain unauthorized actions (LC.§ 15-3-607), and seek damages for breach
of fiduciary duty (LC. §15-3-712).
If Hillen were the "sole owner" of Decedent's property, the heirs' trust interest has been

extinguished, and no longer standing to restrain the PR or recover damages for breach of fiduciary
duty, inasmuch as those statutory obligations are eliminated by the unauthorized actions of the
court, acting outside the scope of her statutory authority. Thus, this court must correct the error
and preserve their right and claims to assert the fiduciary breaches occurring in these proceedings.
Hillen fails to embrace the statutory distinction between "ownership" and the statutory
necessity required before authorized to take "possession" of any assets, a distinction highly
significant to the fate of the assets, and Hillen's quest has been to liquidate assets, (his Chapter 7
Trustee mentality, his only experience) a resulting consequence is to create a capital gains tax
imposed upon the owners of the property by the reckless acts of liquidation of these assets owned
by the heirs. Neither the statute nor Idaho case law support Hillen's liquidation quest or claim to
ownership.
Significant distinctions arise out of statutory limitations placed upon the exercise of a
"power" by a personal representative, as opposed to Hillen's fictitious claim to be the sole
"owner" of Decedent's property. Hillen cannot be deemed the "sole owner" of Decedent's
property, to the exclusion of Decedent's heirs, as he has a statutory trust obligation to heirs, and
must remain subject to heirs' statutory right to restrain his unauthorized actions (LC. § 15-3-607),
and statutory right to recover damages for Hillen' s breach of fiduciary duty (LC. § 15-3-712).
This unrestrained behavior of Hillen is unfounded in law, and cannot be embraced by the
court, as it perpetuates a statutory violation and conflicts with case law.
E.

THE INTENDED CONSEQUENCE OF THE RULE 70(b) ENTRY

This magistrate, having declared the gifting of Victoria H. Smith's assets under the 2008
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Power of Attorney from Victoria to VHS Properties, LLC on July 4, 2012 to be invalid, and then
declaring the 1991 Holographic Will of Victoria H. Smith to be invalid upon the controversial
claim of undue influence, the court intended to reverse the July 4, 2012 transfer of Decedent's
property assets and to restore the ownership to Victoria, but Victoria, then being deceased, having
died on September 11, 2013, this court, being unfamiliar with the transfer of ownership interests
ofa decedent mandated by LC. §15-3-101 within the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), and unaware
of the corresponding case law, inappropriately issued a Rule 70(b) Order/Judgment, erroneously
transferring title and ownership of the Decedent's property to a special administrator who then
became the Personal Representative (PR), contrary to not only the statute and well established
case law, but also in dereliction of the controlling authority that prohibits any person in a fiduciary
capacity to take title to Decedent's property interests, other than to satisfy valid and approved
claims of a creditor or other interested persons, the authority regarding which is identified in detail
hereinafter.
In the month of August, 201 7, while in open court during a hearing before this magistrate
assigned to the probate controversy, the magistrate acknowledged she was not familiar with the
law as it relates to probate matters, and expressly stated she was looking to the Parties to receive
guidance as to the law. This statement was made two months after the statutorily unsupported
Order/Judgment was entered.
Under the UPC, the heirs or devisees, by well-established Idaho law, become the vested
and titled owner of Decedent's assets, immediately upon death, and neither the estate nor any
personal representative is allowed to own such assets, but allowed possession only when the PR
has established a necessity to exercise the statutory power to obtain possession, for the
satisfaction of creditors or other interested persons; otherwise the assets remain titled with the

heirs and distributed to the heirs or devisees through an in-kind distribution, when possible.
Vernon, being a 2/3 rd8 heir of Decedent, retains 2/3rds ownership, as the probate is
currently structured, and no heir benefits by a PR's objective to liquidate assets, in the absence of
any creditors, as such irrational conduct serves only to deprive a heir of real property that by law
is declared to be unique by nature and cannot be replaced, and further exposes the owners to
capital gains tax upon the liquidation of assets that should never be sold, Vernon has spent his

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION
FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS-PAGE 10

Page 87

lifetime preserving and maintaining these real property assets, unique and cannot be replaced.
This PR has a misguided perception to liquidate the assets foolishly, having no experience in
probate matters, as he has maintained his professional experience as a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
Trustee, where bankrupt estates are liquidated, not distributed.
Vernon has persistently opposed the disastrous actions of the PR who has been pursuing
a misplaced objective to liquidate assets, as Vernon and his Mother have spent their entire life
after the death of Vernon K. Smith Sr. preserving and maintaining the assets in teamwork, with
his Mother confirming to him the assets to become his within her Will, but now confronted with
the destructive decision of the magistrate and this unfounded objective of a PR to liquidate assets,
buttressed by the false claim that Hillen is the "owner" of Decedent's assets, a travesty by any
definition, and a clear violation of case law, resulting in the loss of unique property and the
unwanted creation of a tax liability with capital gains, none of which is in the best interests of any
heir. Hillen's claim to ownership is based upon this magistrate's error, with the entry of the
probate court's Rule 70(b) Order.
F.

THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCE OF RULE 70 (b) ENTRY
This ruling, as currently reflected in the Order/Judgment entered by this Magistrate on

June 2, 201 7, has created a flawed perception within the administration by the Personal
Representative, defying the objectives of the Uniform Probate Code requiring in-kind distribution
of assets, instead pursuing a course ofliquidating Decedent's assets, contrary to the objectives of
the UPC and that of the 2/3rds heir, always seeking to preserve assets.
The Personal Representative, acting upon that erroneous perception, has caused the filing
of four civil actions pending before the district court, two of which are on appeal to the Idaho
Supreme Court, with the third and fourth awaiting further proceedings, the effects of which has
come about due to the erroneous placement of title with the personal representative, which vesture
is invalid, as it conflicts with the court's statutory and jurisdictional authority to vest title in a
personal representative, contradicting the provisions of the UPC, which statutory authority controls
this issue, now in direct violation of existing case law, preventing ownership of a decedent's
property in a personal representative, who, acting solely in the capacity as a fiduciary, must act as
a trustee for the benefit of heirs or the devisees, whose authority, under the administration of an
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estate by a Personal Representative is limited to possession of a decedent's assets only under
certain limited circumstances of necessity to satisfy, in trust, any existing creditor claims, of which
there were none in this estate.
It is undisputed Victoria H. Smith had no creditors at the time of her death, as Vernon

resolved any issues of debt or liability asserted against either his Father or his Mother many years
ago, and no creditor claims have ever been filed against her estate. The only estate liability was
the disputed payment of federal estate taxes, which have been paid by the PR, who alone had the
obligation to file the return. The personal representative has tendered over four million dollars in
payment of the federal estate tax, for the satisfaction of that obligation, the net proceeds as received
by the estate from the Hamer farm sale in an amount over seven million dollars. There are no
other known estate obligations for which any liquidation of estate property is seen to be required.
By Idaho law, an heir's title is only subject to divestment and possession by the PR by an
exercise of the§ 15-3-711 power, limited by a required necessity for the administration of the estate

for the benefit of creditors or other interested parties. What Hillen is attempting to accomplish by
his filing of these district court proceedings is disregard the existing statutory mandate, and in its
place, exercise titled ownership to decedent's property (instead of the heirs), doing as he wants at
his sole discretion to liquidate the property needlessly, apparently of the belief he can escape
liability if acting as an "owner" and not as a fiduciary that protects the interests of the successors.
If Hillen is no longer required to act under the exercise of a statutorily-conferred power,
there is no longer any fiduciary interest to protect, and neither Vernon (nor Joseph) could challenge
Hillen's actions, as the PR liability is extinguished by the unintended consequence of the misplaced
Rule 70(b) disposition. This could never have been the intention of the court, as to be such is
without statutory authority, beyond the magistrate's exercise of its jurisdiction, and a breach of the
Judicial Cannon of Ethics.
Vernon opposes Plaintiff Hillen' s attempt to either take possession or dispossess him from
the 1900 W. Main Street property as not being authorized by any applicable provision of the Idaho
UPC, and lacking any basis arising out of the Rule 70(b) Order, or the Idaho Supreme Court's
appellate decision. Hillen was not made the "sole owner" of the estate property by the Rule 70
Order, nor does the personal representative have any right conferred under the Idaho UPC to
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proceed with the liquidation of estate property in the absence of an established need for such action
in the interest of creditors or other persons justifiably interested in the estate.

III.
LEGAL STANDARD APPLICABLE
TO A MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
The issues addressed in this Motion for Judgment Upon the Pleadings is controlled by
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(c) & (d), IRCP, and if facts are considered outside the
confines of the pleadings, then Rule 56, IRCP may have application. This motion is controlled by
Rule 12(c), but should affidavits be considered by the court, the motion may then be required to
be addressed as a motion for summary judgment (Rule 56(c)), requiring additional time to address
the issues raised outside the confines of the pleadings.
Rule 12(c), defines a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as follows:
"After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any
party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court,
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in
Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56"
A judgment upon the pleadings results from the fact that the answer does not put forth an

issue as to any material allegations of the complaint, or where the pleadings show upon their face
that the party is entitled to recover without proof A judgment on the pleadings is allowable, not
because of the lack of proof, but because of the lack of an issue raised by the responsive pleading.
Where issues of fact are raised by the pleadings, which require evidence to establish before the
court could intelligently determine whether such issues are to be found in favor of the plaintiff or
defendant, it is deemed to be error to enter a judgment on the pleadings. See Alspaugh v. Reid, 6
Idaho 223, 55 P. 300; Coombs v. Collins, 6 Idaho 536, 57 P. 310; Mills Novelty Co. v. Dunbar, 11
Idaho 671, 83 P. 932; Davenport v. Burke, 27 Idaho 464 149 P. 511 (1915); and more recently, see

Jones v. City of St. Maries, 111 Idaho 733, 727 P.2d 1161 (1986). In the case of Hicks v. Lovell,
64 Cal. 14, 49 Am. Rep. 679, 27 P. 942, it was held that, Judgment on the pleadings is authorized
"where the answer admits or leaves undenied the material facts stated in the complaint."
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When a case is decided on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, for the purpose of any
appeal of that decision, the appellate court must accept as true the appellants' allegations. See,
Jones, supra, citing Davenport v. Burke, 27 Idaho 464,473, 149 P. 511,515 (1915). In Sterling v.
Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986), the court held that where the district court decided

the case on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(c), the moving party
admits all allegations of the opposing party's pleadings, and concomitantly admits the untruth of
its own allegations which has been denied, therein once again citing to Davenport v. Burke, 27
Idaho 464,473, 149 P. 511, 515 (1915).
In Capital Partners Int'l Ventures, Inc. v. Danzas Corp., the federal court held that

if

matters outside the pleadings are presented to the court, the motion for judgment on the
pleadings is converted into a summary judgment motion under Rule 56, F.R.C.P.. Before

summary judgment may be entered, the non-moving party must be given notice and an opportunity
to respond, when a represented party has reason to know the court will look outside of the
pleadings. 309 F.Supp.2d 1138, 1143 (N.D. Cal. 2004).

The Idaho Supreme Court has expressed a "preference for interpreting the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure in conformance with the interpretation placed upon the same language in the
federal rules." Obendorf v. Terra Hug Spray Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 892, 897, 188 P.3d 834, 839
(2008). Both the Idaho and Federal rules use identical language requiring that motions to dismiss
and motions for judgment on the pleadings, are treated as summary judgment motions when
matters outside the pleadings are presented. I.R.C.P. 12(b), 12(c); FRCP 12(c), 12(d); see also
Hoyle v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 367, 48 P.3d 1256 (2002); Bagley v. Thomason, 155 Idaho

193, 307 P.3d 1219 (2013).
A judgment on the pleadings cannot be granted if there remain disputed issues of fact, such
that the movant is not entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471,
474, 163 P.3d 1183, 1186 (2007). Questions concerning whether particular actions attempted by
the personal representative are authorized by statute, or are permitted by an order of the court,
present issues of fact that cannot be resolved on motion for judgment on the pleadings. 144 Idaho
at 477, 163 P.3d at 1189 (2007).
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IV.
ARGUMENT

For those reasons stated above and as argued below, Hillen' s request for a judgment on the
pleadings is not supported by: (1) the decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in Matter of Estate of
Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 466, 432 P .3d 6, 15 (2018); or (2) the actual language of the Rule 70(b)
Order, itself, or (3) by the applicable provisions of the Idaho Uniform Probate Code (UPC), which
expressly limit the authority of a personal representative to act in respect to a Decedent's property.
A.

THE RULE 70(b) ORDER, CONSTRUED BY HILLEN AS A TRANSFER OF
"OWNERSHIP" OF DECEDENT'S ASSETS, WAS NEVER PLACED AT ISSUE
OR DECIDED UPON IN THE APPEAL OF THE WILL AND POWER

As stated by the Supreme Court in this case--Jn re Estate ofSmith, 164 Idaho 457,432 P.3d
6, (Idaho 2018) the heirs or devisees, by well-established Idaho law, become the vested and titled
owner of Decedent's assets, immediately upon death, and neither the estate nor any personal
representative is allowed to own such assets, but allowed possession only when the PR has
established a necessity to exercise the statutory power to obtain possession, for the satisfaction of
creditors or other interested persons.

Otherwise the assets remain titled with the heirs and

distributed to the heirs or devisees through an in-kind distribution, to every extent possible.
Vernon, being a 2/3 rd8 heir of Decedent, retains 2/3rds ownership, as the probate is currently
structured. There are no creditors. None of the heirs benefit by a PR's objective to liquidate
assets, in the absence of any creditors. This irrational conduct serves only to deprive an heir of
real property that by law is declared to be unique by nature and cannot be replaced, and exposes
the owners to capital gains tax upon the liquidation of assets that should never be sold. Vernon
has spent his lifetime preserving and maintaining these real property assets, unique and cannot be
replaced. Joseph has also consented to 'in kind' distributions of property and has even requested
partition of the existing assets; he has never requested that the PR liquidate the assets foolishly.
Considering the construction Hillen is attempting to place upon this Rule 70(b) Order,
Hillen seeks also to contend his claim to ownership is a consequence of the Court's decision in,
Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 466, 432 P.3d 6, 15 (2018). His logic in not supported
by any Appellate precedent or the decision of the Supreme Court.
Upon the bifurcated appeal to the Supreme Court, only two issues were presented to, and
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decided by, the Idaho Supreme Court in Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457,466,432 P.3d
6, 15 (2018): (1) Did the probate court err in finding the 1991 Holographic Will of Victoria H.
Smith invalid due to undue influence? and (2) Did the probate court err in setting aside the July 4,
2012 transfers of Victoria H. Smith's property to an LLC by the exercise of the power of attorney,
because the power of attorney did not authorize gifting? On both questions the Idaho Supreme
Court upheld the decision of the probate court.
Although the property was returned to the Decedent and under the administration of the
Estate, no issues were raised nor decided on that appeal construing the purpose or intent of the
Rule 70(b) Order, as the return to Decedent was perceived to be made upon the trust provisions
of the UPC, despite what is being wrongfully contended by Hillen. On the Supreme Court appeal,
no issues were raised or decided to the effect that:
►

Hillen was made the sole "owner" of the Estate property, as opposed to being
granted a power and possession, in trust, for the benefit of the Estate's heirs, as
provided by the UPC;

►

The "divestment" language of the Rule 70(b) Order was intended to accomplish
anything other than re-instate Decedent's ownership that had been earlier subject
to the power of attorney transfers on July 4, 2012;

►

Vernon K. Smith was divested of all of his interest in the property of the Decedent,
which he received as a matter oflaw under LC. § 15-3-101;

►

As a result of the entry of the Rule 70(b) Order, Hillen was no longer subject to
any of the constraints, as otherwise imposed under the UPC, upon his actions as a
personal representative; and,

►

As a result of the entry of the Rule 70(b) Order, Hillen was free to proceed with a
full liquidation of the Decedent's assets, without reference to any necessity for the
disposition of that property in the interest of creditors and others who might have
a legitimate interest in the administration of the Estate.

The following statement was made in the Idaho Supreme Court's recitation of the
"procedural background" of this PROBATE case, the only express reference within its opinion
regarding the Rule 70(b) Order:
"In June 201 7, the court entered a judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 70(b), which vested title to all of Victoria's real and personal property
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in the personal representative who had been appointed.
V emon appealed these decisions, and this Court granted Joseph's motion for
acceptance of appeal directly from the magistrate court pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule
44. This appeal follows the parties' stipulation to bifurcate the appeal to first address any
matters occurring up to and including the post-trial judgment under Rule 70(b) before
considering any matters occurring thereafter. The personal representative of the estate,
Intervenor-Respondent Noah Hillen, is not participating in this portion of the appeal. 164
Idaho at 466, 432 P.3d at 15 (emphasis added).
Hillen construes the above-cited and highlighted statement to establish his status as the
"sole owner" of Decedent's property. Because no issue was raised or decided by the Idaho
Supreme Court as to the effect of the Rule 70(b) Order, the Court's statement is nothing more than
obiter dictum. See e.g., Smith v. Angell, 122 Idaho 25, 35, 830 P.2d 1163, 1173 (1992) (Bistline,
J, concurring in the reversal of the judgment below and the remand for further proceedings) ("' [A]
remark by the way, that is, an observation or remark made by a judge in pronouncing an opinion
upon a cause, concerning some rule, principle, or application of law, or the solution of a question
suggested by the case at bar, but not necessarily involved in the case or essential to its
. .
. . .") .
determmat10n;.
Long-standing Idaho authority supports the interpretation of Idaho appellate decisions by
differentiating between those issues that were actually raised and decided by the Court, and other
matters which were simply referred to in the decision. Bashore v. Adolf, 41 Idaho 84, 88, 238 P.
534, 534 (1925) ("'There is a pronounced line of demarcation between what is said in an opinion
and what is decided by it." (citation omitted; italicized emphasis added)). See also, Idaho Schools
For Equal Educational Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 586, 850 P.2d 724, 737 (1993)
(McDevitt, C.J., concurring and dissenting); North Side Canal Co. v. Idaho Farms Co., 60 Idaho
748, 758, 96 Idaho 232, 235-36 (1939); and Stark v. McLaughlin, 45 Idaho 112, 123, 261 P. 244,
245 (1927).
This long-standing principle of interpretation as applied to Idaho appellate opinions, and
as based upon the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Bashore v. Adolf, supra, has been applied by
Idaho's U.S. District Court in, AMX Intern., Inc. v. Battelle Energy Alliance, 744 F.Supp.2d 1087,
1091-92 (D.Idaho 2010); and Hash v. US., 454 F.Supp.2d 1066, 1072 (D.Idaho 2006) ("The Idaho
Supreme Court itself has stated that its opinions "must be considered and construed in the light of
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the rule that they are authoritative only on the facts on which they are founded. General expressions
must be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. "There is a
pronounced line of demarcation between what is said in an opinion and what is decided by it."
(Citation omitted).' Bashore v. Adolf, 41 Idaho 84,238 P. 534 (1925) (emphasis in original).").
Hillen's misguided construction of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision, claiming it
supports his ownership, is inconsistent with not only the provisions of the UPC (a right of
possession and "power" for the satisfaction of creditor claims and other interested persons), but
expressly prohibited from holding ownership, as announced in Lemp v. Lemp, 32 Idaho 397,401,
184 P. 222, 223 (1919), ("The administrator or executor is not the owner of any part of the estate.2
That case remains the case authority in Idaho. He, in his official character, only holds it in trust for
the parties entitled to it, subject to the purposes of administration. 3
Court judgments and decrees are subject to the same rules of interpretation as construction
of contracts. McKoon v. Hathaway, 146 Idaho 106, 109, 190 P.3d 925, 928 (2008); City of
Pocatello v Spackman, 162 Idaho 302, 306, 396 P.3d 1184, 1188 (2017). A prominent rule of

contract interpretation is that contracts must be interpreted in respect to the then-existing law. Path
to Health, LLP v. Long, 161 Idaho 50, 57, 383 P.3d 1220, 1227 (2016) ("'This Court has held that

"it is axiomatic that extant law is written into and made a part of every written contract."' This
very rule was expressly applied in Application of Kaufman, 69 Idaho 297, 306-07, 206 P .2d 528,
533 (1949) ("What the court said, therefore, must be taken in connection with the statutes as they
then existed and applied, .... "); and in, In re Anderton 's Estate, 67 Idaho 160, 163, 174 P.2d 212,
213 (1946) (noting that an executor must act "in strict compliance with the law .... "). Therefore,
the Idaho Uniform Probate Code provisions, as in effect at the time of the referenced appeal in
Matter ofEstate ofSmith, supra, is incorporated within and applies to the interpretation of the Rule

70(b) Order with any interpretation of the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion on appeal.
The Rule 70(b) Order can only be interpreted and applied consistent with the applicable

2

Although Lemp was decided under the 1864 Idaho Probate Code, this principle oflaw has not in any way been altered

by Idaho's 1971 adoption of the Uniform Probate Code.
3

Although Lemp was decided under the 1864 Idaho Probate Code, there is no indication that this principle
of law was in any way altered by Idaho's 1971 adoption of the Uniform Probate Code.
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UPC statutes, which confer upon a PR a "power" over title, not ownership, allowing a right to
"possession" only when necessary for the administration of the estate for the benefit of creditors
and other interested persons. I.C. § 15-3-711. That has never been alleged or established to take
exclusive possession of assets belonging to heirs.
Hillen's argument the Idaho Supreme Court has made him also sole owner and permit his
liquidation of the estate is not only without merit, but supports an actionable claim for malfeasance.
Hillen's behavior must be summarily rejected, and the Rule 70(b) Order corrected to comply with
the statute and case law as mandated by the appellate courts.
B.

THE RULE 70(b) ORDER DOES NOT SUPPORT HILLEN'S MOTION
Though the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion did not address or decide any question

concerning the construction and application of the Rule 70(b) Order, the language of that Order on its face - does not support Hillen's contentions it conferred upon him "sole ownership" of
Decedent's property. The Magistrate's only authority was to restore to decedent the property
transferred from the decedent, Victoria H. Smith, on July 4, 2012, which prior to her death had
been transferred to VHS Properties, LLC by use of a power of attorney. In issuing that Rule 70(b)
Order, the transfers, however made, could not lawfully vest title in the PR, as any transfer to Hillen
is statutorily conditioned upon the limitations by virtue of his disclosed capacity "as personal
representative of the Estate." This conditional reference confirms Hillen may act with Decedent's
property only as authorized to exercise a "power" over that property to satisfy creditors any other
outstanding interests, consistent with the provisions of the Idaho UPC concerning the authority
and powers of a personal representative as limited to those specific circumstances.
The personal representative is bound by the limitations imposed by the Idaho UPC. The
Official Comment to I.C. § 15-3-703 specifically constrains a PR's acts by statutory authority in
declaring that, "[A] personal representative's authority is derived from appointment by the public
agency known as the Court. But, the Code also makes it clear that the personal representative, in
spite of the source of his authority, is to proceed with the administration, settlement and
distribution of the estate by use of statutory powers and in accordance with statutory directions.
See Sections 3-107 and 3-704 ..... " Here, Hillen is attempting to act in excess of his statutorilyconferred authority by claiming the effect of the Rule 70(b) Order was to make him the sole
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"owner" of the Decedent's property, and also to divest the heirs of all statutorily-conferred title in
the Decedent's property. He is clearly in breach of his fiduciary duty and responsibility by pursuing
this unauthorized action and liquidations without necessity is an actionable breach.
Somewhat problematic was the language used within the Rule 70(b) Order concerning the
divestment of the property interest of the real party in interest in this case, Defendant, Vernon K.
Smith, from whom the office practice derives its presence on the property. On page 2 of that order
the Magistrate referenced the scope of this divestment as extending to Vernon K. Smith's capacity,
"individually," "as personal representative," "as attorney-in-fact or agent or fiduciary," and "any
other capacity." The use of this all-encompassing and unauthorized language by a Magistrate
necessarily raises the magistrates lack of awareness of the statutes, as the "intention" could not be
to eliminate Vernon K. Smith's interest as an heir of the estate, as established under LC. § 15-3101. If it were, the magistrate is in breach of her ethical obligation to apply the statutory limitations
from where her jurisdiction and authority arise. A magistrate had no authority to eliminate the
interest of an intestate heir under I.C. § 15-3-101, regardless of intention.
If this Court were inclined to embrace Hillen's claimed ownership under the Rule 70(b)

Order, then does Joseph H. Smith - Vernon's brother- become divested as well, or does he become
the sole intestate heir of the estate?

4

No Magistrate has authority to eliminate an heir's intestate

interest without specific grant of statutory authority 5 - and such an outcome would be an absurd
result. By analogy to the rules of contract construction relied upon in interpreting court orders, no
effect can be given to an order that would lead to such an absurd result. Schieche v. Pasco, 88
Idaho 36, 41, 395 P.2d 671, 673 (1964).
The question of a court acting m excess of statutorily-conferred authority has been
addressed by the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 195 P.3d 731
(Ct.App.2008) where that Court laid out the problem as follows:
[C]ourts and lawyers sometimes say that a court lacked jurisdiction when they really
mean simply that the court committed error because the action that was taken did not
4
Vernon's sister, Victoria Ann Converse, assigned her 1/3 intestate share to Vernon, such that he then held
2/3 share in the intestate estate and his brother Joseph held a 1/3 interest. If Magistrate Copsey' s Rule 70(b) Order is
so-construed, as to eliminate Vernon's intestate share in the estate, then as the sole remaining intestate heir whose
interest has been neither assigned nor eliminated by court order, does Joseph become the intestate heir of the estate?
5
The "Slayer's Act," as codified at I.C. § 15-2-803, would constitute one such example of specific statutory
authority that permits the elimination of an intestate heir's interest in an estate.
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comply with governing law. For example, our appellate courts have referred to a lack of
"jurisdiction" when perhaps more precisely meaning that a motion or complaint was not
timely filed, that a condition precedent to the right to file the action was not satisfied, or
that governing statutes or court rules did not authorize the particular decision made by the
court. (citations omitted) 146 Idaho at 375, 195 P.3d at 734
The Court in Armstrong cited the California Supreme Court's decision in People v.
American Contractors Indemnity Co., 33 Cal.4th 653, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 93 P.3d 1020 (2004) for

the proposition that, when a court acts contrary to the authority conferred by statute, it has acted
in excess of its jurisdiction and that action is voidable. 146 Idaho at 376, 195 P.3d at 735.
The Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326, 329 n.3, 246 P.3d 979, 982
n.3 (2011) acknowledged the Idaho Court of Appeal's decision in Armstrong, as differentiating
concepts of a court's jurisdiction and its authority, without either adopting or rejecting that
formulation of Idaho law made by the Idaho Court of Appeals.

6

The Idaho Court of Appeals has

continued to authoritatively cite and rely upon its Armstrong decision subsequent to the Idaho
Supreme Court's comment on Armstrong as made in the 2011 Hartwig decision. See e.g., State v.
Vaughn, 156 Idaho 13, 15, 319 P.3d 497,499 (Ct.App.2014) and State v. Steelsmith, 154 Idaho

577, 580 n.2, 288 P.3d 132, 135 n.2 (Ct.App.2012).
In summary, the Magistrate could never intend the Rule 70(b) Order have the effect Hillen
advocates, as the magistrate has no authority to enter an order to that effect. Consequently, Hillen's
request for relief in this action, based upon his construction of the Rule 70(b) Order making him
the unrestrained "sole owner" of Decedent's property, allowing him to proceed with the entire
liquidation of Decedent's property with impunity, must be rejected by this court, and not construe
the motion to extend outside the statutory scope of his limited authority, and the pleadings are void
of any alleged necessity, let alone based on a false claim of ownership of the assets.
C.

THERE ARE NO GROUNDS, WITHIN THE PROVISIONS OF THE UPC TO
SUPPORT HILLEN'S REQUESTED RELIEF BY THIS MOTION

The fact remains Hillen, as the personal representative, has no statutory authority within

6

Until superseded by a decision of the Idaho Supreme Court, as issued upon the same question, opinions of
the Idaho Court of Appeals are binding precedent upon all lower Idaho Courts. State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 98687, 842 P.2d 660, 665-66 (1992).
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the UPC to assert his alleged status as "sole owner" of Decedent's property, and has no unlimited
right proceed to liquidate Decedent's property in disregard of the limitations concerning such
necessary liquidations as stated within the UPC.
Under the applicable provisions of the UPC a personal representative has limited authority
to possess property of the Decedent concerning limited aspects in the administration of the estate,
but nowhere within the UPC is the personal representative authorized to take "title" to Decedent's
property to the exclusion of the Decedent's heirs.
Under §15-3-101, "Estates descend at death to successors identified by any probated will,
or to heirs if no will is probated, subject to rights which may be implemented through
administration."

See, "Official Comment" LC. § 15-3-101, subsection (1), final sentence

(underlined emphasis added); and Hintz v. Black, 125 Idaho 655, 659, 873 P.2d 909, 913
(Ct.App .1994) ("[T]he assets were subject to recoupment by the personal representative, if
required in order to satisfy estate liabilities. LC. § 15-3-709."). Absent any need arising out of
the administration of the estate - the satisfaction of creditors, of which there are none in this
proceeding - the property of the estate passes at the death of the decedent to devisees and heirs, as
a matter oflaw, under (see LC. § 15-3-101). None of the properties were encumbered as Vernon
resolved all debt and encumbrances years ago, as Vernon satisfied all interests in all properties
before his Mother's death, and resolved any claims of any nature long before his Mother's death.
LC. §15-3-101 is repetitively referenced within the chapter 3 provisions of the Idaho UPC
which address the powers of the personal representative. See, "Official Comment" § 15-3-709
("Section 3-101 provides for the devolution of title on death. Section 3-711 defines the status of
the personal representative with reference to 'title' and 'power' in a way that should make it
unnecessary to discuss the 'title' to decedent's assets which his personal representative acquires.");
"Official Comment" § 15-3-901 ("Title to a decedent's property passes to his heirs and devisees
at the time of his death. See Section 3-101. This section indicates how successors may establish
record title in the absence of administration."); "Official Comment" § 15-3-906 ("This section
establishes a preference for distribution in kind. It directs a personal representative to make
distribution in kind and to convert assets to cash only where there is a special reason for doing so.
It provides a reasonable means for determining value of assets distributed in kind. It is implicit in
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Sections 3-101, 3-901 and this section that each residuary beneficiary's basic right is to his
proportionate share of each asset constituting the residue.").
The "Official Comment" to I.C. § 15-3-711 clearly states the intended relationship between
the ownership interests of the heirs and the trust responsibilities of the PR:
The relationship of the personal representative to the estate is that of a trustee .
. . . .Interested persons who are apprehensive of possible misuse of power by a personal
representative may secure themselves by use of the devices implicit in the several sections
of Parts 1 and 3 of this Article. See especially Sections 3-501, 3-605, 3-607 and 3-611.
Official Comment to I.C. § 15-3-711.
In summary, there is no statutory authority that authorizes Hillen's persistence m
dispossession without alleging a factual basis for necessity. Such an act of a magistrate to empower
a PR to act otherwise would be in excess of the authority of the court under the Idaho Court of
Appeal's Armstrong decision. Hillen's request for the entry of a judgment on the pleadings is not
supported by existing Idaho law, the Rule 70(b) Order, or the appellate decision of the Idaho
Supreme Court. Therefore, Hillen's request for the entry of a judgment on the pleadings to evict
V emon or his entities must be denied.

v.
DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR RELIEF
The PlaintiffHillen's motion for judgment on the pleadings must be denied.
The stated basis Hillen has asserted, claiming he is the sole owner of Decedent's property
and entitled to entirely liquidate Decedent's property, is not supported by the decision of the Idaho
Supreme Court in Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 466, 432 P.3d 6, 15 (2018), nor by
the terms of the ill-drafted Rule 70(b) Order, or the statutes or controlling case law. Hillen's stated
basis for his requested relief is not founded within the applicable provisions of the Idaho UPC, as
Hillen has not supported his request with any evidence of any necessity to administer the Estate
for the benefit of any creditors or other persons interested in the Estate.
In the absence of any valid grounds in support of his motion, Hillen has no right to
pointlessly seek the eviction of Vernon or the entity Defendants.
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VI.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the personal representative's Motion pending before the
court for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, must be denied.
Dated this 30th day of April, 2020.
Vemo
Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Despite Defendants' 1 attempt to complicate the facts, this case remams a
straightforward dispute and the issue before the Court is a narrow one: whether Hillen, as Personal
Representative of the Estate, has a sufficient ownership interest in the Estate's real property to
eject Defendants therefrom. He does based on, among other things, Judge Copsey's Rule 70
Judgment the Supreme Court previously upheld. Because the pleadings establish all three
ejectment elements, Hillen is entitled to a judgment ejecting Defendants from the Law Office
(located at 1900 W. Main St., Boise, ID 83702). Hillen respectfully requests that the Court grant
Hillen's motion.
II.

ARGUMENT

The argument section of this memorandum makes three points: (a) there are no
factual disputes that require this Court to look beyond the pleadings; (b) Hillen is the legal title
holder to the Law Office, pursuant to the Rule 70 Judgment, or, alternatively, has the power and
authority to eject Defendants from the Law Office, pursuant to the Uniform Probate Code
("U.P.C."); and (c) that Defendants operate through Vernon is immaterial and of no consequence
to this ejectment action. Each point is discussed in tum.
Before doing so, however, and as discussed by Defendants, several similar cases
were recently before the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, including that before the
Honorable Judge Steven Hippler of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho (Ada County
Case No. CV0l-19-10368). That case involved another ejectment action brought by Hillen against
an occupier of Estate-owned property who was represented by Vernon. Judge Hippler carefully

1

Capitalized terms not defined herein shall have the same meaning as in prior briefing.
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analyzed arguments similar to those raised by Defendants here, and concluded that the Rule 70
Judgment vested Hillen with sufficient interest to maintain an ejectment action against occupiers
of Estate property. See Amended Memorandum and Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Judgment on the Pleadings, CV0l-19-10368 (filed October 3, 2019), at 4-7.
For the Court's convenience, a copy of Judge Rippler's decision is attached hereto
as Exhibit A should the Court find it instructive. Attached as Exhibit B hereto is a copy of Judge
Hippler' s Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend the
Judgment and Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees. The latter decision is of particular
significance since it demonstrates that Vernon's argument is needless hair-splitting: either Hillen
owns the property or he has the power of the owner of the property. Either avenue yields the same
outcome, i.e., that Hillen has the authority to eject trespassers off Estate property.
Judge Hoagland reached a similar conclusion (in CV0l-19-10367). A true and
correct copy of Judge Hoagland's Order Granting Motions for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings,
Rule 54(B) Certification, and Writ of Assistance is attached as Exhibit C. The Courts' various
decisions and corresponding Judgments are on appeal.
A.

There are no Factual Issues in This Case and Hillen is Entitled to an Action
for Ejectment as a Matter of Law.

Defendants raise no factual issues in their Memorandum in Opposition to Motion
for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings ("Opposition Memorandum") and this Court need look no
further than the pleadings to decide as a matter of law that Hillen is entitled to a judgment ejecting
Defendants from the Law Office. The three elements of ejectment-ownership by Hillen,
possession by Defendants, and refusal by Defendants to surrender possession-are present from
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the pleadings. Defendants concede the second and third elements, leaving only ownership to be
decided by the Court, which Hillen will discuss in the next section of this brief.
B.

The Rule 70 Judgment Establishes Hillen as the Lawful Owner of the Law
Office. Alternatively, Hillen Holds the Same Right of Ownership as Would a
Lawful Owner.
1.

The Rule 70(b) Judgment Vests Title in Hillen.

The pleadings are more than sufficient to establish Hillen' s ownership interest in
the Law Office. The Rule 70 Judgment states, in no uncertain terms: "The Court does hereby vest
in the Personal Representative as of May 5, 2017, any and all real property of any kind or nature ...
including but not limited to [the Law Office.]."
Further, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the Rule 70 Judgment in Matter of
Estate ofSmith, 164 Idaho 457,463,432 P.3d 6, 12 (2018). The opening paragraph of Smith states

that V emon appealed from decisions of the magistrate court "and a corresponding judgment
entered pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 70(b) [the Rule 70 Judgment]. We affirm the
decisions of the magistrate court." Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457,463,432 P.3d 6, 12
(2018). Of course, Defendants claim the decision in Smith is dicta. Their argument lacks merit.
First, Hillen does not need Smith to establish ownership. The bottom line is that
Hillen holds a Rule 70 Judgment vesting title in the Law Office to Hillen. As stated in 4 7
Am.Jur.2d Judgments§ 754, "A judgment of a court having jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter is presumptively binding until set aside in a manner prescribed by law." Vernonnot Defendants-is improperly attempting to collaterally attack the Rule 70 Judgment in this
relatively simple proceeding for ejectment against distinct entities. This is evident from the
multiple pages of Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Partial Judgment on the
Pleadings ("Opposition"), which discuss and challenge Judge Copsey's lawfully entered Rule 70
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Judgment. E.g. Opposition at 11-13, 15-16, 19-21. But, the Rule 70 Judgment remains valid and
binding and has not been set aside in any manner prescribed by law. Unless and until that legal
setting aside occurs, Hillen, as Personal Representative of the Estate, remains the lawful owner of
the Law Office.
Second, the comments in Smith are not dicta. As noted by Defendants, the Court
recognized that the Rule 70 Judgment vested title to all of Victoria's real and personal property in
Hillen. Smith, 164 Idaho at 466,432 P.3d at 15. The Court then addressed "any matters occurring

up to and including the post-trial judgment under Rule 70(b)[.]" Id. (emphasis added). After
considering any matters up to and including the veracity of the Rule 70 Judgment, the Supreme
Court concluded that "the decisions of the magistrate court are affirmed." Id. at 482, 432 P.3d at
31. This is not dicta. It is a direct and clear ruling from the highest court in the state.

2.

Hillen Has the Power to Eject Defendants From the Law Office.

Defendants also argue that, by attempting to exercise the statutorily granted power
over Estate property (in this case the Law Office) that an absolute owner would have, Hillen has
somehow acted in excess of his authority. Opposition at 23. This, Defendants argue, means that
Hillen is not entitled to a judgment for ejectment. Opposition at 23. Not so.
First, Defendants' arguments conflict with Idaho statute. The U.P.C. states that
personal representatives-such as Hillen-have "the same power over the title to property of the
estate that an absolute owner would have, in trust however, for the benefit of the creditors and

others interested in the estate." I.C. § 15-3-711 (emphasis added). An absolute owner of the Law
Office would have a sufficient interest to eject an unwelcome party therefrom. The plain language
of the U.P.C. vests Hillen with that same power. Accordingly, Hillen has the authority to bring this
ejectment action against Defendants even without the Rule 70 Judgment.
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Second, Defendants' claim is illogical and runs counter to the U.P.C. Section 15-3101. For example, U.P.C. Section 15-3-101 expressly provides that rights ofheirs-like Vemon"are subject to the restrictions and limitations" of the U.P.C. That same Uniform Probate Code
caused Hillen to be lawfully appointed the Personal Representative and the Probate Court to vest
in him all of the Estate's real property, including the Law Office.
Third, Defendants' contention that an estate's personal representative only has
power to transfer estate property for the benefit of a creditor (e.g. Opposition at 5, 7, 12) is contrary
to the plain language ofldaho Code Section 15-3-711. 2 Defendants cite to the foregoing provision
(and Section 13-3-906) for the proposition that there is some sort of preference for an in-kind
distribution to an estate's heirs. That is irrelevant to the question of whether Hillen has a sufficient
ownership interest to meet the elements of ejectment-because Hillen has the same power as
would an absolute owner. The comments to Section 15-3-711 make it clear that the power
conferred on Hillen is "the broadest possible 'power over title."'
The comments go on to note that the power is "conceived to embrace all possible
transactions which might result in a conveyance or encumbrance of assets, or in a change of
possession." (emphasis added). If Hillen is entitled to effectuate a change of possession with

respect to Estate property, it is unclear how Hillen could ever lack authority to remove an
individual from Estate property who is unlawfully in possession. That is what Hillen is doing.
In short, whatever other effect the valid and unchallenged Rule 70 Judgment has, it
clearly and unambiguously conferred upon Hillen the power to eject Defendants from the Law

2
In addition to being legally incorrect, Defendants' assertion is simply false. The statute quoted by
Defendants says that a personal representative holds estate property in trust for creditors or other interested persons.
I.C. § 15-3-711. Defendants ignore the latter half of this sentence in making their arguments. Contrary to Defendants'
claims, the Estate here has interested persons, including but not limited to, Vernon and his brother who are both heirs.
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Office. Defendants' repeated references to alleged breaches of fiduciary duties or the needs to
liquidate estate property have no bearing on the analysis presently before the Court, i.e., whether
the three elements of ejectment are met. All three elements are established as a matter of law here.
C.

Whether Defendants Operate Through Vernon is Immaterial.
Defendants assert that the present action for ejectment against them is somehow

improper because they are operated by Vernon. E.g. Opposition at 5. That is incorrect. As
explained in Hillen's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings
and Motion to Certify Judgment Under I.R.C.P. 54(b), Defendants are distinct legal entities and
are in possession of the Law Office. Actual possession of real property means "physical occupancy
or control over property[.]" Black's Law Dictionary 1282 (9th ed. 2009). Defendants occupy the
Law Office both by their admissions and filings with the Idaho Secretary of State. They are,
therefore, in possession of the Law Office by virtue of physical occupancy and must be ejected
therefrom.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court grant his Motion
for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings.
DATED this 5th day of May, 2020.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By Isl Alexander P. McLaughlin
Randall A. Peterman- Of the Firm
Alexander P. McLaughlin - Of the Firm
Jack W. Relf- Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of May, 2020, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO CERTIFY
JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B) to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed
to the following:
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Vernon K. Smith, Jr.
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83702
Attorney for Defendant

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt: vkslaw@live.com

Isl Alexander P. McLaughlin
Alexander P. McLaughlin
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Filed: 02/10/2020 13:36:21
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Hoskins, Janet

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY
-OAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of

Case No. CV01-19-I0367

Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS .FOR
I

vs.

VERNON K. SMITH IU an individual,
Defendant.

PARTIAL IDDGMENT ON THE

PLEADINGS., RULE 54(B)
CERTIFICATION, AND WR1T OF
ASSISTANCE

THIS MATTER comes before th.e Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Judgment on the
Pleadings and Motion to Certify Judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) and
request for a writ of assistance, filed through counsel on October 9, 2019. Hearings were held on
December 3, 2019, and on January 14,. 2020, at which time the matter was taken under
advisement. For the reasons set forth herein, the Motions are GRANTED.

FACTS

In this ejectment action, Plaintiff Noah Hillen i(''Hillen''), the personal representative of Victoria
Smith's ("Victoria'') estate seeks to eject Defendant Vernon K. Smith III ("Vernon'') from
property that is o:wned by Victoria's estate.

This case is one of several cases concerning Victoria's estate. In March of 2017, the magistrate
court, in Ada County Case No. CV-IE-2014-15 3 52,. issued a decision finding that V 1ctoria' s
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holographic will was in alid because it was a product of Vernon K. Smith Jr.'s (Vernon's father

and lawyer in this case) undue influence, 1· and that Victoria died intestate.. In June of 20] 7, in the
same case, an Ordler and Judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 70(b)2 were entered

vesting title to all of Victoria's real and personal property to Hillen as the appointed personal
representative of Victoria's estate. Specifically, the Judgment vested Hillen with "any and all
real property of any kind or natur,e, including but not limited to: any fixrur,es, appurtenances,
additions, easeme· ts, licenses, water rights, or similar rights of any kind or nature appurtenant
thereto; and any and all proceeds, product, offspring, rents or profits of or from any real

property[,]"3 including the property at is ue in this case - 2001 North Raymond Street, Boise,
Idaho 83704 (hereafter; "Raymond Street property'').

The Judgment provided that "[s]uch

vesting is fr e and clear of any lien,. claim or interest of the C]aimaints[;] '' one of whom included

V,emon K. Smith Jr.

Vernon K. Smith Jr. appealed these decisions, and in 2018, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed
the magistrate court's decisions. See Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 432 P.3d 6
(2018). The Supreme Court specifically noted that the Rule 70(b) Judgment was at issue in the

appeal:

In October 2016, the magistrate ,court held a two-day bench trial on the issue of
undue influence. The parties then submitted post..trial bnefing. On March 9, 2017
the magistrate court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, in which
1

Vernon K. Smith Jr. was the sole beneficiary under the will.

2

"If the real or per onal pr-0perty is within the district, the court, instead of ordering a conveyance, may enter a
judgment divesting any party's title and vesting it in others. That judgment has the effect of a tegaUy executed
conveyance." LR.C.P. 70(b).
3

The Court talces judicial notice pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 20 I of the Judgment (:filed June 2, 20 17) in Ada
County Case No. ·CV-lE 2014-15352
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it ruled that Victoria's will was invalid because it was a product of Vemon's4

undue influence, and that Victoria died intestate. The court later amended its

decision to corr,ect minor typographical and clerical ,errors. In June 2017, the court
entered a judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 70(b),. which vested
title to all of Victoria's real and personal property in the personal representati e
who had been appointed [Hillen].

Vemon appealed these decisions, and this Court granted Joseph's motion for
acceptance of appeal directly from the magistrate court pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule 44. This appeal follows the parties' stipulation to bifurcate the
appeal to first address any matters occurring up to and including the post...trial
judgment under Rule 70(b) before considering any matt-ers occurring thereafter.
The personal representative of the estate, Intervenor-Respondent Noah Hillen, is
not participating in this portion of the appeal.
Vernon asserts. that the magistrate court ,erred in granting Joseph partial summary
judgment (and the corresponding Rule 70(b) judgment) and then erred again in its

ruling that the will was invalid.
Id. at 466 432 P.3d at 15 (emphasis added).

On December 11, 2018, HiHen sent a 30 day notice of termination of leas e to Vernon at the
1

Raymond Street property. The notice demanded Vernon vacate the Raymond Street property no
later than January 31 2019'. Vernon did not vacate the property.

On June 7, 2019', Hillen filed the instant Verified Complaint against Vernon alleging ( 1)
ejectment, r{2) declaratoryjudgment/quiet title, (3) tr,espass, and (4) unjust enrichment.

4

5

Referencing Vernon's father and lawyer - Vernon. K. Smith Jr.

5
'

On the same date, Hillen fi.1ed a neaTly identfoal ejectment action against a business that was occupying prnp,erty
that was owned by Victoria's estate (Ada. County Case No. CV01~19-10.368). Following the filing o a Motion
similar to the one before this Court, on October 3, 2019) Judge Hippler issued a Memorandum Decision and Order
Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Partial SummaryJudgm'ent on the Pleadings.
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Hillen now seeks a partial judgment on his ejectment claim and requests the Court issue a writ of
assistance and certify the judgment as final under Rule 54(b).

LEGAL STANDARD

"After the pleadings are closed, but early enough not to delay trial,. a party may move for

judgment on the pleadings." I.R.C.P. 12(c). Ifmatters outside the pleadings are presented to and
not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule
56, and an parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that i

pertinent to the motion. · .RC.P. 12(d),. Here, Hillen pfovided a Declaration in Support of his
Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pkadings. At the December 3 2019' hearing, the Court
notified the parties that ·t intended to trea: the Motion as one for summary judgment and gave
them time to file any additional materials.. Accordingly, the Court finds that the parties have

been giv,en a reasonable opportunity to present all the material pertinent to the Motion.

Summary judgment may be entered only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and tbe movant is enftled to judgment as a matter of law/' I.R.C.P. 56(a).
The Court "liberally construes the facts and existing record in favor of the non-moving party" in
1

making such determination. Hall v. Forsloff, 124 Idaho 771,. 773, 864 P.2d 609, 611 (1993). '" If

reasonable people could reach different conclusions or infi rences from the ev· dence, the motion
must be denied.'' Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 238 108 P.3d 380,. 385
(2005). Moreover, "[a] mer,e scintilla of evidence or only slight do bt as to the facts is not
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sufficient to create a genuine issue for purpose _of summary judgment.''' Staffordv. Weav,er, 136
Idaho 223,225, 31 P.3d 245,247 (200 ) (citations omitted).

The moving party bears the initial burdeu of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact, and then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with sufficient ,evidence
to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Di.st., 125 Idaho 872
874, 876 P.2d 154 156 (1994).

When the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving an

element at trial,, the moving party may establish a lack of genuine issue of material fact by
establishing the lack of evidence supporting the ,element. Dunnick v. Elder; 126 Idaho 308, 311,
882 P.2d 475,478 (Ct. App.. 1994).

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment ''may not rest upon mere allegations in the
pleadings,. but must set forth by affidavit specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.,,

Gagnon v. W. Bldg. Maint. , Inc. , 155 Idaho 112, 114, 306 P.3d 197, 199 (2013). Such evidence
may ,consist of affidavits or depositions, but "the Court

wm consider only that material

. . .

which is based upon personal knowledge and which would be admi sible at trial." Harris v.

State, Dep 't of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 298;, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992). If the
evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact,, then only a ,q uestion of law remains on
which the court may then ,enter swnmary judgment as a matter of law. Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co.

ofIdaho 138 Idaho 443 445, 65 P.3d 184, 186 (2003).

Order Granting Motions for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, Rule 54(b) Certificat·on,. and Writ of Assistance~ 5
Page 141

ANALYSIS

Hillen asserts he is ,entitled to judgment on his claim for ejectm.ent and requests a Rule 54(b)
certificate and writ ofass·stance. Each issue will be addressed in tum.

(1) Ejectment

''Ejectment requires proof of (1) ownership, (2) poss.ession by the defendants, and (3) refusaw. of
the defendants to surrender possession." Ada Cry. Highway Dist. v~. Total Su.cc.ess Investments,
LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 369, 179 P.Jd 321, 332 (2008) (noting that it is necessary to detenmne the

quiet title portion of the suit before reaching the issue of ejectment).

Here, there is no dispute as to the second and third elements, i.e. Vernon i in possession of the
Raymond Street property and he refuses to surrender his possession. The issue is whether Hillen

is the owner of the Raymond Street property.

Vernon asserts that the daho Supreme Court did not decide whether the Rule 70(b) Order and
Judgment transferred complete ownership of Victoria's estate property o Hillen, the Rule 70(b)
Order does not support Hillen's request for re ief, and various provis·ons of Idaho's Uniform

Probate Code do not support Hillen' s request.

Although this particular issue might not have been rai ed. in the previous appeal, it is clear that
the Rule 70(b) Order and Judgment were at issue on appeal. The Supreme Court noted that the
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appeal followed "the parties' stipulation to bifurcate the appeal to first address any matters
,occurring up to and including the post..trial judgment under Rule 70(b) before ,considering any

matters occurring thereafter." Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho at 466, 432 P.3d at 15.

Further, the Supreme Court noted that Vernon K. Smith Jr. ru-gued on appeal "that the magistrate
court erred in granting Joseph partial swnmary judgment (and the ,corr,esponding Rule 70(b)
judgment) and then erred again in its ruling that the will was in.valid." Id.

The Rule 70(b) Judgment vested in Hillen "any and all real property of any kind or nature,

including . . . [the Raymond Street property]" and "(s]uch vesting is free and clear of any Hen,
claim or interest of the Claimaints[.]" Generally, ''final judgments, whether right or wrong, are
not subject to collateral attack.'' Cuevas v. Barraza 152 Idaho 890,, 894, 277 P.3d 337,, 341
(2012) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).. As Judge Hippler noted in his Amended
Memorandum Decision and Order p.. 7 (filed Oct. 3, 2019), mf''the Judgment could not have done

what it purported to do, then Vernon [K. Smith Jr.] should have moved in that case for relief

from the judgment Wlder I.R.C.P. 60(b). [The defendant] essentially requests that the Court act as
an appellate court and overrule the Judgment in the other case, something it cannot do.''

Vernon next argues that the Rule 70(b) Order itself does not support Hillen's request, because as

a personal representative ofVictoria''s estate, HiUen is statutorily constrained by Idaho's Uniform

Probate Code and is in breach of his fiduciary duties.

"The legal title to estate property vests in the heirs or d.evisees upon the death of the decedent.''
Ellmaker v. Tabor, 160 Idaho 576, 580, 377 P.3d 390, 394 (2015); see I.C. § ]5-3-Wl.
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However, "the rights of creditors, devisees, and heirs to his property are subject to the restrictions
and limitations contained in this code to facilitate the· prompt settlement of estates." I.C. § 15-3-

10 .

One such restriction or limitaf on is the right of a personal representative to ''take

posse sion or control of, the decedent's property[.]"

I.C. § 15-3 ...709.

''[A] personal

representative has the same power over the title to property of the estate that an absolute owner
would have, in trust however, for the benefit of the creditors and others inter,ested in the estate.

This power may be xercised without notice, hearing, or order of court.'' 1.C. § 15-3-711. The

Uniform Law Comments note that
The personal repr-esenmti e i . given the broadest possible ''power over title''. He
receives a "power", rather than title becau e the power concept eases the
suooession of assets which are not possessed by the personal representative ....
The power over title of an absolu e owner is conceived to embrace all possible
transactions which might result .in a conveyance or encumbrance of assets, or
in a change of rights ofpossession.

(Emphasis added.)

Here, the plain language of the Rule 70(b) Judgment vested in Hillen "any and all r,eal property

of any kind or nature, including . . . [the Raymond Street p.ropertyf and "'[s]uch v,esting is fr,ee
and clear of any lien claim or interest of the Claimaints[.]" Thus,. by virtue of the plain and

unambiguous statutory language and the Rule 70(b) Order and Judgment; Hillen is the owner (in
his capacity as the personal representativ,e of Victoria's estate) of the Raymond Street property

and has authority to ject Vemon. Accordingly Hillen' s Motion for Partial Judgment on the
Pleadings on his eje-etment claim is GRANTED.
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(2) Rule 54(b) Certificat

HiHen also requests a Rule 54(b) certification.

In orde for the Court to attach a Rule 54(b)(l)

certificate entering a final judgment on "one or more but less than all of the claims or parties,"
the Court must find ''that there is no just reason for delay," in entering a final judgment as to that
claim or party. I R..C.P. 54(b)(l); Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500, 505 (2005). Kolin v. St.
Luke 's Regional Medical Center 130 Idaho 323, 328 ( 997), is instructive on when a trial court
1

should grant Rule 54(b) certification. In Kolin,. the respondents filed a motion for Rule 54(b)(l)
certification after summary judgment was granted in their favor.

The trial court granted the

certification, and the petitioner filed a motion to decerffy, which the trial court denied.

On

appeal, the Supreme Court found that the district court abused its discretion in granting Rule

54(b) certification. It explained: "We have cautioned that I.R.C.P. 54(b) certification should not
be granted r-outinely, or as a matter o - course;. it should be reserved only for the 'infrequent harsh
case.,. The party requesting certification must show that it will suffer some hardship or injustice,
or provide some other compelling reason

hy the certification should be granted." Id.

The respondents m Kolin argued that they would be prejudiced or harmed, because they "had
obtained a quick resolution to their case, and did not feel they should ha e to wait until the

claims. against the other defendants were resolved." Id~ The Court ,e mphasized that "mere delay
is not a hardship in and of itself, because I.R.C.P. 54(b) contemplates that there will normally be
a delay in cases involving multiple parties and motions." Id. "The decision to grant or deny a
54(b) certificate rest in the ound d·scret·on. of the trial judge who is best able to evaluate the
situation.'' Brinkmeyer v. Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho 596, 599, 21 P.3d 918, 921 (200,1); PHH Mortg.
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Servs. Corp. v. Perreira,, 146 Idaho 631,636,200 P.3d 1180, J 185 (2009) (affimring trial court's
decision to grant Rule 54(b) certification on decision restoring possession of property to the
plaintiff).

Hillen asserts Rule 54(b) certification is warranted because he is unable to sell, lease, or
otherwise perform his statutory duties as the personal representative of Victoria's estate, due to
Vernon's unlawful possession.

He asserts that be has been charged with expeditiously

liquidating estate property and distributing the proceeds to Victoria's heirs and that Vernon's

,continued possession prevents him for dloing so.

Under these facts and c·rcumstances, the Court finds that there is no just reason for delay and

Rule 54(b) certification is proper.

In addition, Vernon made no argument that Rule, 54(b)

certification should not be granted.

(3) Writ of Assistance

Hillen also requests a writ of assistance to transfer possession of the property from Vernon to

Hillen. The decision to grant a writ of assistance is in the trial court's discretion Williams v.
Sherman, 35 Idaho 16'9~ 205 P. 259 (1922); Federal Land Bank v. Parsons, 118 Idaho 324, 796
P .2d 533 (Ct. App. 1990). "A writ of assistance is a fonn of process issued by a court of equity
to transfer the possession of property, and more specifically lands, the title or right to which it
has previously adjudicated. ..." Pro Indiviso, Inc.. v. Mid-Mile Holding Tr., 131 Idaho 74] , 746~

963 P.2d 1178, 1183 (1998) (citation omitted).
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The sole que tion to be determined on the motion is whether applicant has a right,
as against the party in possess~ on to use the writ to obtain posses ion. In the
absence of any claim of an independent paramount title, the only question on such
.applicaf on is whether the decree has or has not been complied with.

Id. (citation omitted).

As set forth prev10usly, Hillen has the right to eject Vernon from the Raymond Street property.
Judge Hippler granted a writ of assistance in his case for the ol owing reasons:
The Court recognizes that the typical course would be to refrain from issuing a
wnt of assistance until after the party fails to comply with the judgment. In this
case, however, such a waiting period would be pointless, as it seems l~ely that
Gib on wtll not •comply in a timely manner. His future non-compliance seems
likely for two reasons: First, when at the hearing the Court asked Gibson whether
he would comply with a judgment against him, Gibson fa:led to give an
unequivocal answer in the affinnative. econd, Vemon's 6 conduct in the
underlying probate case reveals a dilatory pattern and the Court is concerned that
Vernon, as Gibson's counsel,. wi 1 continue this pattern by encouraging. his client
to not immediately comply with the judgment A waiting period in this instance
seemingly would serve no purpose but to further delay the probate of V'ctoria's
estate and waste he:r estate's resources by requiring it to again request a writ of
assistance after Gibson fails to comply. To avoid such a waste of time, and
believing a writ will likely be necessary to ,enforce the judgment, the Court grants
Hillen' s request for a writ of assistance.

Vernon made no argument that a writ of assistance should not be granted. Here,, it seems likely
that Vemo 's attorney and father will dispute any judgment this Court enters based on his past
conduct in the probate court and based on the rune arguments and defenses he has raised in this
case and in Judge Hippler's ,case. Accordingly, the Court win GRANT th writ of assistance.

6

Referencing Vernon's father and attorney in this case - Vernon K. Stnith Jr.
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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, Hillen' s Motions for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, Rule
54(b) certification, and Writ o Assistance are GRANTED.. The Rule 54(b) Judgment and Writ

of Assistance will be issued concurrent with this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: 2/10/2020 09:06 AM

Date
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Signed: 2/10/2020 01 :36 PM

I hereby certify that on _ _ _ __..,, I served a true and correct copy of the within instrument
to:

Randall Petennan

Alexander McLaughlin
Jack Relf

rap@givenspurley ..com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
Vernon Smith
vkslaw@live.com

Phil M,cGrane
Clerk of the District Court

By ~
Depu~Clerk
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Ty er Atkinson 6/212017 at 2:36 PM

F

De1p

h Judicial District. Ad Co n
CHRISTOPHER D RI~ Clerk

IN T

DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,. JN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

IN THE MA TIER O THE STATE OF
VICTORIA H. SMITH,

Case

o. CV-lE-2014-I 5352

JUDGMENT ON MOTION UNDER
RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, VESTING

Deceased.

ALL REAL AND PERSO AL
PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE IN THE
l'ERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

JUDGMENT IS E TERED AS FOLLOWS:

Personal P·roperty
The Court does hereby vest in

oah Hillen, as the personal representative of the

Estate ("Persona Representative';), as of May 5, 2017, any and .all personal property of any kind
or nature, whether choate or inchoate, whether tangibl,e or intangible; any and all r·ghts or
interests in ca h or cash equivalents; any and all rights in any msurance policies; any and all
rights in any executory contracts, including but not limited to leases of any k'nd or nature,. or any

ecurlty agreements which constitute a disguised lease under Idaho law; any rights and powers of
Victoria H. Sm'th under any personal property; and any and all proceeds product, offspring,
rents or profits of or from any personal pmperty ("Pe sonal Property").

JUDG . E TO MOTIO UNDER RULE 7'0(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
V STING ALL REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF TH ESTATE [ 1 THE PERSO AL
REPRESE TA TIVE ~ 1
13102216.4
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rk

Such vesting is free and clear of any lien; claim or interest of the following parties
("'Claimants").
1. Vernon K. Smith, Jr. individually;
2. Vernon K. Smith Jr., in his capacity as the personal representative of the
Estates;

3.. Vernon K. Smith,.Jr. in his capacity as an attorney-in-fact or agent or
fiduciary for Victoria H .. Smith;

4. Vernon K. Smith, Jr., in any other ,capac·ty;
5. Victoria L. Smith, in her personal and any other capacity;
,6. VHS Properties, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company;
7 . Riverside Farms, Inc., an Idaho corporation;

8. S & S Trust, LLC, in :daho limited Jiability company; and
9. Any entity controlled by any of the individuals or entifies identified above (the
foregoing shall hereinafter be collectivdy referenced as the' Claimants").

II.

Rea Property
The Court doe hereby vest in the Personal Representative as of May 5, 2017, any
and all real property of any kind or nature, including but not limited to: any fixtures,
appurtenances, add ·tions, ea eme.nts, licenses, water rights,, or similar rights of any kind or nature
appurtenant thereto; and any and an proceeds, product . offspring, rents or profits of or from

any

real property ( collectively ''Real Property"), includmg but not limited to the following:

A.

Jefferson County Property..
(i)
That certain Real Property A, commonly referenced as the Jefferson
County Property, and more specifically identified on Exhibit A.

B.

Ada County Property.
(i)

That certain Real Property B, commonly referenced as the Ada County,
and more spedfically identified on Exhibit B.

JUDGME T ON MOTION UND R RULE 70(b) OF THE IDA O RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.,
VESTING ALL REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF mE ESTA
THE PERSO · A
REPRESE., TA:TIVE- 2
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Such vesting is free and clear of any lien, claim or interest of the Claimant .
DATED this 2nd day of June, 2017.

The Honorable~. Copsey
District Judge
Signea: 61212017 10:48 AM

OTION UND R RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO R LES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
.JUDGME 10
D PERSO 1AL PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE IN THE PERSONAL
VEST GALL REAL

REPRESE TA TIVE - 3
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Sig11edt; 6/2n017 02:38 PM

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _ ___ day of June, 2017, I caused a true and correct copy of
the fo egoing JUDGMENT O MOTION UNDER RULE 70(b) OF THE IDAHO RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, VESTING ALL REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF
THE ESTATE I THEPERSO ALREPRESENTAT VEtobe ·ervedbythemethod
indicated below, and addressed to the· fol lowing:
RANDALL A. P TERMAN
ALEXANDER P. MCLAUGHLIN
Givens Pursley LLP
601 W. Bannock St.
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701
Attorneys for Noah G. Hillen, Special
Administrator

[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile· (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery

[X] Email / iCourt:

rap@gi enspursley.coms

VERNO K. SMITH, JR.
Attorney at Law
900 West Main Street

Boise, Idaho 83702
Personal Representative ofEstate of Vernon K.
Smith~ Sr.. and attorneys for David Gibson

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 345-1129
[ J Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Del· very
[X] Email/ iCourt: vls59@live.com

RORYJO

[

JONE ,.GLEDHILL, F1

[ ] Facsimile: (208) 331-1529

U.S. Mail

225 North 9th Street, #820
Boise, Idaho 83702
Attorneys for Vernon K. Smith, Jr.

[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email/ iCourt: riones@·dJllaw.com;
ejudd@idalaw.com

ALLE

[
[
[
[

B. ELLIS

LUS LAW, PLLC

1263'9 West Explorer Drive
Boise, Idaho 83713
Attorneys for Joseph H. Smith

]
]
]
]

U.S. MaH
Facsimile: (208) 345 9564
Hand Dervery
Overnight Del·very

[X] Email/ iCourt: aellis@aellislaw.com

Ronald L. Swafford
Swafford Law, PC
,655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls, Idaho ,8340 l
Attorneysfor Sharon Bergmann

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 524 4131

[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[X] Email/ iCourt:.
ron·@swatfordlaw.com

JUDGME TO
O'TIO UNDER RU E 70(b) OF THE IDA · 0 R ES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
VES
G
LREAL
DP RS0NALPR0PE TY0FTHEESTATEINTHEPERSO AL
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Courtesy copy provided to:
Victoria Anne Converse
10548 NW Skyline Blvd.

[X]

.S. Mail

[ ] Facsimile
[ ] Hand Delivery

Portland OR 97231

[ ] Overnight Delivery
ROBERT MA YNES
Maynes Taggart,. PLLC

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 524-6095
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Delivery

P.O. Box 3005

Idaho Falls,. Idaho 83403
Attorneys for Walker Land & Livestock, LLC
Darrell G. Early
Office o,f the Attorney General
1410 N. Hilton, 2nd Floor
Boise, Idaho 83706
Attorneys for State ofIdaho Department of
Environmental Quality

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Facsimile: (20.8) 373-0481
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Overnight Deiiv,ery
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EXIIlBITA
Legal Description -Jefferson County Property
Parce11

a.

9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 in Block 51 VIiiage and Townaite of Hamer, including and
Lots 7,
joining vacated streets and alleys by Ordinance No. 51 Jefferson County, Idaho.
Parcel 2

Township 7 North, Range 36 East of the Boise Meridian, Jefferson County, Idaho.
Section 2: All
Section 11 ; All

EXHIBIT A-1
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EXHIB' B
L.eg,al Description - Ada County Property
Parcel 1 (Commonly known as: 1902 W Main St, B,o ise, ID 83702)

Lot 6 in Bll ock 29 of !F airview Additfon, according to the offic:ial pll at thereof, filed in Book 2 of·Pl,ats
at Page 73, and Amended by an Affidavit r,ecorded January 14, 2009 as Instrument No. 109003860,
o,f f1
i cial records of Ada County,, Idaho.
Par;cel 2 (Commonly known as: 1900 W Ma.in St. Boise,, 11D 83702)
1

Lot 7 i n Block 29 of Fairview Addition, according to the official pllat thereof, filed m Book 2 ,o f 'P lats
at 1
Page 73 and Amended by an Affidavit recorded January 14, .2009 as Instrument No. 109003860,
o,f ficial records of Ada County, Idaho.
Parcel 3 (Commonly known as.: 110 N. 22nd S,t , Boise. ID 83,702)
1

Lot 5 in Block 29 of Fairview Addition, according to ·t he official .Plat the:r,eof, filed in Book .2 ,o f Plats
at Page 73, and Amended by an Affidavit recorded J'a nuary 14, 200,9 as Instrument. N,o. 109003860,
o,ffiicial records of Ada County,, Idaho.
.Parcel 4 fCommo•n ly ,k nown as.: 18017 W Id ho St. Boise. 10 837021
The No,r thwesterly 32 feet of Lot 11 in Block 23, of McCarty"s Second .A dd tiio,n to Boise City, Ada
County, State of Idaho, according to the
off1c1al plat thereof recorded in the,office of the County Reoorde,r of Ada County,, State of Idaho.

Parcel 5 fCommonly known as: 200 1 N R.a ymond St. Boise, ID 83704)
1

Lot 6 excep,t the South 50 feet in B lock 2 of A Resubdiv1s1on of Lot 21, and a porti:on of Lots 6,, 7
and 22, Oradell Subdivision, acc,o rdii ng to the official plat thereof, filed in Book 25, records .o f Ada
Co,unrty, Idaho,.
1

1

Parcel 6 (Commonly known as~ 0 S Pleasant Valley Rd. Boise. ID 83705; 6259, S Pleasant. Valley
Rd. Boise. 1IID 83705: 0 S C,o le Rd, Boise. ID 83709)

Unit.I:
The Southeast ,q uarter o,f the Southeast quarter of Section 32, Township 3 North, Range .2 East of
the eo:ise Mer,dian, m1Ada County, Idaho.
Unit II:
Parcel A

The West half of the Northwest quarter of Section 5, Township 2 North, Range 2 East of the Boise
Meridian. Also shown of 1r:ecord as Lot 4 and the Southwest quairter of the Northwest quarter of
Section 5, Township 2 orth, Range 2 East, of the Boise eridian.
Parcel B

The East half of the Northwest quarter ,o f Secti:o n 5,, Township 2 N,orth, Range 2 East of the Boise
Meridian.
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Parcel C
The Southwest quarter of Section 5, Township 2 1N orth, Range 2 East o,f the Boise Meridian.

Umit Ill::
The East half of the Northeast quarter of Sectio:n 7, and the West half of the Northwest quarter of
Section 8 all in Township 2 North of' Range 2 East of Bo ·se Meridian in Ada County, Idaho~

Pa1rcel 7' (Commo,n ly known as; 593,3 N., Branstetter. Garden City. ID 83714: W. Chinden Blvd ..
·G arden C"ty, ID 837·14; 9,907 W. Chinden Bl~d .. Gard en City. ID 83714 l
1

Uniit ,I:
IReal proiPerty· situated in the County of .Ada, State of Idaho, consisting o,f 132 acres, more, or less
to wit: Commencing1at a. point North 36°.21' W'est distant 2 .88 chams from the ce,n ter of Secti,on 26,
T,o wnship 4 North, Range 1 East, B.M., the reall p,lace of beginnin,g, runnrng thence South 73°15'
East a distance of ·1.40 chains to a pointj thence No,n h 18°48' East a distance of 64.53 chain to a
point; thence North 60°42' West a distance of 2.75 chains to a point; then,oe South 68°00 West a
dist.a nce, of 9.50 chains to a point;: thence North 75° 00'' West a distance o,f 12.00 chains to a point;
thence North 4910 00' West a d stance o·f 3.90 chains to a point; thence South ,&4°·30• West a
distance of 3.70 chains to a point; thence South 72°00' We ta distance of 8.50, chains to a point;
thenc,e North 81°00' West a distance, of 3.83 chains to a po nt; thence South 0°05 1 West a distance
of 14.92 chains to a po.i nt: ~hence -orth 80°30 East a dl's tance of 2.00 cha1
ins to a point; thence
South 48°1 St East a distance of 2.00 chains to a point; thence South 8010 30' East a d1sta1n ce of 3.15
chain1s to a point; thence South 61°00' East a d(stance of 1.00 chains to a point: thenc,e South
23°30' East a distance of 2.10 chains to a point; thence South 1000' ·w est a. 'distance of 3.60,
chams to, a point; thence South 26°00' West a d1istance of 1.80 chains to a po.i nt.: thence South
27°00' East a distance of 3.70 chains t,o a point, thence South 1°45' East a distance of 1.50 chains
to a point; thence South 38°30' East a.distance of 1..20 chains to a point; thence s .o uth 40°45' West
a distance of 2.80 chains to a point; thence South 3°45,' West a distance of 4.30 chains to a pomt;
thence South 34°15' East a distance of 2. 00 chains to a poii nt; thence South 67°00·• East a. distan,c e
of 1.40 chai·n s to a point; thence South 49°15,' East a distance of 2·.so chains to a point; thence
South 22°30' East a distance of 2.95 ,chains to a point; thence S•o uth 52° 00' East a distance of 2..so
chains to a point; thence South 64°00' East a distance of 2.60 chains to a point; thence North
84°45' East a distance of 1.32 chains to a point: thence South 00°03' West a distance of 14.8'9
chains ·t o the place of beg1inning; together with all water, ditch and llateral rig ts appurtenant
hereto or used in connection therewith, Including 132 sha.res in the Thu.11man liU D'iteh Co, LTD.,
and as said acreage 1.s further identifi,ed in that Bargain and Sale Deed, dated December 20, 1954,
and reco11ded in the Rec,o rds of the· Ada County Reoo.r der's, Office, located 10 Book 440 at Page
104, copies of which are attached hereto, and Incorporated her-ein; and
1

'

1

1

1

Unit II:
Real p,r operty .s ituated 1in the Cou1n ty ,o f Ada, Stat.e of Idaho,, consisting of 44 acNtS, more or less,

to wit.
Commencing at a poiint 2 chains 88 links North 36°21 '' We t from the Wash Boulder set in the
center of Section Twenty-six in Township Four North of Range O,n1e East of the Boise Meridian;
thence North variIabon 18°48' East 18 ,c hains and 70 links to, a Slough; thence North and W,e sterly
followmg the left and South Bank of the said Slough to the East boundary o,f Lot Nine in Section
Twenty three in T,owinship and Range aforesaid; thence South foHowing East Boundary of said Lot
Niine, 7 cha1
ins and 75 links to Southeast comer of said L.o t Nine; th,ence South following the East
boundary of the West Half of the Northwest Quarter of said Section Tw,enty..six, 25 chains and 40
links to top of B luff; thence South and Easterly foHowing the edge of rhe Bl1uff to a point. 2 chains
1
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and 88 links No,rth 35°21' West from the· Wash Boulder _et in ·the•center of said Section Twenty
six,, said point being the place of beginnin,g . 'Together w·th all Certificates of Shares, including
Certificat.e No. 1,14 for 44 shares of the capital, stock i,n the Thurman MIH Ditch Company, Ltd, and
recorded in
as said acreage is further identified in that Warranty Deed dated M'arch 18, 1958, and 1
the Records of the Ada County Recorder's Office as Instrument No. s,O54O7, copies of which are
;attached hereto and incorporated herein; and said parcels of real1properties further identified in
the ·rax Parc:e,I Identification Numbers for further reference as s.et forth as:
(1)

Legal Descript:on: Parcel #0995 in Flood District S2 of Sec 23 & N2:of Sec 26
4N 1E #0990-B
Tax Parcel Number: S052'6120995
Property Address: 5933 N Branstetter St, Garden City, ID 83714

(2.)

Legal,Description: Parcel #4432 of :SE4 SE4 NW4 Seeti.on 26 4N 1E #244430-S
Tax Parcel Number: S0526244432
Property Address: 5933 N Branstetter St, Garden C.ity1ID 83714

(3}

Legal Descript on· Parcel #4434 of NE4 SE4 NW4 Section 26 4N 1E#244430 B

1

1

lax Paroel Number: S0526244434
Property Address: 6·933 N Branstetter St., Garden C'ty, ID 83714
(4),

Legal Descriptjoni: Parcel #2580 ,in Flood District Secs 23 ,& 26 4N 1E
Tax Parcel Number: S0526212580
Property Address: W Chinden Blvd., Garden CHy, ID 83714

(5•)

Legal Description: Parcel #3600@ KW Comer SE4 NW4 Section 26 4N
1E#244660-B
Ta~ Parcel Number: S0526243600
Property Address· W Chinden Blvd., Garden City, ID 83714

(6)

Legal Description: Parcel #3700, P,or N2 SE4 NW4 Section 26 4N 1E #24466O,B
Tax Paroel Number: S05262.43700
Property Address: W Chinden Blvd., Garden City1ID 83714

(7)

Legall Description: Parcel #4265 NR ,crR SE4- NW4 Sectio:111 26
4N, 1E #244255-B
Tax Parcel Number: SO526244265
Pro,perty Address: 9907 W Chinden Blvd., Garden City, ID 83714
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Filed: 06/03/2020 15:32:31
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Masters, Beth

2
3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

4

STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
5
6
7
8

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff,

9
10

Case No. CV0l-19-20686

vs.
DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION
FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO CERTIFY
JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(b)

11
12
13
14

LAW OFFICE OF VERNON K. SMITH,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company;
VERNON K. SMITH LAW, PC, an Idaho
professional service corporation,

15

Defendants.
16
17

INTRODUCTION
18

This case concerns real property and the Estate of Victoria H. Smith ("Victoria").

19

Victoria owned the real property ("Law Office") at issue prior to her death in 2013. The plaintiff,

20

Noah G. Hillen ("Hillen"), is the Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith. In

21

Ada County Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352, the probate court determined that Victoria's 1991
Holographic Will was invalid as a result of undue influence, and that transfers of Victoria's

22

property assets to VHS Properties, LLC were likewise invalid. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld
23

those decisions on appeal in Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 466, 432 P.3d 6, 15

24

(2018). As part of the lower court proceedings, on June 2, 2017, the probate court entered a

25

Judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 70(b), which provides:

26

The Court does hereby vest in the Personal Representative as of May 5,
DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO
CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B) - Page 1
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2017, any and all real property of any kind or nature, including but not limited to:
any fixtures, appurtenances, additions, easements, licenses, water rights, or
similar rights of any kind or nature appurtenant thereto; and any and all proceeds,
product, offspring, rents or profits of or from any real property (collectively "Real
Property"), including but not limited to [the Law Office] .... Such vesting is free
and clear of any lien, claim, or interest of [Vernon K. Smith Jr.]. 1

2
3
4

On November 13, 2019, Hillen filed the Complaint in this case with counts for:

5

Ejectment; Declaratory Judgment/Quiet Title; Trespass; and Unjust Enrichment. On March 26,

6

2020, Hillen filed a Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings for Count One Ejectment, a

7

Motion to Certify Judgment under I.R.C.P. 54(b), and a request for a Writ of Assistance. On May
5, 2020, the Court held a hearing on the motions. Having reviewed the motions, the record, and

8

the arguments of the parties, the Court grants the motions.

9

STANDARD

10

I.R.C.P. 12(c) governs motions for judgment on the pleadings. By its
terms, Rule 12(c) treats such motions similarly to motions for summary judgment.
Thus, the standard of review applicable to lower courts' rulings on motions for
summary judgment also applies to motions for judgment on the pleadings.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.

11
12
13
14
15

Union Bank, NA. v. JV L.L.C., 163 Idaho 306, 311, 413 P.3d 407, 412 (2017) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).

16

ANALYSIS

17

Hillen requests that the Court rule in his favor on Count One for Ejectment, enter

18

judgment on Count One in favor of Hillen and certify it as final under Rule 54(b ), and

19

immediately issue a writ of assistance restoring possession of the Law Office to Hillen.

A. Ejectment

20

"Ejectment requires proof of (1) ownership, (2) possession by the defendants, and (3)
21

refusal of the defendants to surrender possession." Ada Cty. Highway Dist. v. Total Success

22

Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 369, 179 P.3d 323, 332 (2008). Both parties agree that the

23

third element required for ejectment has been met; therefore, only the first two elements are

24

25
26

1

Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 201, the Court takes judicial notice of the Judgment filed June 2, 2017 in Ada
County Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352.
DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO
CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B) - Page 2
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discussed below.
With respect the first element required for ejectment, Hillen argues that, as Personal
2
3

Representative, he is the owner of the Law Office and/or holds the same power that an owner
would have over the same. The Court agrees.
Until termination of his appointment a personal representative has the
same power over the title to property of the estate that an absolute owner would
have, in trust however, for the benefit of the creditors and others interested in the
estate. This power may be exercised without notice, hearing, or order of court.

4

5
6

LC. § 15-3-711. By statute Hillen holds the same power over the Law Office that an absolute
7

owner would have. That alone satisfies the first element required for ejectment. Further, the Rule

8

70(b) Judgment "vest in the Personal Representative as of May 5, 2017, any and all real property

9

of any kind ... free and clear of any lien, claim, or interest of [Vernon K. Smith Jr.]." Under the

10

plain language of both Idaho Code section 15-3-711 and the Rule 70(b) Judgment, Hillen's
power of ownership satisfies the first element required for ejectment. To the extent that

11

Defendants dispute the plain language of the Rule 70(b) Judgment, "[t]he law in Idaho is clear
12

that a party cannot collaterally attack a judgment as allegedly erroneous if the issuing court had

13

authority to enter that judgment." Baird-Sallaz v. Sallaz, 157 Idaho 342, 347, 336 P.3d 275, 280

14

(2014).

15

With respect to the second element required for ejectment, Hillen argues that there is no
dispute that Defendants are operating in the Law Office. Hillen contends that Defendants occupy

16

the Law Office both by their admissions and filings with the Idaho Secretary of State. In
17

response, Defendants argue that "Vernon is the one in possession of [the] premises, from where

18

he practices law, and he is not named as a Defendant in the action. The entities identified in

19

pleadings are there upon Vernon's possession, as the entities have no independent possessory

20

interest." Defendants do not support this claim with any further argument or authority for the
Court to consider. In reply, Hillen contends that actual possession of property is defined as

21

"physical occupancy or control over property[.]" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1282 (9th ed.

22

2009); therefore, Defendants are in possession of the Law Office by virtue of physical occupancy

23

and satisfy the second element required for ejectment. The Court agrees.

24

25

Based upon the analysis above, the Court finds that there are no genume issues of
material fact in this case and that all elements required for ej ectment have been met. Thus,
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to Count One for Ejectment
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is granted.

B. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) Certification
2
3
4

5

In order for a partial judgment to be certified as final and appealable under
I.R.C.P. 54(b), the order granting partial judgment must finally resolve one or
more of the claims between the parties. If it does not, it is error for a trial court to
certify any interlocutory order as final under I.R.C.P. 54(b). The purpose of Rule
54(b) is to avoid piecemeal appeals. The decision to grant or deny a 54(b)
certificate rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge who is best able to
evaluate the situation.

6

Brinkmeyer v. Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho 596, 599, 21 P.3d 918, 921 (2001) (internal citations
7
8
9
10

omitted). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides:
(1) Certificate of Partial Judgment as Final. When an action presents more than
one claim for relief ... the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or
more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines
that there is no just reason for delay....
I.R.C.P. 54(b)(l).

11

In support of the motion to certify, the Declaration of Noah G. Hillen states that: "As

12

long as Defendants remain in possession of the Premises, I cannot collect rent for, sell, or

13

otherwise account for the Premises which I need to do to exercise my duty to administer the

14

Estate on behalf of its heirs." As such, the Court cannot find any just reason to delay certification

15

of this issue for purposes of an appeal. The Court notes that there are currently two other district
court cases with nearly identical issues, both of which have been certified on this same issue;

16

Hillen v. Gibson, Ada County Case No. CV0l-19-10368, and Hillen v. V. K. Smith III, Ada

17

County Case No. CV0l-19-10367. Thus, the Motion to Certify Judgment under I.R.C.P. 54(b) is

18

granted.

19

20

C. Writ of Assistance
"In dealing with the issuance of a writ of assistance, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated
that the exercise of the power to grant the writ rests in the sound discretion of the court." Fed.

21

22
23
24

25

Land Bank of Spokane v. Parsons, 118 Idaho 324, 329, 796 P.2d 533, 538 (Ct. App. 1990).

A writ of assistance is a form of process issued by a court of equity to
transfer the possession of property, and more specifically lands, the title or right
to which it has previously adjudicated. The sole question to be determined on the
motion is whether applicant has a right, as against the party in possession to use
the writ to obtain possession. In the absence of any claim of an independent
paramount title, the only question on such application is whether the decree has or
has not been complied with.
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Pro lndiviso, Inc. v. Mid-Mile Holding Tr., 131 Idaho 741, 746, 963 P.2d 1178, 1183 (1998)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
2

As the Court has determined that Plaintiff has a right to take possess10n against

3

Defendants in this case, the question becomes whether Defendants will comply with this

4

decision. At the end of the May 5, 2020 hearing on the motions, the Court asked Defendants if

5

they would comply with a decision and order in Plaintiffs favor. Defendants indicated that they
would not. Therefore, in an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that a waiting period would

6

serve no purpose but to further delay the probate of Victoria's estate and waste her estate's
7
8

resources by requiring it to again request a writ of assistance after Defendants fail to comply.
Thus, the Court grants Hillen's request for a writ of assistance.
CONCLUSION

9
10

Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Judgement on the Pleadings in Count One is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs Motion to Certify Judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) is GRANTED.

11

Plaintiffs request for a Writ of Assistance is GRANTED.
12
13
14
15

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: 6/2/2020 01 :36 PM

Dated this ___ day of _ _ _ _ _ _, 2020.

16

MICHAELREAR])ON
District Judge

17
18

19

20
21

22
23
24

25
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2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

3

I hereby certify that on this 3rd

day of

June

, 2020, I served a true and correct

4

copy of the:
5
6

DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
AND MOTION TO CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B)

7

to each of the parties below:

8
9
10

11
12
13
14

Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
Telephone: (208) 388-1200
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com

15
16
17
18

Vernon K. Smith, ISB No. 1365
ATTORNEY AT LAW
Telephone: (208) 345-1125
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129
vkslaw@live.com

19

PHIL MCGRANE
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho

20
21

22
23

Date:

By ~tr£.,, MM1:G.A
Deputy Clerk

Signed: 6/3/2020 03:33 PM
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Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
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Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
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Filed: 06/11/2020 15:30: 15
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Masters, Beth
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Case No. CV0l-19-20686

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
LAW OFFICE OF VERNON K. SMITH,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company;
VERNON K. SMITH LAW, PC, an Idaho
professional service corporation,
Defendants.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Judgment is granted in favor of Noah G. Hillen, as personal representative of the
Estate of Victoria H. Smith, on Count One of his Complaint. Defendants shall immediately vacate
and surrender possession of the premises described as: 1900 W. Main St., Boise, Idaho.
DATED: __
sig_ne_d:_611_112_02_0o_3:o_a_PM_

JUDGMENT-I
GPDMS: 15162009.1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11 June, 2020
, I
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated
below, and addressed to the following:
Vernon K. Smith, Jr.
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Attorney for Defendant

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt: vkslaw@live.com

Randall A. Peterman
Alexander P. McLaughlin
Jack W. Relf
Givens Pursley LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Attorneys for Plaintiff

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt:
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com

Signed: 6/11/2020 03:30 PM

Deputy Clerk
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Electronically Filed
6/17/2020 11 :46 AM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Katee Hysell, Deputy Clerk

Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
013683-0002
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Case No. CV0l-19-20686

MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS'
FEES AND COSTS

Plaintiff,
vs.
LAW OFFICE OF VERNON K. SMITH,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company;
VERNON K. SMITH LAW, PC, an Idaho
professional service corporation,
Defendants.

COMES NOW Plaintiff, Noah G. Hillen ("Plaintiff'), the duly appointed Personal
Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith (the "Estate"), by and through his counsel of
record, and hereby submits this Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs ("Memorandum"),
pursuant to Rules 54(d) and (e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho Code § 12-121.
The Memorandum is supported by the Declaration of Alexander P. McLaughlin in Support of
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Memorandum of Attorneys' Fees and Costs ("McLaughlin Declaration"). The McLaughlin
Declaration is incorporated herein by reference as though restated in full.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff seeks costs and fees related to Count One of his Complaint-the ejectment
claim-which the Court resolved via its Decision and Order on Motion for Partial Judgment on the
Pleadings and Motion to Certify Judgment under I.R.C.P. Rule 54(B) (June 3, 2020) (the "Order").
Plaintiff understands, however, that the entire controversy between Plaintiff and
Defendants, Law Office of Vernon K. Smith, LLC, and Vernon K. Smith Law, PC (collectively,
the "Defendants") is not yet resolved. This request for costs and fees is, therefore, not meant to
address who is the prevailing party for the remaining claims, or any entitlement to costs and fees
related to the outstanding claims. Those matters, and, in all likelihood this fee request, will be
resolved at a later date. Plaintiff only wishes to preserve his ability to seek and obtain fees and
costs incurred with respect to Count One. As such, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court
refrain from ruling on this fee petition and any objection thereto by Defendants until such time as
this Court enters a final judgment on all counts, so the Court can determine, at that time, prevailing
party status and entitlement to an award of fees and costs.
II.

RECAPITULATION OF COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES
Plaintiffhereby submits the following recapitulation of the costs and attorneys' fees

incurred in the prosecution of this litigation brought against Defendants. To the best of Plaintiffs
knowledge and belief, the items herein are correct and the costs and fees claimed in this
Memorandum and the McLaughlin Declaration are in compliance with I.R.C.P. 54(d) and (e),
including, but not limited to, I.R.C.P. 54(d)(4), I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5):
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COSTS (Sections II and 111 2 In(!a}

I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C) Costs as a Matter of Right:

$

378.63

I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D) Discretionary Costs:

$

0.00

TOTAL COSTS:

$

378.63

Randall A. Peterman (partner) - 1.7 hours@ $335/hr

$

569.50

Alexander P. McLaughlin (partner)- 2 hours@ $245/hr

$

490.00

Jack W. Relf (associate)- 18.5 hours@ $185/hr

$

3,422.50

Tiffiny Hudak (paralegal) - 5.2 hours@ $185/hr

$

962.00

Keri A. Moody (paralegal)- 10.8 hours@ $170/hr

$

1,836.00

TOTAL ATTORNEY FEES

$

7,280.00

TOTAL COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES

$

7,658.63

ATTORNEY FEES (Section IV2 In(!a}

III.

I.R.C.P. 54(D)(l)(C) / COSTS-ITEMS ALLOWED-AS A MATTER OF RIGHT
1.

Court Filing Fees:

06/07/2019 - Filing Fee - Complaint
Total Court Filing Fees
2.

$
227.63
$_ _ _
22_7_.6_3

Actual Fees for Service of Process:

06/19/2019 - Service Fee to Tri-County Process Serving
(service of complaint/summons upon Defendants)

$

151.00

Total Actual Fees for Service of Process

$_ _

1___s1_.o___o

3.

Witness Fees: None

4.

Witness Travel Fees: None

5.

Certified Copies of Documents Admitted as Trial Exhibits: None

6.

Cost of Trial Exhibits: None

7.

Cost of Bond Premiums: None
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8.

Reasonable Expert Witness Fees, not to Exceed $2,000 for Each
Expert Witness: None

9.

Charges for Reporting and Transcribing Depositions: None

10.

Charges for One Copy of any Deposition: None

TOTAL COSTS UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)
IV.

$====37::::::=8==.6==3

I.R.C.P. 54(D)(l)(D) / DISCRETIONARY COSTS

Plaintiff is not seeking any discretionary costs. Plaintiff recognizes that not all costs
incurred by Plaintiff were necessary and exceptional as required under I.R.C.P 54(d)(l)(D), e.g.,
costs expended for certain routine services, including copy and messenger fees.
V.

ATTORNEYS' FEES

Plaintiff requests $7,280.00 in attorneys' fees.

The fee arrangement between

Plaintiff and Givens Pursley was on a time and hour basis. The working attorneys, their fees, their
rates, and the time incurred in this matter are specifically listed and itemized in Exhibit A to the
McLaughlin Declaration.
VI.

LEGAL BASIS FOR AWARD OF FEES

Plaintiff initiated this suit to, among other things, eject Defendants from the subject
property located in Ada County and commonly known as 1900 W. Main St., Boise, Idaho (the
"Main Street Property"). Plaintiff moved for partial judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiffs
ejectment count. The Court granted the motion and agreed to certify a judgment under Rule 54 of
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally Order at 3-4. Plaintiff is, therefore, the prevailing
party under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) relative to the ejectment claim.
A.

Plaintiff is Entitled to Attorneys' Fees and Costs Under Idaho Code
Section 12-121.

Idaho Code§ 12-121 states:
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In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees
to the prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case
was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or
without foundation.
LC.§ 12-121; see also Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(2) (same). 1
The above standard is met where a party fails to set forth "any genuine issues of
law or legitimate issues of fact.. .. " Lamont v. Lamont, 158 Idaho 353, 362, 347 P.3d 645, 654-55
(2015) (awarding attorneys' fees on appeal) (citing Telford Lands LLC v. Cain, 154 Idaho 981,
993,303 P.3d 1237, 1249 (2013)). An award of fees is also warranted under Section 12-121 where
the non-prevailing party advocates a position that is "not fairly debatable." Assocs. Northwest,
Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Ct. App. 1987). "When deciding whether
the case was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, the entire
course of the litigation must be taken into account." Idaho Military Historical Society v. Maslen,
156 Idaho 624, 631, 329 P .3d 1072, 1079 (2014) (stating, in part, that the assertion that a party set
forth at least one argument that has merit is no longer a basis to evade an award of fees and costs).
Here, this Court should award Plaintiff his reasonable fees under LC. § 12-121.
The main issue in this action was whether Plaintiff owns the Main Street Property or has the same
power of an owner of such property, which is occupied by Defendants. As the Court noted in its
Order, ownership was already decided in favor of Plaintiff via the Rule 70 Judgment the probate
court entered (and the Supreme Court affirmed). Order at 3. That issue is, therefore, not "fairly
debatable" and Defendants failed to set forth "any genuine issues of law or legitimate issues of

1

Idaho Code§ 12-121 is a discretionary attorneys' fees provision. Jim and Maryann Plane Family Trust v.
Skinner, 157 Idaho 927, _, 342 P.3d 639, 647 (2015). Thus, an award of fees under Section 12-121 "will not be
overturned absent an abuse of discretion." Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 468, 259 P.3d 608, 614 (2011) (citing
Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212,225, 192 P.3d 1036, 1049 (2008)).

MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS - 5
15163282.1

Page 171

fact." Since Defendants defended this action without a basis in fact or law, Plaintiff is entitled to
an award of fees under Section 12-121.

B.

Plaintiff's Attorneys' Fees Are Reasonable.
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) "sets forth the factors the court must consider to determine what

amount is reasonable" for an award of fees and costs. Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444, 459,
210 P.3d 552, 559 (2009). Those factors consist of the following:
(A) The time and labor required.
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions.
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the
experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law.
(D) The prevailing charges for like work.

(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances
of the case.
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(H) The undesirability of the case.
(I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the
client.

(J) Awards in similar cases.
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer
Assisted Legal Research), if the court finds it was reasonably
necessary in preparing a party's case.
(L) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the
particular case.
Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(3); Nalen v. Jenkins, 113 Idaho 79, 81, 741 P.2d 366, 368 (Ct. App. 1987)
(stating that the court is to consider each factor without placing undue weight on any given one).
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Here, a review of the above factors indicates the fees Plaintiff incurred and seeks
are reasonable. The reasonableness of the award is set out in detail in the McLaughlin Declaration.
Briefly, however, Plaintiff notes that he achieved a tremendous outcome-ejectment of
Defendants from the Main Street Property. Counsel are experienced litigators and their rates are
reasonable. Further, while the labor involved in this matter was not intensive, the amount Plaintiff
seeks is commensurate with the labor involved and the result obtained. The record supplies a more
than adequate basis for the Court to award the attorneys' fees requested using the factors set forth
in Rule 54(e)(3).
C.

Plaintiff is Entitled to an Award of the Fees and Costs Incurred in Preparing
the Filings Associated with this Fee Request.
In BECO Construction Company, Inc., v. J-U-B Engineers Inc., the Idaho Supreme

Court held "that courts may award reasonable attorney fees incurred in connection with the effort
to secure a reasonable amount of attorney fees." 149 Idaho 294,298,233 P.3d 1216, 1220 (2010);
also Lettunich v. Lettunich, 145 Idaho 746, 185 P.3d 258 (2008) (affirming district court's ruling

awarding fees in connection with litigating the reasonableness of fees requested by the prevailing
party, stating that "litigation over the amount of the attorney fee award is also part of the legal
action for which he is entitled to an award of attorney fees.").
Here, the amount sought by Plaintiff in connection with an award of reasonable
fees and costs is itself reasonable. Also, just as in Lettunich, the requested fee award is a
continuation of the litigation. Accordingly, an award of fees for drafting the documents associated
with Plaintiffs fee request is appropriate.
VII.

CONCLUSION

As demonstrated above, Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action and Idaho
Code Section 12-121 entitles Plaintiff to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees. The items of costs
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and attorneys' fees stated in this Memorandum are correct, reasonable, and in compliance with
Rules 54(d) and 54(e). For these reasons, an award of costs in the amount of $378.63 and fees in
the amount of $7,280.00 (for a total amount of$7.658.63) is reasonable and warranted in favor of
Plaintiff against the Defendants.
DATED this 17th day of June, 2020.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By Isl Alexander P. McLaughlin
Randall A. Peterman - Of the Firm
Alexander P. McLaughlin - Of the Firm
Jack W. Relf- Of the Firm
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of June, 2020, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS to be
served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Vernon K. Smith, Jr.
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Attorney for Defendants

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt: vvs1900@gmail.com

Isl Alexander P. McLaughlin
Alexander P. McLaughlin
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NO-------::=-=!"""""f..,,.......,.,.__
AL.ED
A.M.----P.M.__.,--►.....__

I
2
3
4

Vernon K. Smith
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main Street
Boise, Idaho 83 702
ISB No. 1365
Tel. (208) 345-1125
Fax:(208) 345-1129
vkslaw(@live.com

JUN 2 4 2020
PHIL McGRANE, Clerk
By JOLENE MILLS
DEPUTY
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

8

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

9
IO

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

11

Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. CV0 1-19-20686

12
V.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

13
14

15
16

LAW OFFICES OF VERNON K. SMITH,
LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Company;
VERNON K. SMITH LAW, PC., an Idaho
Professional Service Corporation.
Defendant-Appellants.

17

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, NOAH G. HILLEN, acting

18

in the capacity as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith, and Plaintiff-

19

Respondent's attorneys,

20

Givens-Pursley, LLP, Boise, Idaho, 83701-2720, and the Clerk of the above-entitled Court of

21

Ada County, Idaho.

22

Jack W. Relf and Alexander P. McLaughlin, of the law firm of

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

23

1. The above-named Appellants, through their attorney of record, Vernon K. Smith, do

24

appeal against the above-named Plaintiff-Respondent, Noah G. Hillen, from that

25

MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER, PARTIAL JUDGMENT, and WRIT OF

26

ASSISTANCE, having granted Plaintiffs MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE
,,..
. CV01-19-20686

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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I
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j

PLEADINGS, with Judgment entered June 11, 2020, said appeal taken pursuant to
2

Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (a)(3) I.A.R., the Honorable Michael Reardon, District Judge

3

presiding, with copies thereof attached hereto at Item's No. "l ", "2", and "3", and by

4

this reference incorporated, and as required by Idaho Appellate Rule l 7(e)(l)(C).

5

2. That the above-named Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court

6

from that Partial Judgment entered on the Motion for Judgment On The Pleadings,

7

described in paragraph ( 1) above, as was certified as provided by Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P .,

8

and is an appealable Order/Judgment pursuant thereto.

9

3. A preliminary statement of the issues to be presented on appeal, which Appellants

10

intends to assert, but not preventing Appellants from asserting other issues on appeal, do

11

include, but not limited to, the following:

12

a. In the absence of any established need for the liquidation of assets in the

13

administration of an estate, as determined under I.C. § 15-3-711, does a personal

14

representative have any authority within the general provisions of the Idaho Uniform

15

Probate Code, LC. §§15-1-101 et seq. (UPC), to eject the entity owned and operated

16

by the person in possession, Vernon K. Smith, being the 2/3rds heir of the assets of

17

the Decedent, who is in lawful possession of the property pursuant to I. C. § 15-3-

18

101, and has been vested with the exclusive possession through the authority of the

19

Decedent since 1971?

20

b. Under the UPC, can a personal representative ever "own" estate property, as opposed

21

to taking and holding "possession" of that property in trust for the benefit of

22

creditors in satisfaction of their claims, of which there has never been any claims?

23

c. Does a magistrate in a probate proceeding have any authority to transfer "ownership"

24

of property to a personal representative by means of a Rule 70(b), I.R.C.P. order?

25

d. Does the "conclusive evidence" standard announced in I. C. § 15-3-709 apply to a

26

personal representative's pleading, made upon alleged "ownership" of property, as
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opposed to a pleading to obtain "possession" of property, for satisfaction of creditor
2

claims as an estate necessity, to which the "conclusive evidence" standard was

3

intended to apply under that section, and in this probate, there are no claims?
THE NATURE OF THIS APPEAL

4
5

Appellants are statutory entities of Vernon K. Smith (Vernon), and the real property

6

from which these entities and being sought to be ejected, is owned by the heirs of the Decedent,

7

Victoria H. Smith. The Personal Representative of the Estate, Noah G. Hillen, filed his

8

complaint for ejectment of Vernon's entities, which was granted, entering a Rule 54(b)

9

judgment ejecting Defendants from the property that Vernon has continuously occupied and had

10

exclusive possession since 1971, which ejectment was being undertaken upon the sole claim

11

Hillen was the "owner" of the property. Hillen's ejectment pleading was exclusively premised

12

upon Hillen's controversial allegation he has exclusive "ownership" of the property, as arising

13

out of a transfer of "ownership" to him, as personal representative, by a Rule 70(b) I.R.C.P.

14

Order entered by Magistrate Cheri Copsey in the probate proceeding on June 2, 2017. The

15

property, if not wrongfully sold, will remain with the ownership of the heirs, preferring

16

Vernon's continued occupancy to prevent vandalism, damage and potential property loss.

17

This appeal arises out of the district court's entry of a 54(b)certified judgment and

18

apparent determination no distinction exists between a personal representative's "power over the

19

title to property," as granted by, and limited in its exercise under the Idaho Uniform Probate

20

Code (UPC), and the alternative alleged "actual ownership of property", as arising out of the

21

magistrate's Rule 70(b) I.R.C.P. Order, which Order simultaneously would effectively operate

22

to divest Estate heirs of their titled and vested interest in that property.

23

The Personal Representative (Hillen) relies upon his alleged "ownership" and

24

unrestricted authority to dispose of the property, based upon that June 2, 2017 Order, which

25

vested title to all of Victoria's real and personal property in the personal representative.

26

Consequently, as based upon this alleged statement of "ownership 11 of Vernon's 2/3
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1

rightful ownership Decedent's property, Hillen is attempting to liquidate the entire Smith Estate

2

in the same fashion he typically liquidates an estate in his work as a Chapter 7 bankruptcy

3

trustee.

4

The Estate of Victoria H. Smith had no creditors, and Federal estate taxes were paid, and

5

no illustrated obligation has been identified within the Complaint to justify further possession

6

and liquidation in the administration to require further liquidation of remaining property in

7

satisfaction of a lawful purpose recognized under the provisions of the UPC, specifically I. C.

8

§15-3-711.

9
IO

11
12

13
14

4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.
5. Is a reporter's transcript requested? No, just the Clerk's Record pertaining to the
documents and disposition taken in this matter identified below.
6. Appellant does specifically request the Clerk's Record to include all filed and lodged
documents, currently including and identified to be as follows:
a. Verified Complaint for Ejectment and Other Relief, with Exhibits "A" and "B"
(filed 11/13/19)

15

16

b. Answer to Verified Complaint (filed 12/16/19)

17

c. Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (filed 3/26/20)

18

d. Memorandum in Support of Motion (filed 3/26/20)

19

e. Declaration of Noah G. Hillen (filed 3/26/20)

20

f.

21

g. Declaration of Vernon K. Smith (filed 4/30/20)

22

h. Reply Memorandum, with Exhibit "A", "B", and "C" (filed 5/5/20)

23

1.

Memorandum Decision and Order (filed 6/3/20)

24

J.

Partial Judgment (filed 6/11/20)

25

k. Writ of Assistance (filed 06/15/20)

26

I.

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion (filed 4/30/20)

Memorandum for costs and attorney fees (when filed)
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m. Motion to disallow (when filed)
2

n. Memorandum in opposition to costs and attorney fees (when filed)

3

o. The Estate Tax Return, if not of record, to be augmented or submitted in
appendix.

4

5

p.

Hilleny. David R. Gibson (4th Dist., Ada County Case No.CV0l-19-10368) (J.

6

Hippler) Complaint for Ejectment and Other Relief (currently on appeal, Docket

7

No. 47687-2020).

8

q. Hillen v. Vernon K. Smith III (4th Dist., Ada County Case No.CV0I-19-10367)

9

(J. Hoagland) Complaint for Ejectment and Other Relief (currently on appeal,

10
11

12
13

Docket No. 4 7884-2020.
7. I certify:
a. No Reporter's Transcript has been requested, so no notice has been sent to the
Reporter;

14

b. No estimate fee for any Reporter's Transcript, as none is requested;

15

c. That the Clerk of the District Court will be paid the estimated fee for the

16
17
18
19
20

preparation of the Clerk's Record, when requested.
d. That the required filing fee has been paid in conjunction with the i-Court filing
system in the amount of $129.00.
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20, I.A.R.

21

22

Dated this 24th Day of June, 2020.

23

Vernon K. Smith,
Attorney for Defenda

24

...... .---.....

25
26

NOTICE OF APPEAL

P.5
Page 180

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2

I hereby certify that on this 24th day of June, 2020, pursuant to the Idaho Rules of

3

Electronic Filing and Service, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument upon

4

the following persons, and by the methods and to the electronic mail addresses listed as follows:

5

Jack W. Relf
Alexander P. McLaughlin
Givens Pursley, LLP
60 I West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83 70 I

6
7

8

i-Court Electronic Filing and Service to:

jackrelfi@givenspurslev .corn
apm@givenspursley .corn

jackre1ffa1givenspurslev .com
apm(cugivenspursley .com

9

11

Dated this 24th day of June, 2020.

12

VemonK. S
Attorney for

13

~

14
15
16

17
18

19

20
21

22

23
24
25

26
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Filed: 06/03/2020 15:32:31
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Masters, Beth

2
3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

4

STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
5

6
7

8

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff,

9
10

Case No. CV0 1-19-20686

vs.
DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION
FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO CERTIFY
JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(b)

11

12
13

14

LAW OFFICE OF VERNON K. SMITH,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company;
VERNON K. SMITH LAW, PC, an Idaho
professional service corporation,

15

Defendants.
16
17

INTRODUCTION
18

This case concerns real property and the Estate of Victoria H. Smith ("Victoria").

19

Victoria owned the real property ("Law Office") at issue prior to her death in 2013. The plaintiff,

20

Noah G. Hillen ("Hillen"), is the Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith. In

21

Ada County Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352, the probate court determined that Victoria's 1991

22

Holographic Will was invalid as a result of undue influence, and that transfers of Victoria's
property assets to VHS Properties, LLC were likewise invalid. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld

23

those decisions on appeal in Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 466, 432 P.3d 6, 15

24

(2018). As part of the lower court proceedings, on June 2, 2017, the probate court entered a

25

Judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 70(b), which provides:

26

The Court does hereby vest in the Personal Representative as of May 5,
DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO
CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER 1.R.C.P. 54(8) - Page 1
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2017, any and all real property of any kind or nature, including but not limited to:
any fixtures, appurtenances, additions, easements, licenses, water rights, or
similar rights of any kind or nature appurtenant thereto; and any and all proceeds,
product, offspring, rents or profits of or from any real property (collectively "Real
Property"), including but not limited to [the Law Office] .... Such vesting is free
1
and clear of any lien, claim, or interest of [Vernon K. Smith Jr.].

2
3.

4

On November 13, 2019, Hillen filed the Complaint in this case with counts for:

5

Ejectment; Declaratory Judgment/Quiet Title; Trespass; and Unjust Enrichment. On March 26,

6

2020, Hillen filed a Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings for Count One Ejectment, a

7

Motion to Certify Judgment under I.R.C.P. 54(b), and a request for a Writ of Assistance. On May
5, 2020, the Court held a hearing on the motions. Having reviewed the motions, the record, and

8

the arguments of the parties, the Court grants the motions.

9

STANDARD

10

I.R.C.P. 12(c) governs motions for judgment on the pleadings. By its
terms, Rule 12(c) treats such motions similarly to motions for summary judgment.
Thus, the standard of review applicable to lower courts' rulings on motions for
summary judgment also applies to motions for judgment on the pleadings.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.

11
12

13
14

15

Union Bank, N.A. v. JV L.L.C., 163 Idaho 306, 311, 413 P.3d 407, 412 (2017) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).

16

ANALYSIS

17

Hillen requests that the Court rule in his favor on Count One for Ejectment, enter

18

judgment on Count One in favor of Hillen and certify it as final under Rule 54(b), and

19

immediately issue a writ of assistance restoring possession of the Law Office to Hillen.
A. Ejectment

20

"Ejectment requires proof of ( 1) ownership, (2) possession by the defendants, and (3)
21

refusal of the defendants to surrender possession." Ada Cty. Highway Dist. v. Total Success

22

Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 369, 179 P.3d 323, 332 (2008). Both parties agree that the

23

third element required for ejectment has been met; therefore, only the first two elements are

24

25

26

1

Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 201, the Court takes judicial notice of the Judgment filed June 2, 2017 in Ada

County Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352.
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1

discussed below.
With respect the first element required for ejectment, Hillen argues that, as Personal

2
3

Representative, he is the owner of the Law Office and/or holds the same power that an owner
would have over the same. The Court agrees.
Until termination of his appointment a personal representative has the
same power over the title to property of the estate that an absolute owner would
have, in trust however, for the benefit of the creditors and others interested in the
estate. This power may be exercised without notice, hearing, or order of court.

4

5
6

LC. § I 5-3-711. By statute Hillen holds the same power over the Law Office that an absolute

7

owner would have. That alone satisfies the first element required for ejectment. Further, the Rule

8

70(b) Judgment "vest in the Personal Representative as of May 5, 2017, any and all real property

9

of any kind ... free and clear of any lien, claim, or interest of [Vernon K. Smith Jr.]." Under the

10

plain language of both Idaho Code section 15-3-711 and the Rule 70(b) Judgment, Hillen' s
power of ownership satisfies the first element required for ejectment. To the extent that

11

Defendants dispute the plain language of the Rule 70(b) Judgment, "[t]he law in Idaho is clear

12

that a party cannot collaterally attack a judgment as allegedly erroneous if the issuing court had

13

authority to enter that judgment." Baird-Sallaz v. Sallaz, 157 Idaho 342,347,336 P.3d 275,280

14

(2014).

15

With respect to the second element required for ejectment, Hillen argues that there is no
dispute that Defendants are operating in the Law Office. Hillen contends that Defendants occupy

16

the Law Office both by their admissions and filings with the Idaho Secretary of State. In

17

response, Defendants argue that "Vernon is the one in possession of [the] premises, from where

18

he practices law, and he is not named as a Defendant in the action. The entities identified in

19

pleadings are there upon Vernon's possession, as the entities have no independent possessory

20

interest." Defendants do not support this claim with any further argument or authority for the
Court to consider. In reply, Hillen contends that actual possession of property is defined as

21

"physical occupancy or control over property[.]" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1282 (9th ed.

22

2009); therefore, Defendants are in possession of the Law Office by virtue of physical occupancy

23

and satisfy the second element required for ejectment. The Court agrees.

24

25

Based upon the analysis above, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of
material fact in this case and that all elements required for ejectment have been met. Thus,
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to Count One for Ejectment

26
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1

is granted.
B. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) Certification

2
3

4

5

In order for a partial judgment to be certified as final and appealable under
I.R.C.P. 54(b), the order granting partial judgment must finally resolve one or
more of the claims between the parties. If it does not, it is error for a trial court to
certify any interlocutory order as final under I.R.C.P. 54(b). The purpose of Rule
54(b) is to avoid piecemeal appeals. The decision to grant or deny a 54(b)
certificate rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge who is best able to
evaluate the situation.

6

Brinkmeyer v. Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho 596, 599, 21 P.3d 918, 921 (2001) (internal citations
7

8
9

10

omitted). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides:
(1) Certificate of Partial Judgment as Final. When an action presents more than
one claim· for relief ... the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or
more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines
that there is no just reason for delay ....

I.R.C.P. 54(b)(l).
11

In support of the motion to certify, the Declaration of Noah G. Hillen states that: "As

12

long as Defendants remain in possession of the Premises, I cannot collect rent for, sell, or

13

otherwise account for the Premises which I need to do to exercise my duty to administer the

14

Estate on behalf of its heirs." As such, the Court cannot find any just reason to delay certification

15

of this issue for purposes of an appeal. The Court notes that there are currently two other district
court cases with nearly identical issues, both of which have been certified on this same issue;

16

Hillen v. Gibson, Ada County Case No. CV0 1-19-10368, and Hillen v. V. K. Smith III, Ada

17

County Case No. CV0l-19-10367. Thus, the Motion to Certify Judgment under I.R.C.P. 54(b) is

18

granted.

19
20

C. Writ of Assistance
"In dealing with the issuance of a writ of assistance, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated
that the exercise of the power to grant the writ rests in the sound discretion of the court." Fed.

21

22
23
24

25

Land Banko/Spokane v. Parsons, 118 Idaho 324,329, 796 P.2d 533,538 (Ct. App. 1990).

A writ of assistance is a form of process issued by a court of equity to
transfer the possession of property, and more specifically lands, the title or right
to which it has previously adjudicated. The sole question to be determined on the
motion is whether applicant has a right, as against the party in possession to use
the writ to obtain possession. In the absence of any claim of an independent
paramount title, the only question on such application is whether the decree has or
has not been complied with.

26
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Pro Indiviso, Inc. v. Mid-Mile Holding Tr., 131 Idaho 741, 746, 963 P.2d 1178, 1183 (1998)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
2

As the Court has determined that Plaintiff has a right to take possession against

3

Defendants in this case, the question becomes whether Defendants will comply with this

4

decision. At the end of the May 5, 2020 hearing on the motions, the Court asked Defendants if

5

they would comply with a decision and order in Plaintifrs favor. Defendants indicated that they
would not. Therefore, in an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that a waiting period would

6

serve no purpose but to further delay the probate of Victoria's estate and waste her estate's
7

resources by requiring it to again request a writ of assistance after Defendants fail to comply.

a· Thus, the Court grants Hillen's request for a writ of assistance.
CONCLUSION

9

10

Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Judgement on the Pleadings in Count One is GRANTED.
Plaintiff's Motion to Certify Judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) is GRANTED.

11

Plaintiff's request for a Writ of Assistance is GRANTED.
12
13
14

15

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: 6/2/2020 01 :36 PM

Dated this _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _, 2020.

16

MICHAELREAlt[j"ON
District Judge

17
18

19

20
21
22
23

24

25
26
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2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

3

I hereby certify that on this 3rd

day of

June

, 2020, I served a true and correct

4

copy of the:
5
6

DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
AND MOTION TO CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(8)

7

to each of the parties below:

8

9

10
11
12
13

14

Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
Telephone: (208) 388-1200
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com

15
16

17
18

Vernon K. Smith, ISB No. 1365
ATTORNEYATLAW
Telephone: (208) 345-1125
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129
vkslaw@live.com

19

PHIL MCGRANE
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho

20
21
22
23

Date:

Signed: 6/3/2020 03:33 PM

By

!,rl ~"'uiA
Deputy Clerk

24

25
26
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Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PuRSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com

Filed: 06/11/2020 15:30:15
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Masters, Beth

15162009_I [013683-0002]

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Case No. CV0l-19-20686

JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
LAW OFFICE OF VERNON K. SMITH,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company;
VERNON K. SMITH LAW, PC, an Idaho
professional service corporation,
Defendants.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Judgment is granted in favor of Noah G. Hillen, as personal representative of the
Estate of Victoria H. Smith, on Count One of his Complaint. Defendants shall immediately vacate
and surrender possession of the premises described as: 1900 W. Main St., ~oise, Idaho.

DATED:

Signed: 6/11/2020 03:08 PM

Michael Reardon,

n'mifct Judge

JUDGMENT-I
GPDMS:15162009.1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 11 June, 2020
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated
below, and addressed to the following:
U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt: vkslaw@live.com

Vernon K. Smith, Jr.
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Attorney for Defendant

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Randall A. Peterman
Alexander P. McLaughlin
JackW. Relf
Givens Pursley LLP
60 I West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Attorneys for Plaintiff

[ ] U.S. Mail
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

Facsimile (208) 388-1300
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt:
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com

Signed: 6/11/2020 03:30 PM

Deputy Clerk

JUDGMENT-?
GPO MS: 15162009.1
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Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300 _
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com

IF YOU AND YOUR PERSONAL PROPERTV
ARE NOT REMOVED BY

~

- -1 , . - r _ 1

of ~tJDU

NO REMOVE
YOU WILL BE
LIABLE FOR ALL COSTS.

15162009_1 (013683-00021

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Case No. CV0 1-19-20686

WRIT OF ASSISTANCE

Plaintiff,
VS.

LAW OFFICE OF VERNON K. SMITH,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company;
VERNON K. SMITH LAW, PC, an Idaho
professional service corporation,
Defendants.
TO THE ADA COUNTY SHERIFF OR ANY CONSTABLE OF ADA COUNTY:
WHEREAS, a certain action for the possession of the following described premises,
to wit:
1900 W. Main St., Boise, Idaho
lately tried before the above entitled Court, wherein Noah G. HilJen, as personal representative of
the Estate of Victoria H. Smith, was Plaintiff and the Law Office of Vernon K. Smith, LLC, and

WRIT OF ASSISTANCE - 1
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11202 0

611
Vernon K. Smith Law, PC were Defendants, Judgment was rendered on _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ - that
the Plaintiff have restitution of the premises;

In the name of the State of Idaho, you are, therefore, hereby commanded to cause
the Defendants and their goods and chattels to be forthwith removed from the premises and the
Plaintiff is to have restitution of the same. In the event the goods and chattels are not promptly
removed thereafter by the Defendants, you are authorized and empowered to cause the same to be
removed to a safe place for storage. You are also commanded to levy on the goods and chattels of
the Defendants, and pay the costs and disbursements, aforesaid, and all accruing costs, and to make
legal service and due return of this Writ.
WITNESS my hand and official seal on: 6/15/2020
Phil McGrane
Clerk of the District Court
By:

c/_..4&...,~

Deputy Court Clerk

WRIT OF ASSISTANCE - 2
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Filed: 07/02/2020 12:21 :40
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Wegener, Kelle

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Order Conditionally
Dismissing Appeal

Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

Supreme Court Docket No. 48132-2020
LAW OFFICE OF VERNON K. SMITH,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company;
VERNON K. SMITH LAW, PC, an Idaho
professional service corporation,

Ada County District Court No.
CV01-19-20686

Defendants-Appellants.

A Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on June 24, 2020, from the Decision
and Order on Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion to Certify Judgment
Under I.R.C.P. 54(b) and filed on June 3, 2020, and the Judgment filed on June 11, 2020, both
of which were entered by District Judge Michael J. Reardon. It appears the Judgment is not in
compliance with I.R.C.P. 54(b)(1) in that the Judgment does not include a Rule 54(b) Certificate
of Final Partial Judgment immediately following the court's signature; therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this appeal be, and hereby is, conditionally dismissed as
the Judgment filed on June 11, 2020, does not appear to be in compliance with I.R.C.P.
54(b )(1 ).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this appeal shall be suspended for twenty-one (21)
days from the date of this Order for entry of a judgment in compliance with I.R.C.P. 54(b)(1) or,
the filing of a Response with this Court showing why this appeal should not be dismissed.
Dated this 1st day of July, 2020.

For the Supreme Court

PG~~
u ~erk« ~

Melanie
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Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com

Filed: 07/09/2020 16:17:29
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Masters, Beth

15200439_1 [013683-0002]

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Case No. CV0l-19-20686

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

AMENDED JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
LAW OFFICE OF VERNON K. SMITH,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company;
VERNON K. SMITH LAW, PC, an Idaho
professional service corporation,
Defendants.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Judgment is granted in favor of Noah G. Hillen, as personal representative of the
Estate of Victoria H. Smith, on Count One of his Complaint. Defendants shall immediately vacate
and surrender possession of the premises described as: 1900 W. Main St., Boise, Idaho.
DATED:

Signed: 7/9/2020 04:13 PM

~

Michael Reardon, District Judge

AMENDEDJUDGMENT-1
Page 193

RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE:
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment, it is hereby
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the Court has determined that there is
no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment, and that the Court has and does hereby
direct that the above judgment is a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal
may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED:
DATED:

Signed: 7/2/2020 01:38 PM

-------

Michael Reardon, D;ct Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
, I
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th of July, 2020
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED JUDGMENT to be served by the
method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Vernon K. Smith, Jr.
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Attorney for Defendant

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt: vkslaw@live.com

Randall A. Peterman
Alexander P. McLaughlin
Jack W. Relf
Givens Pursley LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Attorneys for Plaintiff

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt:
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com

Deputy Clerk of the Court
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Signed: 7/9/2020 04:18 PM

Electronically Filed
7/9/2020 7:32 PM
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Timothy Lamb, Deputy Clerk

VERNON K. SMITH
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Idaho State Bar No. 1365
Telephone: (208) 345-1125
Fax:
(208) 345-1129
vkslaw@live.com

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

)
)
)

)
Plaintiff-Respondent ,

Case No. CV0 1-19-20686

)
)

)
)
)
)

V.

LAW OFFICES OF VERNON K. SMITH,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company~
VERNON K. SMITH LAW, PC, an Idaho
Professional service corporation,

NOTICE OF APPEAL OF
AMEMDED CERTIFIED
JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)
)

Defendants-Appellants.

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, NOAH G. HILLEN,
acting in the capacity as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith, and
Plaintiff-Respondent's attorneys, Jack W/ Relf and Alexander P. McLaughlin, of the law firm
of Givens-Pursley, LLP, Boise, Idaho, 83701-2720, and the Clerk of the above entitled Court
of Ada County, Idaho.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
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1.

The above-named Appellants, through their attorney of record, Vernon K.

Smith, do appeal against the above-named Plaintiff-Respondent, Noah G. Hillen, from that
MEMORANDUM DECISION, ORDER and PARTIAL JUDGMENT granting Plaintiffs
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, with AMENDED JUDGMENT
entered July 9, 2020, said appeal taken pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (a)(3) I.AR., the
Honorable Michael Reardon, District Judge presiding, with copies thereof attached hereto as
provided for by Idaho Appellate Rule l 7(e)(l)(C).
2.

That the above-named Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme

Court from that Partial Judgment entered on the Motion for Judgment On The Pleadings,
described in paragraph 1 above, as was certified as provided by Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., and is
an appealable Order/Judgment pursuant thereto.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues to be presented on appeal, which

Appellants intends to assert, but not preventing Appellants from asserting other issues on
appeal, do include, but not limited to, the following:
a. In the absence of any established need for the liquidation of assets in the
administration of an estate, as determined under I. C. § 15-3-711, do£s a personal
representative have any authority within the general provisions of the Idaho Uniform
Probate Code, I. C. §§15-1-101 et seq. (UPC), to eject the entity owned and operated by
the person in possession, Vernon K. Smith, being the 2/3rds heir of the assets of the
Decedent, who is in lawful possession of the property pursuant to I. C. § 15-3-101, and has
been vested with the exclusive possession through the authority of the Decedent since
1971?
b. Under the UPC, can a personal representative ever "own" estate property, as
opposed to taking and holding "possession" of that property in trust for the benefit of
creditors in satisfaction of their claims, of which there has never been any claims?
c. Does a magistrate in a probate proceeding have any authority to transfer
"ownership" of property to a personal representative by means of a Rule 70(b), I.R.C.P.
order?
d. Does the "conclusive evidence" standard announced in I. C. § 15-3-709 apply to
a personal representative's pleading, made upon alleged "ownership" of prope11y, as
opposed to a pleading to obtain "possession" of property, for satisfaction of creditor claims

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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as a estate necessity, to which the "conclusive evidence" standard was intended to apply
under that section, and in this probate, there are no claims?
NATURE OF THIS APPEAL
Appellants are statutory entities of Vernon K. Smith (Vernon), and the real property
from which these entities and being sought to be ejected, is owned by the heirs of the
Decedent, Victoria H. Smith. The personal representative of the Estate~ Noah G. Hillen,
filed his complaint for ejectment of Vernon's entities, which was granted, entering a Rule
54(b) judgment ejecting Defendants from the property that Vernon has continuously
occupied and had exclusive possession since 1971, which ejectment was being undertaken
upon the sole claim Hillen was the "owner" of the property. Hillen's ejectment pleading
was exclusively premised upon Hillen's controversial allegation he has exclusive
"ownership" of the property, as arising out of a transfer of "ownership" to him, as personal
representative, by a Rule 70(b) I.R.C.P. Order entered by Magistrate Cheri Copsey in the
probate proceeding on June 2, 2017. The property, if not wrongfully sold, will remain with
the ownership of the heirs, preferring Vernon's continued occupancy to prevent vandalism,
damage and potential property loss.
This appeal arises out of the district court's entry of a 54(b )certified judgment and
apparent determination no distinction exists between a personal representative's "power
over the title to property," as granted by, and limited in its exercise under the Idaho Uniform
Probate Code (UPC), and the alternative alleged "actual ownership of property", as arising
out of the magistrate's Rule 70(b) I.R.C.P. Order, which Order simultaneously would
effectively operate to divest Estate heirs of their titled and vested interest in that property.
The Personal Representative (Hillen) relies upon his alleged "ownership" and
unrestricted authority to dispose of the property, based upon that June 2, 2017 Order, which
vested title to all of Victoria's real and personal property in the personal representative.
Consequently, as based upon this alleged statement of "ownership" of Vernon's 2/3
rightful ownership Decedent's property, Hill eh is attempting to liquidate the entire Smith
Estate in the same fashion he typically liquidates an estate in his work as a Chapter 7
bankruptcy trustee.
The Estate of Victoria H. Smith had no creditors, and. Federal estate taxes were
paid, and no illustrated obligation has been identified within the complaint to justify further
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possession and liquidation in the administration to require further liquidation of remaining
property in satisfaction of a lawful purpose recognized under the provisions of the UPC,
specifically I. C. §15-3-711.
4.

No order has been ent~red sealing all or any portion of the record.

5.

Is a reporter's transcript requested? No, just the Clerk's Record pertaining

to the documents and disposition taken in this matter identified below.
6.

Appellant does specifically request the Clerk's Record to include all filed

and lodged documents, currently including and identified to be as follows:
a. Verified Complaint for Ejectment and Other Relief, with Exhibits "A" and "B"
( filed 11113/19)
b. Answer to Verified Complaint (filed 12/16/19)
c. Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (filed 3/26/20)
d. Memorandum in Support of Motion (filed 3/26/20)
e. Declaration of Noah G. Hillen (filed 3/26/20)
f.

Memorandum in Opposition to Motion (filed 4/30/20)

g. Declaration of Vernon K. Smith (filed 4/30/20)
h. Reply Memorandum, with Exhibit "A", "B", and "C" (filed 5/5/20)
1.

Memorandum Decision and Order (filed 6/3/20)

J.

Partial Judgment (filed 6/11/20)

k. Amended Judgment (filed 7/9/20)

1.

Memorandum for costs and attorney foes (when filed)

m. Motion to disallow (when filed)
n. Memorandum in opposition to costs and attorney fees (when filed)
o. The Estate Tax Return, if not of record, to be augmented or submitted in
appendix.
p. Hillen v. David R. Gibson (4th Dist., Ada County Case No.CV0l-1910368) (J. Hippler) Complaint for Ejectment and Other Relief
(currently ori appeal, Docket No. 47687-2020).
q. Hillen v. Vernon K. Smith III (4th Dist., Ada County Case No.CV0l-19-10367)
(J. Hoagland) Complaint for Ejectment and Other Relief ( currently on appeal,
Docket No. 4 7884-2020.
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7.

I certify:

a. No Reporter's Transcript has been requested, so no notice has been sent to the
Reporter~
b. No estimate fee for any Reporter's Transcript, as none is requested;
c. That the Clerk of the District Court will be paid the estimated fee for the
preparation of the Clerk's Record, when requested.
d. That the required filing fee has been paid in co"njunction with the I-Court filing
system in the amount of$129.00.
e. That service has been made upon all
Rule 20, I.A.R.
Dated this 9 th day of July, 2020.

Vernon K. Sm1
Attorney for Defendants-Appella s

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 9th day of July, 2020, I caused a true and correct
copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the following
addresses:
Jack W. Relf
Alexander P. McLaughlin
Givens Pursley, LLP
601 West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
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X

)
)

---

U. . Mail
Fax 208-388-1200
Hand Deliv-· red
Icourt

Filed: 06/03/2020 15:32:31
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Masters, Beth
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3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

4

STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
5
6
7
8

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff,

9
10

Case No. CV0l-19-20686

vs.
DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION
FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE
PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO CERTIFY
JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(b)

11
12
13
14

LAW OFFICE OF VERNON K. SMITH,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company;
VERNON K. SMITH LAW, PC, an Idaho
professional service corporation,

15

Defendants.
16
17

INTRODUCTION
18

This case concerns real property and the Estate of Victoria H. Smith ("Victoria").

19

Victoria owned the real property ("Law Office") at issue prior to her death in 2013. The plaintiff,

20

Noah G. Hillen ("Hillen"), is the Personal Representative of the Estate of Victoria H. Smith. In

21

Ada County Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352, the probate court determined that Victoria's 1991
Holographic Will was invalid as a result of undue influence, and that transfers of Victoria's

22

property assets to VHS Properties, LLC were likewise invalid. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld
23

those decisions on appeal in Matter of Estate of Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 466, 432 P.3d 6, 15

24

(2018). As part of the lower court proceedings, on June 2, 2017, the probate court entered a

25

Judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 70(b), which provides:

26

The Court does hereby vest in the Personal Representative as of May 5,
DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO
CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B) - Page 1

ATTACHMENT "1" P.1
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2017, any and all real property of any kind or nature, including but not limited to:
any fixtures, appurtenances, additions, easements, licenses, water rights, or
similar rights of any kind or nature appurtenant thereto; and any and all proceeds,
product, offspring, rents or profits of or from any real property (collectively "Real
Property"), including but not limited to [the Law Office] .... Such vesting is free
and clear of any lien, claim, or interest of [Vernon K. Smith Jr.]. 1

2
3
4

On November 13, 2019, Hillen filed the Complaint in this case with counts for:

5

Ejectment; Declaratory Judgment/Quiet Title; Trespass; and Unjust Enrichment. On March 26,

6

2020, Hillen filed a Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings for Count One Ejectment, a

7

Motion to Certify Judgment under I.R.C.P. 54(b), and a request for a Writ of Assistance. On May
5, 2020, the Court held a hearing on the motions. Having reviewed the motions, the record, and

8

the arguments of the parties, the Court grants the motions.

9

STANDARD

10

I.R.C.P. 12(c) governs motions for judgment on the pleadings. By its
terms, Rule 12(c) treats such motions similarly to motions for summary judgment.
Thus, the standard of review applicable to lower courts' rulings on motions for
summary judgment also applies to motions for judgment on the pleadings.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.

11
12
13
14
15

Union Bank, NA. v. JV L.L.C., 163 Idaho 306, 311, 413 P.3d 407, 412 (2017) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).

16

ANALYSIS

17

Hillen requests that the Court rule in his favor on Count One for Ejectment, enter

18

judgment on Count One in favor of Hillen and certify it as final under Rule 54(b ), and

19

immediately issue a writ of assistance restoring possession of the Law Office to Hillen.

A. Ejectment

20

"Ejectment requires proof of (1) ownership, (2) possession by the defendants, and (3)
21

refusal of the defendants to surrender possession." Ada Cty. Highway Dist. v. Total Success

22

Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 369, 179 P.3d 323, 332 (2008). Both parties agree that the

23

third element required for ejectment has been met; therefore, only the first two elements are

24

25
26

1

Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 201, the Court takes judicial notice of the Judgment filed June 2, 2017 in Ada
County Case No. CV-IE-2014-15352.
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discussed below.
With respect the first element required for ejectment, Hillen argues that, as Personal
2
3

Representative, he is the owner of the Law Office and/or holds the same power that an owner
would have over the same. The Court agrees.
Until termination of his appointment a personal representative has the
same power over the title to property of the estate that an absolute owner would
have, in trust however, for the benefit of the creditors and others interested in the
estate. This power may be exercised without notice, hearing, or order of court.

4

5
6

LC. § 15-3-711. By statute Hillen holds the same power over the Law Office that an absolute
7

owner would have. That alone satisfies the first element required for ejectment. Further, the Rule

8

70(b) Judgment "vest in the Personal Representative as of May 5, 2017, any and all real property

9

of any kind ... free and clear of any lien, claim, or interest of [Vernon K. Smith Jr.]." Under the

10

plain language of both Idaho Code section 15-3-711 and the Rule 70(b) Judgment, Hillen's
power of ownership satisfies the first element required for ejectment. To the extent that

11

Defendants dispute the plain language of the Rule 70(b) Judgment, "[t]he law in Idaho is clear
12

that a party cannot collaterally attack a judgment as allegedly erroneous if the issuing court had

13

authority to enter that judgment." Baird-Sallaz v. Sallaz, 157 Idaho 342, 347, 336 P.3d 275, 280

14

(2014).

15

With respect to the second element required for ejectment, Hillen argues that there is no
dispute that Defendants are operating in the Law Office. Hillen contends that Defendants occupy

16

the Law Office both by their admissions and filings with the Idaho Secretary of State. In
17

response, Defendants argue that "Vernon is the one in possession of [the] premises, from where

18

he practices law, and he is not named as a Defendant in the action. The entities identified in

19

pleadings are there upon Vernon's possession, as the entities have no independent possessory

20

interest." Defendants do not support this claim with any further argument or authority for the
Court to consider. In reply, Hillen contends that actual possession of property is defined as

21

"physical occupancy or control over property[.]" BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1282 (9th ed.

22

2009); therefore, Defendants are in possession of the Law Office by virtue of physical occupancy

23

and satisfy the second element required for ejectment. The Court agrees.

24

25

Based upon the analysis above, the Court finds that there are no genume issues of
material fact in this case and that all elements required for ej ectment have been met. Thus,
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to Count One for Ejectment

26
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is granted.

B. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) Certification
2
3
4

5

In order for a partial judgment to be certified as final and appealable under
I.R.C.P. 54(b), the order granting partial judgment must finally resolve one or
more of the claims between the parties. If it does not, it is error for a trial court to
certify any interlocutory order as final under I.R.C.P. 54(b). The purpose of Rule
54(b) is to avoid piecemeal appeals. The decision to grant or deny a 54(b)
certificate rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge who is best able to
evaluate the situation.

6

Brinkmeyer v. Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho 596, 599, 21 P.3d 918, 921 (2001) (internal citations
7
8
9
10

omitted). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides:
(1) Certificate of Partial Judgment as Final. When an action presents more than
one claim for relief ... the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or
more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines
that there is no just reason for delay....
I.R.C.P. 54(b)(l).

11

In support of the motion to certify, the Declaration of Noah G. Hillen states that: "As

12

long as Defendants remain in possession of the Premises, I cannot collect rent for, sell, or

13

otherwise account for the Premises which I need to do to exercise my duty to administer the

14

Estate on behalf of its heirs." As such, the Court cannot find any just reason to delay certification

15

of this issue for purposes of an appeal. The Court notes that there are currently two other district
court cases with nearly identical issues, both of which have been certified on this same issue;

16

Hillen v. Gibson, Ada County Case No. CV0l-19-10368, and Hillen v. V. K. Smith III, Ada

17

County Case No. CV0l-19-10367. Thus, the Motion to Certify Judgment under I.R.C.P. 54(b) is

18

granted.

19

20

C. Writ of Assistance
"In dealing with the issuance of a writ of assistance, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated
that the exercise of the power to grant the writ rests in the sound discretion of the court." Fed.

21

22
23
24

25

Land Bank of Spokane v. Parsons, 118 Idaho 324, 329, 796 P.2d 533, 538 (Ct. App. 1990).

A writ of assistance is a form of process issued by a court of equity to
transfer the possession of property, and more specifically lands, the title or right
to which it has previously adjudicated. The sole question to be determined on the
motion is whether applicant has a right, as against the party in possession to use
the writ to obtain possession. In the absence of any claim of an independent
paramount title, the only question on such application is whether the decree has or
has not been complied with.

26
DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO
CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B) - Page 4

ATTACHMENT "1" P.4
Page 204

Pro lndiviso, Inc. v. Mid-Mile Holding Tr., 131 Idaho 741, 746, 963 P.2d 1178, 1183 (1998)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
2

As the Court has determined that Plaintiff has a right to take possess10n against

3

Defendants in this case, the question becomes whether Defendants will comply with this

4

decision. At the end of the May 5, 2020 hearing on the motions, the Court asked Defendants if

5

they would comply with a decision and order in Plaintiffs favor. Defendants indicated that they
would not. Therefore, in an exercise of its discretion, the Court finds that a waiting period would

6

serve no purpose but to further delay the probate of Victoria's estate and waste her estate's
7
8

resources by requiring it to again request a writ of assistance after Defendants fail to comply.
Thus, the Court grants Hillen's request for a writ of assistance.
CONCLUSION

9
10

Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Judgement on the Pleadings in Count One is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs Motion to Certify Judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) is GRANTED.

11

Plaintiffs request for a Writ of Assistance is GRANTED.
12
13
14
15

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed: 6/2/2020 01 :36 PM

Dated this ___ day of _ _ _ _ _ _, 2020.

16

MICHAELREAR])ON
District Judge

17
18

19

20
21

22
23
24

25
26
DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND MOTION TO
CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B) - Page 5

ATTACHMENT "1" P.5
Page 205

2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

3

I hereby certify that on this 3rd

day of

June

, 2020, I served a true and correct

4

copy of the:
5
6

DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
AND MOTION TO CERTIFY JUDGMENT UNDER I.R.C.P. 54(B)

7

to each of the parties below:

8
9
10

11
12
13
14

Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
Telephone: (208) 388-1200
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com

15
16
17
18

Vernon K. Smith, ISB No. 1365
ATTORNEY AT LAW
Telephone: (208) 345-1125
Facsimile: (208) 345-1129
vkslaw@live.com

19

PHIL MCGRANE
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho

20
21

22
23

Date:

By ~tr£.,, MM1:G.A
Deputy Clerk

Signed: 6/3/2020 03:33 PM

24
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Randall A. Peterman, ISB No. 1944
Alexander P. McLaughlin, ISB No. 7977
Jack W. Relf, ISB No. 9762
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Telephone (208) 388-1200
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com

Filed: 07/09/2020 16:17:29
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Masters, Beth
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Case No. CV0l-19-20686

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

AMENDED JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
vs.
LAW OFFICE OF VERNON K. SMITH,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company;
VERNON K. SMITH LAW, PC, an Idaho
professional service corporation,
Defendants.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Judgment is granted in favor of Noah G. Hillen, as personal representative of the
Estate of Victoria H. Smith, on Count One of his Complaint. Defendants shall immediately vacate
and surrender possession of the premises described as: 1900 W. Main St., Boise, Idaho.
DATED:

Signed: 7/9/2020 04:13 PM

~

Michael Reardon, District Judge
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RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE:
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment, it is hereby
CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the Court has determined that there is
no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment, and that the Court has and does hereby
direct that the above judgment is a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal
may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED:
DATED:

Signed: 7/2/2020 01:38 PM

-------

Michael Reardon, D;ct Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
, I
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th of July, 2020
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED JUDGMENT to be served by the
method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Vernon K. Smith, Jr.
1900 W. Main St.
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Attorney for Defendant

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 345-1129
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt: vkslaw@live.com

Randall A. Peterman
Alexander P. McLaughlin
Jack W. Relf
Givens Pursley LLP
601 West Bannock Street
Post Office Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
Attorneys for Plaintiff

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[X]

U.S. Mail
Facsimile (208) 388-1300
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Email/iCourt:
rap@givenspursley.com
apm@givenspursley.com
jackrelf@givenspursley.com

Deputy Clerk of the Court
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Filed: 07/16/2020 08:26:50
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Wegener, Kelle
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Order Reinstating Appeal

V.

Supreme Court Docket No. 48132-2020

LAW OFFICE OF VERNON K. SMITH,
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company;
VERNON K. SMITH LAW, PC, an Idaho
professional service corporation,

Ada County District Court No.
cvo 1-19-20686

Defendants-A

ellants.

An Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal was issued by this Court on July 1, 2020, and
this appeal was suspended for twenty-one (21) days for entry of a judgment in the District Court
in compliance with I.R.C.P. 54(b )(1) or, filing of a Response with this Court showing why this
appeal should not be dismissed.

Subsequently, an Amended Judgment with a Rule 54(b)

Certificate attached was entered by District Judge Michael J. Reardon and filed on July 9, 2020.
Further, a Notice of Appeal of Amended Certified Judgment was filed on July 9, 2020, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal issued by this
Court on July 1, 2020, is withdrawn and proceedings in this appeal are reinstated.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk's Record shall be prepared and filed with this
Court by September 11, 2020.

DATED this _ _1_0t_h__ day of July, 2020.
For the Supreme Court
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Filed: 08/14/2020 09:57:29
Fourth Judicial District, Ada County
Phil McGrane, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Larsen, Thomas

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
NOAH G. HILLEN, in his capacity as
Personal Representative of the Estate of
Victoria H. Smith,

Supreme Court Case No. 48132
District Court Case No. CV0l-19-20686

Plaintiff- Respondent,
V.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
LAW OFFICE OF VERNON K. SMITH,
LLC, an Idaho limitied liability company;
VERNON K. SMITH LAW, PC, an Idaho
professional service corporation,
Defendants-Appellants,
I, Thomas Larsen, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, of the State
of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing Record in the
above entitled cause was electronically compiled at my direction, and is a true, full and correct Record
of the pleadings and documents as requested by the parties.
I further certify that I have caused to be served the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript (if
requested), along with copies of

D All Exhibits offered or admitted;
~

No Exhibits submitted;

D Presentence Investigation;
D Other Confidential Documents;
D Confidential Exhibits (if applicable)
to each of the Attorneys of Record or Parties in this case as follow:
Vernon K. Smith
vklaw@live.com

Jack W. Relf
jackrelf@givenspursley.com
Alexander P. McLaughlin
apm@givenspursley.com
Dated:Signed: 8/14/2020 09:57 AM

PHIL McGRANE
Clerk of the District Court

By~~
Deputy Clerk

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL
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